Enduring Problems in Philosophy

[Pin]

Physicalist. My sense is that materialism is a somewhat outdated and vaguer term, because 'matter' underdetermines the realm of the physical.

But do you think that things that happen mentally are reducible to physical processes? Here's a simple argument to offer an objection. Let's say you miss someone: this is an emotion, which we would describe as a mental state. Now, if you say that the mental state is reducible to a physical process, you are saying effectively that your state of missing that person is identical to neuron firings in your brain.

But it is not identical, because in the emotion you are missing someone. The mental state is directed outward, and toward a specific object (the person you miss). Philosophers call this the intentionality of mental states: they have an intrinsic 'aboutness', something which they are directed to. (Notice it is the same with consciousness: we are not just conscious, but conscious of...). On the other hand, it makes no sense that a series of neuron firings in the brain is 'about' anything. Physical processes are devoid of intentionality. Therefore they cannot be the same.

How would you respond to this objection?

I would still hold the position. I think that the intentionality of mental states is a posthoc rationalization to make sense of what our physiology compels us to do. For example, Dante's love of Beatrice in the divine comedy was described in no short words. However, without the functioning of his brain as it does in response to the stimulus she is, he wouldn't love her in the first place. If that particular feeling were to be synthesized in the form of a pill or substance, it would then be demonstrated that the same excess of passion that Dante has for Beatrice is possible to be felt towards an acorn or a piece of plastic.

Still, while romantic love can be synthesized towards an object, I don't think it morally should be. I think that contradicts our purpose as human beings.

We shouldn't love objects.

 

[Ren]

@Ren



That's true, but that's extremely, extremely far from the point I was making/regardless of where it's arising, this misunderstanding is too major to not clarify quite significantly.

I think one big source of the problem is we have to distinguish the experience itself from the mental state (the way YOU are using "state" -- I'm not sure I made such a distinction, but you definitely seem to be). Many philosophical views are significantly externalist about the content of a mental state.
These would say that the aboutness of the mental state is significantly determined by factors outside of the experiential components. In other words, it'll involve the very complex causal web the mental experience is part of, not just the experience itself.

All that's being claimed is that it's not obvious the metaphysical nature of the experience itself is playing a big role in determining the aboutness. In your post, you are underscoring that the aboutness may be determined by something more complex than a single causal relation.
Nobody disputes that among physicalists....most/all would say often there's at least a huge causal web the mental state fits into that is needed to understand the content of the state.

The example of visual stimulus is as good as any to illustrate the point, in that sure, in that case it was a single causal relation determining the aboutness, but the point is even if it's a complex web of causal relations that the experience is part of, that doesn't change the fact that it is this web/the experience being involved in a giant mosaic, NOT a very specific point about the metaphysical nature of the experience itself, that may determine the aboutness.

You mention the issue of whether a mental "state" has about-ness -- that's not the question quite. The way you're using state, you're likely distinguishing it from the experiential component alone. We both might even agree that the experience of tasting ice cream doesn't itself come with an aboutness. What triggered that experience would have to play a role -- whether it was a machine stimulating the brain or whether it was an actual spoon of ice cream being placed in the mouth.

The burden is really to decide if the metaphysical nature of the purely experiential component (the qualia part) is essential to conferring intentionality.

My point was that one could be an anti-physicalist about mind quite easily who thinks the latter. I'm not saying if I agree with those anti-physicalists, but I think this issue is controversial/one of the less clear.

Basically, you read the example of visual experience to somehow be supporting the claim that "aboutness" can be reduced to some really simple causal relation between a stimulus and the experience, then going on to say something to the effect, I think, that a leaf falling could somehow trigger a state that has to do with something way more complicated...thus the aboutness is way beyond the cause-effect relation between leaf and experience.

That was incredibly misunderstanding the point (of course, I apologize if I contributed to the misunderstanding, but the discussion will be pointless if I don't nip this).

Of course I agree with that. The point of the visual experience is if anything that even in the simplest case, the aboutness may be determined by stuff outside the experiential component itself, and not depend on the precise metaphysics of qualia you commit to, and indeed, many anti-physicalist accounts of qualia won't help significantly change the account of intentionality one gives in this regard. Giving an account of how anti-physicalist accounts of qualia actually help even in the simplest case seems challenging.

One can further expand this point! Even if we say we need more than a complex causal mosaic/"functionalist" in flavor accounts to account for the aboutness -- say we care about being able to think about abstract objects or something -- again the point arises that many anti-physicalist accounts of mind that are responses to the problem of qualia don't obviously help with that aspect of intentionality.

I'm certainly not saying you can't try to make a highly nuanced point about how traditional physicalism doesn't work to account for intentionality, but the specific objection you raised would be easily dismissed, as at minimum bare-bones physicalists do agree that complex causal webs, not single casual relations to the direct stimulus, are obviously often necessary to give a proper account.

Apologies for misunderstanding your point. I get it now.

I'll respond to you later today, focusing on this specifically:

The burden is really to decide if the metaphysical nature of the purely experiential component (the qualia part) is essential to conferring intentionality.

