Favorite Approaches and Paradigms in Philosophy

[wolly.green]

Your position right now seems to be that the division into disciplines is at most 'incredibly harmful', and at least counter productive.

No no. Divisions aren't harmful. Divisions happen naturally because "the theories which we construct to solve our problems have a tendency to grow into unified systems." (Karl Popper). The dangers start to emerge when we treat our preferred 'theoretical systems' as foundations. As systems of thought that explain EVERYTHING.

I believe this idea has emerged from the mistaken belief that there is such a thing as a fixed methodology or system of thought that can be used to solve all philosophical problems within a particular domain. Individuals that self identify with a particular paradigm think "if only everyone else could recognise that my methods are the most rigorous and reliable, they could see that their methods are hopeless and doomed to fail." But of course, every time we confront a fundamentally new kind of problem, we must invent new methodologies to solve it.

Again, however, there is typically some interplay between both approaches - some cyclical revolution-systematisation-revolution-sytematisation dynamic pretty much how Kuhn describes to be honest.

The truth is that one cannot function properly without the other - even Popper had to make use of the advanced knowledge of a specialist neuroscientist in The Self and Its Brain. Here we see how advanced, specialised knowledge is combined with a holistic approach.

I am not trying to draw a distinction between 'revolution' and 'systematization', or between 'exploration' and 'orthodoxy'. I'm criticizing the mistaken belief that paradigms or schools of thought are designed to explain the nature of all of philosophy. Or at least to explain the nature of a branch of philosophy. Therefore if one wants to study a branch of philosophy they must either choose a system, or invent their own.

However, as Popper explained, we are students of problems, not of diciplines. Its problems that determine which system or paradigm we use, not the other way around. If our problem requires a new system, fine. If it requires a mixture of something old and something new, great! But if you make a new discovery that requires you to synthesise and unify all of the old paradigms into a completely new theory, then we are all the better for it.

In essence, my point is not that defending a particular system of thought is bad. That's actually necessary for knowledge to grow. What I AM objecting to is to define our intellectual investigations as belonging to a particular set discipline. Our intellect belongs to the problems we solve, not the other way around.

 

[Deleted member 16771]

No no. Divisions aren't harmful. Divisions happen naturally because "the theories which we construct to solve our problems have a tendency to grow into unified systems." (Karl Popper). The dangers start to emerge when we treat our preferred 'theoretical systems' as foundations. As systems of thought that explain EVERYTHING.

I believe this idea has emerged from the mistaken belief that there is such a thing as a fixed methodology or system of thought that can be used to solve all philosophical problems within a particular domain. Individuals that self identify with a particular paradigm think "if only everyone else could recognise that my methods are the most rigorous and reliable, they could see that their methods are hopeless and doomed to fail." But of course, every time we confront a fundamentally new kind of problem, we must invent new methodologies to solve it.



I am not trying to draw a distinction between 'revolution' and 'systematization', or between 'exploration' and 'orthodoxy'. I'm criticizing the mistaken belief that paradigms or schools of thought are designed to explain the nature of all of philosophy. Or at least to explain the nature of a branch of philosophy. Therefore if one wants to study a branch of philosophy they must either choose a system, or invent their own.

However, as Popper explained, we are students of problems, not of diciplines. Its problems thar determine which system or paradigm we use, not the other way around. If our problem requires a new system, fine. If it requires a mixture of something old and something new, great! But if you make a new discovery that requires you to synthesise and unify all of the old paradigms into a completely new theory, they we are all the better for it.

In essence, my point is not that defending a particular system of thought is bad. That's actually necessary for knowledge to grow. What I AM objecting to is to define our intellectual investigations as belonging to a particular set discipline. Our intellectual belongs to the problems we solve, not the other way around.

Thanks for clarifying, wolly.

Personally, I don't actually see this happening too often really, but perhaps this is a function of my discipline, too.

Typically historians start with the problem (E.g. explain the origin of this movement or that) and are very fluid with the theories they may then apply to explain it. It happens the other way, too, however - testing a theory with an empirical examination.

You might be able to say that this is the 'idiographic mindset' - that the problem is unique and deserves its own system to explain it, rather than the 'nomothetic mindset' - that the problem is a result of preexisting natural laws and we ought to explain it in those terms.

It varies hugely, of course, but I don't personally feel much of the 'paradigmatic pressure' that the sciences must feel.

 

[John K]

Well-argued.

On that point, how do we all break down on the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis (that language structures thought)? It was kind of discredited up to a few years ago when people like Daniel Casasanto started bringing it back.