 

[Ren]

I would still hold the position. I think that the intentionality of mental states is a posthoc rationalization to make sense of what our physiology compels us to do. For example, Dante's love of Beatrice in the divine comedy was described in no short words. However, without the functioning of his brain as it does in response to the stimulus she is, he wouldn't love her in the first place. If that particular feeling were to be synthesized in the form of a pill or substance, it would then be demonstrated that the same excess of passion that Dante has for Beatrice is possible to be felt towards an acorn or a piece of plastic.

I don't think this answers the objection I raised. Remember I did not claim that everything was mental. I only claimed that not everything was physical.

Of course there are physiological processes involved in feeling emotions. You illustrated that well with Dante's example. My point can be broken down into different parts:

1) If everything is ultimately physical, then there are no mental states as such
2) In everyday life, we refer to mental states all the time
3) Therefore what we refer to as 'mental states' are really physical states
4) Therefore what we refer to as 'mental states' are identical to physical states.

This contextualises my original point, which suggested that mental states can be shown not to be identical to physical states. I illustrated by saying that mental states have intentionality while physical states don't.

You can't just object that intentionality is a posthoc rationalisation of physical states, because this would be already presupposing that your theory is correct. It's also not clear at all to me that you could synthesize Dante's love for Beatrice in the form of a pill or substance; precisely because that love is Dante's towards Beatrice. It has intentionality. If you say that it could be consumed by someone else to develop a strong passion for a piece of plastic, you are once again presupposing that the intentionality is somehow magically transferred. But you are not giving an account of it in physical terms. Thus the mental is not eliminated or explained away in your account.

In short, your physicalist position is, right now, more the expression of faith in an a priori postulate. That's fine if it works for you, but it doesn't convince me to commit to your position.

 

[charlatan]

The burden is really to decide if the metaphysical nature of the purely experiential component (the qualia part) is essential to conferring intentionality.

@Ren no worries, it's always tough to trace where these misunderstandings happen, just now I'm sure we won't talk past each other.

The fact is I'm genuinely undecided on that particular issue, and so most of what I write above is why I'm conservative in resting my anti-traditional-physicalism sentiments on the issue.

But you know what's interesting? I feel like that this question may actually help me settle what particular brand of nontraditional monism I support. I think some anti-physicalist monisms don't add much to our discussion of intentionality -- that was probably my point earlier. It's thus interesting to imagine what would have to happen for one to add substantially.

 

[Ren]

The fact is I'm genuinely undecided on that particular issue, and so most of what I write above is why I'm conservative in resting my anti-traditional-physicalism sentiments on the issue.

Same here. I think that at times, the way I write is more incisive than the disposition behind the words. I've no idea where I stand, myself. It seems that only find an anchor in trying to highlight the weaknesses of each approach.

I've been wondering if my Head Type was 6 rather than 5

But you know what's interesting? I feel like that this question may actually help me settle what particular brand of nontraditional monism I support. I think some anti-physicalist monisms don't add much to our discussion of intentionality -- that was probably my point earlier. It's thus interesting to imagine what would have to happen for one to add substantially.

Yes, I understood the point about anti-physicalist monism being potentially not helpful (or at least neither more nor less helpful) in addressing the question of intentionality. I'll try to discuss that point also.

 

[charlatan]

Yes, I understood the point about anti-physicalist monism being potentially not helpful (or at least neither more nor less helpful) in addressing the question of intentionality. I'll try to discuss that point also.

Yeah, that's the gist; I'll just make sure one point is absolutely clear, though: I think some varieties of anti-physicalist monisms seem to not help, or not at all obviously help.
I think some could, however!

Indeed, this is why I think that currently, it's when I have to choose among the different monisms that I'm going to most turn to the problem of intentionality. Less so when I just have to figure out that I reject physicalism (at least in its traditional form, of course I'm open to the weirder forms that seem much more like they can accommodate the subtle metaphysics needed to bring mind in)

 

[Ren]

@Pin — I think this is the perfect thread to discuss further the problem of the metaphysics of the Christian Trinity.

In philosophical terms, I think the problem is the following.

The law of identity is very straightforward. If x = y, then what is true of x is true of y necessarily. Conversely, what is false of x is false of y necessarily.

But that just means that any true statement about x must be a true statement about y (and conversely for false statements). If x is 'Pin' and y is 'My ENTJ friend', and x = y, then:

If the statement: "Pin is the wonderfully smart and politically savvy creator of the Libtards server" is true, then the statement: "My ENTJ friend is the wonderfully smart...." must be true also. And that seems to work.

----------

Now let's assume that the doctrine of the Trinity states that x(God the Father) = y(God the Son) = z(Holy Spirit).

"God the Son is both fully human and fully divine". This statement is true of y. But it seems to be false of x, and false of z. Therefore y ≠ x, and y ≠ z. You can apply the same reasoning to deduce that x ≠ z.

It follows that the Trinity violates the law of identity.

The only way out, as I see it, is to insist that God is ineffable, and transcends the laws of logic. This would be satisfying to a theologian, maybe. But not to a philosopher.

What do you make of the above? (PS. A possible solution is in the distinction between intensionality and extensionality, but I'll come back to that later if need be).