Personally I think there is a real effect there, but I'm not sure it can be generalised as much as the original hypothesis does - I think it depends to a large degree on the individual, E.g. Whether he/she is multilingual, &c.

Curiously, @Puzzlenuzzle and I were talking about this recently, and she firmly came down on the prelinguistic side - that concepts have an existence separate from their words, and crucially, this is how she subjectively experiences thought. She is multilingual.

I am pretty much monolingual apart from some Latin learned in adulthood, and I was much more open to the idea of linguistic determinism.

My instinct is that there is a whole idiographic dimension to this based upon individual cognition, &c.

What about you guys?

I doubt whether there is a definitive answer to these issues and suspect there are a whole set of messy influences that encourage, open up, bias and channel (etc) the ways we think. Surely language itself must be very significant - for example if I have no words to precisely express a number greater than 5 then I will have a very different world view from those with a richer number vocabularly. Similarly, the habitual language of (say) a medieval courtier / warrior will give them a very different interaction with the world compared with that of a 21st Century politician, I would have thought. But language is only part of the story here surely?

How we think as individuals must be type dependent, as well as biased from our language, culture, upbringing, etc - I can't imagine an Fi dom working the same way as a Ti dom for example. But you can see what I mean because here I am applying the very useful vocabulary of MBTI to this issue which automatically brings its whole underlying psychological model to the table even if that wasn't what I really intended. An example of philosophy seeping into the world view of ordinary people is the idea that the material world is all that there is. There is a vocabulary that goes with that view, or at least a devaluing of vocabulary that isn't consistent with it - this despite the fact that science no longer supports the idea of the existence of solid matter, fixed space or fixed time any more, and has even toyed with the idea that what's out there depends on consciousness observing it, in a sense.

Personally I associate vocabularised thinking with my tertiary Ti - it doesn't seem to feature large with Ni and Se, at least in the way I use them, and I use it only partially with Fe. When I take a photograph (Ni/Se) I use no language whatsoever, unless I drop the camera on my foot . It's the same when I'm driving to somewhere familiar - I manage the car and drive the route with very little language apart from at traffic control signs, though there is clearly a lot of sensing and thinking going on.

With a topic like this thread, there seems to be a symbiosis between thinking in language and intuition - again I'm talking about my own experience not anyone else's. I'd say the intuition is fundamental and non-verbal and the language is secondary but a vital way of feeding and accessing the intuition. Why do I say the intuition is fundamental - it's because it usually remains stable while the language hunts for the best way of expressing it and if the language is inadequate the intuition provides a reference point for correcting it. Also, often I'd prefer to express an idea as a picture rather than in words if I can find or produce one that fits. The picture I put into the "Post your mood in picture form" thread earlier today was a way of expressing a thought from one of my earlier wordy posts in this thread. So I'm probably pretty close to how you say @Puzzlenuzzle expressed the way she thinks, at least in part. But just because I experience thought this way doesn't mean there aren't people whose thought is entirely linguistically based.

 

[charlatan]

Greatly fun thread

Here's how I think I tend to be: I like the logical/technical flavored stuff for, as you call it, the certainty it offers, but I greatly enjoy the speculative, though I prefer personally when it's not brought overly far from the logical schools (but far from has to be about logic itself)

Probably not hard to notice, but I am usually kind of unwilling to take much of a position about things that involve strong commitment to metaphysical intuitions that aren't obvious to nearly everyone, and I'm often making arguments for positions I don't really see a reason to believe, and if anything am just expressing how some or the other argument hasn't ruled them out in what I call a pretty straightforward way. Basically, what I find very interesting is to make the definitions,adopt some speculative metaphysical premises and then see where they actually take you.

I probably like the interplay among logical, speculative, critical. I'm usually a bit wary of the extremely critical, mostly because it's not easy, without sacrificing caution, in my experience, to run down most problematic philosophical views to the dust.

 

[wolly.green]

Greatly fun thread

Here's how I think I tend to be: I like the logical/technical flavored stuff for, as you call it, the certainty it offers, but I greatly enjoy the speculative, though I prefer personally when it's not brought overly far from the logical schools (but far from has to be about logic itself)

Probably not hard to notice, but I am usually kind of unwilling to take much of a position about things that involve strong commitment to metaphysical intuitions that aren't obvious to nearly everyone, and I'm often making arguments for positions I don't really see a reason to believe, and if anything am just expressing how some or the other argument hasn't ruled them out in what I call a pretty straightforward way. Basically, what I find very interesting is to make the definitions,adopt some speculative metaphysical premises and then see where they actually take you.

I probably like the interplay among logical, speculative, critical. I'm usually a bit wary of the extremely critical, mostly because it's not easy, without sacrificing caution, in my experience, to run down most problematic philosophical views to the dust.

You know, one of the things I really like about Karl Popper is that he is not overtly abstract like Bertrand Russell or Wittgenstein. His writing is very concrete and simple.

 

[Ren]

There’s also the vocabulary that is so powerful and useful that it seeps into our unconscious and prejudices us without our realising it. ‘Substance’ is a good example and of course ‘introvert’ is another from the world of psychology. Just using these words in everyday language can commit us to a viewpoint that is immediately in conflict with any set of ideas that does not fit with the original sources of these words. Our resistance to those new ideas may be rational of course, but it may be that we haven’t the energy or wish to abandon or redefine vocabulary to which we have been habituated - this is not likely to be a conscious resistance but more visceral.

I could not agree with you more – but I'm sure you expected that!

The word substance is a great example. As you know, I reject it in OM, insofar as "metaphysical substance" is concerned anyway. It's not impossible, but nonetheless extremely difficult, to keep that word within one's philosophical nomenclature while giving it a new meaning. I initially tried to do that, and found over time that I kept unconsciously falling back into the old usage, befuddling myself in the process.

I prefer saying that there is no such thing as substance in OM. It seems to me now like a dated and conservative ontological concept, inimical in part to fresh metaphysical thinking. And of course, you are right to point out that there are plenty of other examples. (I agree about 'introvert'). To keep things philosophical, what about terms like subject, ego, consciousness, etc.?

There's a reason why Heidegger essentially divorced from these concepts in favor of Dasein, Ereignis, being-in-the-world, being-towards-death, thrownness, fallenness, resoluteness, disposedness, "the they", etc. Doing so enables him to articulate concepts, within existential phenomenology, that would have been impossible to communicate clearly if he had tried to stick to the old categories. People who say that he is very obscure or impenetrable probably just haven't made the effort to accept this new vocabulary to begin with, because that in itself is a very difficult thing to do.

That being said, there's a difference between a thinker who's difficult to understand without prior familiarity with the way they use words - like Heidegger, Kant, and company - and a thinker who's difficult to understand regardless of the effort produced to understand them. If a thinker belongs to the latter category, I am inclined to believe that they should be at least approached with caution.

 

[Ren]

Curiously, @Puzzlenuzzle and I were talking about this recently, and she firmly came down on the prelinguistic side - that concepts have an existence separate from their words, and crucially, this is how she subjectively experiences thought. She is multilingual.

What kind of existence would concepts have under that approach? (@Puzzlenuzzle you're welcome to chime in since this is your position! ^^) – I think that if we countenance the idea that concepts have separate existence, we should specify how we mean that. Would that entail metaphysical realism or are we staying at the level of the epistemological?

I personally consider myself a non-eliminative nominalist (@wolly.green: this answers your question in one of my youtube videos) with regards to metaphysics. I don't think concepts have real existence separate from their names. I can lay out my argument later but it would take some space. Also, I am obviously multilingual.

I agree that there is an idiographic dimension to language use and thinking. It's actually part of the reason why I tend towards nominalism. Personally, I don't commit to linguistic determinism, but I do think that words as signs in use have conatus. They tend to "stick" to their signifieds in a way that is not impossible to surmount but quite difficult. I guess that's quite different from the notion that language structures thought, though. In some sense, language clearly seems to be woven into thinking.

We would have to specify what we mean by "language structures thought" here to make progress, I think.

You know, one of the things I really like about Karl Popper is that he is not overtly abstract like Bertrand Russell or Wittgenstein. His writing is very concrete and simple.

I don't find Wittgenstein that difficult (anymore), though the Tractatus is in my opinion harder than the Investigations. I found the Investigations quite beautifully easy to understand, and so very profound.

 

[Puzzlenuzzle]

Thanks @Ren , I will Got a seminar to go to and after that I'm free. Love your thread and congratulations for reaching 3000 entries

 

[Deleted member 16771]

What kind of existence would concepts have under that approach? (@Puzzlenuzzle you're welcome to chime in since this is your position! ^^) – I think that if we countenance the idea that concepts have separate existence, we should specify how we mean that. Would that entail metaphysical realism or are we staying at the level of the epistemological?

I personally consider myself a non-eliminative nominalist (@wolly.green: this answers your question in one of my youtube videos) with regards to metaphysics. I don't think concepts have real existence separate from their names. I can lay out my argument later but it would take some space. Also, I am obviously multilingual.

I agree that there is an idiographic dimension to language use and thinking. It's actually part of the reason why I tend towards nominalism. Personally, I don't commit to linguistic determinism, but I do think that words as signs in use have conatus. They tend to "stick" to their signifieds in a way that is not impossible to surmount but quite difficult. I guess that's quite different from the notion that language structures thought, though. In some sense, language clearly seems to be woven into thinking.

We would have to specify what we mean by "language structures thought" here to make progress, I think.



I don't find Wittgenstein that difficult (anymore), though the Tractatus is in my opinion harder than the Investigations. I found the Investigations quite beautifully easy to understand, and so very profound.

As I say, personally I'm kind of undecided on this, but I have noted that most of my thinking about it falls into materialist conceptions of how we may think, or in other words, how does the brain construct 'concepts'.

So to me it is quite clear that objects in the physical world have an existence which is separate from nouns, and therefore it might be a simple analogy to say something like 'prelinguistic concepts are akin to images', but that's not quite right.

It is equally clear that, say, other mammals are capable of conceptualising of objects in their environment - to learn, for instance, how to categorise a new creature and to learn how it behaves, &c.

However to me it is quite important to know which part/s of the brain are doing this kind of conceptualisation (I mean the categorisation and generalisation of sense impressions into a 'concept').

So with my evolutionists hat on, I can easily conceive of a reality whereby there is a spectrum of conceptualisation performed by certain areas of the mammalian brain, and therefore the difference is rather one of degree/intensity than type. We could say that at the extreme end of the spectrum is language, while somewhere further down is a panda's 'concept' of a predatory lion, based on the panda's observation of the creature (I'm choosing species that wouldn't live in the same environment here).

That is to say that there is a certain 'concept forming' function of the brain - an 'abstraction centre' which is simply very highly developed in humans. The utility of language seems to be that many more such abstractions can be processed simultaneously.

In other words, this perspective implies both that 'concepts are prelinguistic' and 'concepts are necessarily linguistic' simultaneously, because we have placed language into a broader model of 'mental abstraction/conceptualisation' conceived as a spectrum of competency.

 

[Ren]

Individuals that self identify with a particular paradigm think "if only everyone else could recognise that my methods are the most rigorous and reliable, they could see that their methods are hopeless and doomed to fail."

I honestly don't think that's the case of all individuals who identify as tending towards a particular paradigm. What's true, though, is that theories have a tendency to overreach themselves into systems purporting to explain everything - at least I can testify to that temptation from my very own experience. I find that that's particularly tempting when writing on metaphysics, given that it zeroes in on "first principles".

With a topic like this thread, there seems to be a symbiosis between thinking in language and intuition - again I'm talking about my own experience not anyone else's. I'd say the intuition is fundamental and non-verbal and the language is secondary but a vital way of feeding and accessing the intuition. Why do I say the intuition is fundamental - it's because it usually remains stable while the language hunts for the best way of expressing it and if the language is inadequate the intuition provides a reference point for correcting it. Also, often I'd prefer to express an idea as a picture rather than in words if I can find or produce one that fits. The picture I put into the "Post your mood in picture form" thread earlier today was a way of expressing a thought from one of my earlier wordy posts in this thread. So I'm probably pretty close to how you say @Puzzlenuzzle expressed the way she thinks, at least in part. But just because I experience thought this way doesn't mean there aren't people whose thought is entirely linguistically based.

I sympathize with your articulation of intuition, and agree with it intuitively (woops, circularity spotted). I'm curious about how you would define intuition? It's likely a concept that I will be using in future work but I'm still uncertain about what definition to give it.

Basically, what I find very interesting is to make the definitions,adopt some speculative metaphysical premises and then see where they actually take you.

I think that in many ways this is the true philosophical mindset.

 

[John K]

I think that if we countenance the idea that concepts have separate existence, we should specify how we mean that. Would that entail metaphysical realism or are we staying at the level of the epistemological?

In other words, this perspective implies both that 'concepts are prelinguistic' and 'concepts are necessarily linguistic' simultaneously, because we have placed language into a broader model of 'mental abstraction/conceptualisation' conceived as a spectrum of competency.

I find it hard to give a well-informed view on this myself, because I don't have good knowledge of the philosophical foundations to the concepts - so my views are personal and empirical.

It seems to me that there is an arbitrariness about the "reality" of "universals" and maybe it's one of those issues that has to be addressed in the axioms rather than the conclusions. It may be useful to take an analogy from the world of computer programming. Using object oriented terminology, we could define an object class called "lion" which defines all the characteristics common to all lions that are addressed within the computer system concerned. Using the lion class, we can then create "Leo" which is a particular instance of a lion and which takes part in particular events (in program time and space) as the program executes - and we can create a whole specific pride of them, using the same lion class as the template. And we can do this over and over again within the bounds of the program's content and it's external interactions (eg with us as users). Now the "lion" object class is just another program construct, and so is "Leo", though of course they aren't the same sort of thing and one is characterised, at least in part, by the other. So - it would be quite in order for me to say that they are both real and exist, because there they are in the program code and there they are executing on a computer. I could just as easily say they don't really exist as seperate entities because after all they are just a jumble of computer code that means nothing without a computer and humans to interact with them. I am free to chose either viewpoint. What I do find difficult is to suggest that the one is real but the other isn't - in this analogy, that is the most difficult to justify. What is very obvious - even if "Leo" is a representation of a real live animal, the object Leo is most definitely not the real thing.

I think the way our minds work is very like this. We are confused by the abstraction into thinking lion-ishness is fundamentally different from a particular lion. But we cannot actually perceive a particular lion without having a lion-ish shaped receptacle in our minds to put it in and recognise it as such. The receptacle comes from something very like the programmers object class, and the lion receptacle is very like the program's Leo object. They are both mental constructs and their relationship to the real world is tenuous, mediated as it is by a complex path of sense data that would be incomprehensible to us if we perceived it directly. So again - it seems to me that we can say either both the lion-ishness and Leo are real, or neither is, but it doesn't make sense to me to say one is real and the other isn't. Of course we are free to decide that neither is real, but that there is a real "Leo" about to pounce on us and eat us - that is not the same thing at all and we have very little access to "Leo" in himself, though it would probably be wise to escape quickly if we wanted to carry on speculating on the reality of abstractions!

I don't think the rather more abstract concepts are going to be much different to this - for example, there is embedded in each of us an "object class" we call Courage. Without it, we couldn't recognise it when we came across it. We actually encounter courage as an instantiated behavioural attribute of a person or animal rather than an instantiated object of course, but that doesn't alter the thinking very much. Again, it seems to me that the reality of this is a matter of choice - but I'd still go for both or neither rather than one or the other. As to whether Courage exists in the world independently of human perception, I think I'd say that is unknowable. But quite honestly, I think this is only quantitatively different from whether anything as we perceive it exists in the world independently of our perception. Could what humans mean by a particular "stone" actually match the reality of that stone as not perceived by humans - I don't think so for myself.

I'm curious about how you would define intuition?

I'll come back later on this Ren - you posted while I was writing the above and it's enoughof my ramblings for the moment!!

 

[Ren]

I'll come back later on this Ren - you posted while I was writing the above and it's enoughof my ramblings for the moment!!

Haha, of course! Take your time, you just wrote a Ulysses there

 

[Wyote]

It seems to me that there is an arbitrariness about the "reality" of "universals"

Guess you'll have to live with that from now on, friend.

 

[Wyote]

jokes

It's ok guys, we also have a "president" right now in the US

 

[John K]

It's ok guys, we also have a "president" right now in the US

Spoiler: " "

]

 

[Wyote]

Spoiler: " "

]

 

[Ren]

It's ok guys, we also have a "president" right now in the US

But is what "president" refers to a universal or a particular?

 

[Puzzlenuzzle]

Alright, so, I'm not really sure how to explain myself now, partly because I'm itty bitty tipsy but anyway I hope I will make sense and actually touch the subject heh....

Perception is important. If I say x in my native language… I would come across as cute and funny. Whereas, saying x in another language might come across as cold or even cruel. There is such a vast difference between cultures even though the culture is technically similar. The difference still is shown in the language. Some languages don't give the same 'room' to express ourselves in the same way as we would in our native, our perception on words vary as well on sentences. That's especially for those that come from another linguistic family to their 2nd or 3rd.. or aren't closely linked, in my opinion.

At times I feel that there are different functions or, cultures behind languages even within a language itself.
..Let's not forget that we do use language to get our point across and within that means the social skill to understand or 'guess' other individuals perception on what you could say. It's like you subjectively or, objectively structure something to become subjective - to meet audience.
Words are in a sense irrelevant of the concept. Or well, not really irrelevant but, a word is just a word before being teamed up in another word, that gives it meaning but depending on what words you team together even though saying the same thing in language y and z will have a completely different message. Even if the words mean the same in a dictionary.

My problem is if I get irritated then I have this instinct to automatically go to my native language and using that cognition for expressing myself in my 2nd or 3rd. That will affect the context of what I'm saying. Needless to say, if it happens and I'm speaking English, I genuinely sound like a pitbull lol so, I prefer to shut up. The reason for that is, I at times will automatically go into the cognitive of my native language. That form, in English, makes me sound extra aggressive… even though, I might not be, I actually might be smiling! I'm just setting boundaries, or being upset lol. So, when speaking, I often catch myself becoming aware of what message I'm carrying, especially when setting boundaries because, honestly, I suck at it.
Furthermore, in my native language e.g. we don't have the word 'please' or well, we don't use it - we construct sentences depending on what context we are trying to express. Right now, I can count six different ways to construct the 'same context', and a level of politeness etc but it still will carry a different message!
I have never in my entire life said as many times please and thank you's in my life. I genuinely feel like a retard compared to how I would express myself in my native. Don't get me wrong, I am polite in my native but if I would directly translate one might think I'm a vapid bish. Nevertheless, we use body language.Knowing when and how to use body language isn't the same from culture to culture. Same goes with language and how we utilise words.

Also, in my native language, when speaking, the point lands at the end of the sentence whereas in English it's usually in the beginning. At least, it's constructed much earlier than in my native. Another example.. is that in my native language we actually use the word 'asshole' as an endorsement. It means super cute lol. However, if I would start calling people 'assholes' I don't think I would get the same response oh, and I sound more informal in English than in my native hehe. Anyway, with the few examples I've given then imagine the feeling one might have associated with a word, or sentence etc.That word in another language doesn't necessarily have the same feeling associated to it. In my experience, you never really know a language until you think or dream in it. It's that aha moment when you know you have acquired the feeling for it to a certain degree.

So, given the above examples, I think concepts are only independent of their words to a degree. The feeling for a word, or a sentence varies and therefore affects context due to language, or cultural stimuli.

 

[John K]

I sympathize with your articulation of intuition, and agree with it intuitively (woops, circularity spotted). I'm curious about how you would define intuition? It's likely a concept that I will be using in future work but I'm still uncertain about what definition to give it.

I've got two quotes here about intuition that seem to me give a lot of insight (oh dear, that sounds awfully recursive ).

Spoiler: From Jung: Psychological Types

35. Intuition (from intueri = to look into or upon) is, according to my view, a basic psychological function (v. Function). It is that psychological function which transmits perceptions in an unconscious way. Everything, whether outer or inner objects or their associations, can be the object of this perception. Intuition has this peculiar quality: it is neither sensation, nor feeling, nor intellectual conclusion, although it may appear in any of these forms. Through intuition any one content is presented as a complete whole, without our being able to explain or discover in what way this content has been arrived at. Intuition is a kind of instinctive apprehension, irrespective of the nature of its contents. Like sensation (q.v.) it is an irrational [q.v.) perceptive function. Its contents, like those of sensation, have the character of being given, in contrast to the ‘derived* or ‘deduced* character of feeling and thinking contents. Intuitive cognition, therefore, possesses an intrinsic character of certainty and conviction which enabled Spinoza to uphold the ‘ scientia intuitiva’ as the highest form of cognition. Intuition has this quality in common with sensation, whose physical foundation is the ground and origin of its certitude. In the same way, the certainty of intuition depends upon a definite psychic matter of fact, of whose origin and state of readiness, however, the subject was quite unconscious.

Intuition appears either in a subjective or an objective form: the former is a perception of unconscious psychic facts whose origin is essentially subjective; the latter is a perception of facts which depend upon subliminal perceptions of the object and upon the thoughts and feelings occasioned thereby. Concrete and abstract forms of intuition may be distinguished according to the degree of participation on the part of sensation. Concrete intuition carries perceptions which are concerned with the actuality of things, while abstract intuition transmits the perceptions of ideational associations. Concrete intuition is a reactive process, since it follows directly from the given circumstances; whereas abstract intuition, like abstract sensation, necessitates a certain element of direction, an act of will or a purpose.

In common with sensation, intuition is a characteristic of infantile and primitive psychology. As against the strength and sudden appearance of sense-impression it transmits the perception of mythological images, the precursors of ideas (q.v.). Intuition maintains a compensatory function to sensation, and, like sensation, it is the maternal soil from which thinking and feeling are developed in the form of rational functions. Intuition is an irrational function, not withstanding the fact that many intuitions may subsequently be split up into their component elements, whereby their origin and appearance can also be made to harmonize with the laws of reason.

Everyone whose general attitude is orientated by the principle of intuition, i.e. perception by way of the unconscious, belongs to the intuitive type1 (q.v.). According to the manner in which intuition is employed, whether directed within in the service of cognition and inner perception or without in the service of action and accomplishment, the introverted and extraverted intuitive types can be differentiated. In abnormal cases a well-marked coalescence with, and an equally great determination by, the contents of the collective unconscious declares itself: this may give the intuitive type an extremely irrational an unintelligible appearance.​

Spoiler: From: Katherine Myers - Introduction to Type Dynamics and Development

To Explore Introverted Intuition

1. Try looking at "reality" at though you were looking through a kaleidoscope. Turn things upside down; look from different directions. What if everything you see were the opposite of what you first think it is?
What if the grass were blue and the sky green?
2. Select an inner image, a picture that recurs frequently in your mind, or an analogy that you find yourself using a lot. While you are alone, have a dialogue with this image. Visualize it and then say, "Tell me about yourself." Listen to what it says. Notice the pictures or stories in your mind, then ask more questions to clarify.
3. Take a meditation class (or read a how-to book) and set aside regular time for meditating—do not let it become a structured planning time!
4. Select a normal everyday object or event—a fall leaf or a summer thunderstorm—and write about it without giving any physical description or details. What mood does it create in you? What larger implications does it have? Think about the cycles of life and death or global patterns.
5. Choose something about which you have relatively little specific information and form hypotheses connecting it to larger events. For example, a flower in your garden has wilted for no reason that you can see. Speculate about the possible causes; ask what implications they have for the future of your garden. What solutions can you conjure up?
​

This links to my own best description of Ni from a subjective view. I think it’s the frame / world-view hopping perception I describe that adds extra to the above other than an idea of what intuition feels like to me in practise.

For me Ni is a perception and seeing is a good metaphor for it. It isn't expressed in words - I have to turn to one of the other functions to do that.

In analogy, it's as if I have an image of a landscape in my mind - it's all there but I'm more consciously aware of some parts of it than others. It's whole and self-consistent and has a deep sense of meaning and rightness. I can look around it just like you can focus visually on different parts of a real landscape that is partly in sunlight, partly in shadow. I can't describe it to anyone else very easily. I know what I mean, but not in words - to put it into words is like translating a novel into a foreign language and it's frustrating because it's hard to make it sound quite right. I'm using Ni now to see itself and it's quite hard because I'm filtering it through Ti (I think) to write this. Another way of looking at it - imagine you are standing on top of a (real) hill, overlooking a (real) wide landscape full of features, and being asked to describe it in detail to someone who can't see it.

Of course (going back to the analogy) usually I'll just bring out a relevant bit of it for you, like the rock in the middle of the GIF - but I can see the whole thing and hear the waves and feel the wind on my face and smell the salt sea, and see the light flashing in the lighthouse, and you can't so you often don't get it, which is frustrating. If you are unlucky, I'll then set off on a long, ill-prepared Ti ramble around the whole vision that'll lose you quickly. I find it so refreshing when I can talk to people who think in the same way as me and who can pick up the picture from a few hints and details. A strange thing though - I learn so much more about this inner vision when I do have to put it into effective words. The vision feeds on this and I develop and see more of the landscape's features and inner consistency that way.

It's non-judgemental. Sticking with the analogy - If you tell me that isn't a lighthouse in the GIF but a spaceship and we are looking at a view on an alien planet, I might jibe a bit at first and go a bit passive aggressive with you. In my view I'm on earth looking at an ordinary seascape that is quite self-consistent and I'm pretty invested in it. On the other hand, if I'm curious, or I don't want to upset you, and you have a consistent and interesting alternative viewpoint, then I may happily create a completely new vision in my head around that theme. If I do that then I won't bin the old one, I'll keep them both and swap between them as it suits me. It doesn't really bother me that there are two incompatible world views there - I'll have a preferred one, but that's all it is and I can live with either or both. I can have quite a few of these alternative world views in my head and I love context-shifting between them.

@JennyDaniella is so right about the beauty that Ni can bring - it can be as though you yourself are actually part of a sunset, not just a spectator. This sort of feeling sometimes just creeps up, but sometimes it can take me by surprise, and when it does it's as if it was happening again for the first time - the feeling can be stunning!

Are these the sort of thing you’re looking for? I’m afraid I don’t have a succinct definition, but maybe could have a go at one.

 

[Ren]

Alright, so, I'm not really sure how to explain myself now, partly because I'm itty bitty tipsy but anyway I hope I will make sense and actually touch the subject heh....

Perception is important. If I say x in my native language… I would come across as cute and funny. Whereas, saying x in another language might come across as cold or even cruel. There is such a vast difference between cultures even though the culture is technically similar. The difference still is shown in the language. Some languages don't give the same 'room' to express ourselves in the same way as we would in our native, our perception on words vary as well on sentences. That's especially for those that come from another linguistic family to their 2nd or 3rd.. or aren't closely linked, in my opinion.

At times I feel that there are different functions or, cultures behind languages even within a language itself.
..Let's not forget that we do use language to get our point across and within that means the social skill to understand or 'guess' other individuals perception on what you could say. It's like you subjectively or, objectively structure something to become subjective - to meet audience.
Words are in a sense irrelevant of the concept. Or well, not really irrelevant but, a word is just a word before being teamed up in another word, that gives it meaning but depending on what words you team together even though saying the same thing in language y and z will have a completely different message. Even if the words mean the same in a dictionary.

My problem is if I get irritated then I have this instinct to automatically go to my native language and using that cognition for expressing myself in my 2nd or 3rd. That will affect the context of what I'm saying. Needless to say, if it happens and I'm speaking English, I genuinely sound like a pitbull lol so, I prefer to shut up. The reason for that is, I at times will automatically go into the cognitive of my native language. That form, in English, makes me sound extra aggressive… even though, I might not be, I actually might be smiling! I'm just setting boundaries, or being upset lol. So, when speaking, I often catch myself becoming aware of what message I'm carrying, especially when setting boundaries because, honestly, I suck at it.
Furthermore, in my native language e.g. we don't have the word 'please' or well, we don't use it - we construct sentences depending on what context we are trying to express. Right now, I can count six different ways to construct the 'same context', and a level of politeness etc but it still will carry a different message!
I have never in my entire life said as many times please and thank you's in my life. I genuinely feel like a retard compared to how I would express myself in my native. Don't get me wrong, I am polite in my native but if I would directly translate one might think I'm a vapid bish. Nevertheless, we use body language.Knowing when and how to use body language isn't the same from culture to culture. Same goes with language and how we utilise words.

Also, in my native language, when speaking, the point lands at the end of the sentence whereas in English it's usually in the beginning. At least, it's constructed much earlier than in my native. Another example.. is that in my native language we actually use the word 'asshole' as an endorsement. It means super cute lol. However, if I would start calling people 'assholes' I don't think I would get the same response oh, and I sound more informal in English than in my native hehe. Anyway, with the few examples I've given then imagine the feeling one might have associated with a word, or sentence etc.That word in another language doesn't necessarily have the same feeling associated to it. In my experience, you never really know a language until you think or dream in it. It's that aha moment when you know you have acquired the feeling for it to a certain degree.

So, given the above examples, I think concepts are only independent of their words to a degree. The feeling for a word, or a sentence varies and therefore affects context due to language, or cultural stimuli.

Thanks for this, puzznuzz, it was super interesting to get this privileged insight into your multilingual psyche! It's crazy to think that in your native tongue, you use the word 'asshole' as an endorsement, haha. But in fact, we have similar things in the French language.

Even the French word for ‘happiness’, bonheur, has a very slightly different meaning than it does in English. The connotation of candor/naivety in the concept of happiness is slightly more pronounced in the French word. To get a grasp of this subtle difference requires very deep familiarity with both languages, with the addition of a certain acuity, I think, which is not very common. And in addition, for most people it would be very difficult to explain what that difference is. A fully bilingual person would likely say: "Well, it's obvious when you hear the word bonheur, isn't it? It's not quite the same as happiness."

At first sight, this seems to strengthen the view that concepts have real existence separate from the names that refer to them. We might say: both happiness and bonheur ultimately denote the same concept, say X, with their contextual peculiarities added. However, I don’t think this suggests that there is a floating concept with separate reality existing in us somehow, waiting to be “woken up” and named as happiness, bonheur, or whatever else. I think the concept comes to fruition in its being named. In my view, the naming of the concept formalizes the synthesis of experiences with features in common, like an abstract family.

So it’s not that there is a such a thing as a concept “prior to” its being named, but rather than the naming of it signals that a former cloud of experiences which our intuition had brought together as sharing family-like features has been formally made sense of – as a concept. This obviously differs very much from @John K's position, which I think is more Kantian/Platonic in spirit, according to which the pure form of concepts must somehow exist in us as a cognitive precondition of concepts being made sense of linguistically.

That’s the gist of how I currently see things on that front, anyway. This view seems to avoid the thorny issue of determining what a “separate, prelinguistic concept” is, which sounds (to me) suspiciously obscure and impervious to scrutiny. For me, there is no concept separate from language, though there is concept-in-the-making separate from it. The linguistic sign formalizes the concept.