 

[o2b]

The Trinity. Wow!

(Oh man, this got long. I hope that is OK!)

The Greek theos is the one word that can refer to God as God. There is no other.

I have an excel spreadsheet with every verse that contains this word.

Some men say that they will not believe anything till every objection is removed, and every point cleared up. But I believe wherever I see the weight of evidence. Just give me the weight of evidence and I am there. Judges, justices, and courts, have to decide questions upon the weight of evidence, and why not we? I dare not wait until every objection is answered, and every difficulty taken out of the way. It is a fearful thing to stand back mulishly until every possible chance to doubt is removed. Show me the weight of evidence, from the Bible, from experience, from the influence of the spirit of God, and I think I am always safest on that side. When I take a position like that, as it usually involves some self denial and cross-bearing, I believe I meet the approbation of my Lord. I may expect to meet the blessing of God, sufficient to see all things clearly.

Now, sometimes theos does not refer to God. For example, there is a verse that says their god is their belly, another that says Satan is the god of this world, clearly not references to the one true God.

1151 times, theos refers to the Father only. 5 times it refers to Christ. A whopping ZERO TIMES theos refers to the Holy Spirit.

Right there, the matter is closed. 1151-5.

Of the five, three clearly do not say Christ is theos and this leaves John 1:1 and Hebrews 1:8. Speaking of Hebrews 1:8:

Paul is quoting from Psalm 45:6 in the Septuagint. The translation of this verse from The Jewish Publication Society of the Old Testament reads:

Thy throne given of God is for ever and ever; a sceptre of equity is the sceptre of thy kingdom.

That verse cannot be insisted to be calling Christ God.

Which leaves John 1:1.

John 1:1-2
1 In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God [ho theos], and the Word was God [theos]. 2 He was in the beginning with God [ho theos].

There is no writer in the Bible who identified Christ as the only begotten [monogenes] Son of God than John. That being said, notice the lack of the definite article as theos refers to Christ. This is vital. In the Greek, the lack of the definite article generally means not that thing, but qualitatively like that thing.

So, if I saw some kid in a store and he is really rough and even knocking things down, I might say That kid is like a bull in a china shop! (to quote a well-known idiom). If I said this in the Greek, I need to not use the definite article ho before the word bull else I am saying the kid is literally a bull.

John's lack of the definite article is not by accident. Grammatically, he doesn't even need to be saying that Jesus is of the same class as His Father. But, he is.

The mono in monogenes means only. The genes refers to lineage and like begets like. John is saying Christ is the only being of the lineage of His Father.

John 5:18
18 Therefore the Jews sought all the more to kill Him, because He not only broke the Sabbath, but also said that God was His Father, making Himself equal with God.

John 17:3
“And this is eternal life, that they may know You, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom You have sent.”

1 Corinthians 8:6-7a
yet for us there is only one God, the Father, of whom are all things, and we for Him; and one Lord Jesus Christ, through whom are all things and through whom we live. 7 However, there is not in everyone that knowledge;

So now it's 1151-0.

The Father alone is God and Christ is His divine Son, though He laid that aside at the incarnation. He who is of the lineage of God condescended to be of the lineage of man.

How is monotheism retained? Hypothetically, what if God had a zillion children? Of all these divine beings, only one has a certain uniqueness. Only one's existence is not according to the prerogative of another. Only one is The Source of All Things.

This qualification is part of what the Bible means when it says there is only one God, the Father.

Back to the Trinity. It's really a mute point since the Bible is so clear. But, anyway...

The Trinity says there are three independent conscious existences operating simultaneously through time. That is a logical fallacy. I don't care if we're talking gophers, dogs, people, angels, and even God, personhood and being are synonymous terms.

There is one God, the Father and He begat one Son, the Christ. The Holy Spirit is the divine influence and intellectual and feeling being of the Father and His Son.

The Scriptures declare that Christ is "the only begotten son of God." He is begotten, not created. As to when He was begotten, it is not for us to inquire, nor could our minds grasp it if we were told. The prophet Micah tells us all that we can know about it in these words, "But thou, Bethlehem Ephratah, though thou be little among the thousands of Judah, yet out of thee shall He come forth unto Me that is to be ruler in Israel; whose goings forth have been from of old, from the days of eternity." Micah 5:2, margin. There was a time when Christ proceeded forth and came from God, from the bosom of the Father (John 8:42; 1:18), but that time was so far back in the days of eternity that to finite comprehension it is practically without beginning.

But the point is that Christ is a begotten Son and not a created subject. He has by inheritance a more excellent name than the angels; He is "a Son over His own house." Heb. 1:4; 3:6. And since He is the only-begotten son of God, He is of the very substance and nature of God and possesses by birth all the attributes of God, for the Father was pleased that His Son should be the express image of His Person, the brightness of His glory, and filled with all the fullness of the godhead. So He has "life in Himself." He possesses immortality in His own right and can confer immortality upon others. Life inheres in Him, so that it cannot be taken from Him, but having voluntarily laid it down, He can take it again. His words are these: "Therefore doth my Father love me, because I lay down my life, that I might take it again. No man taketh it from me, but I lay it down of myself. I have power to lay it down, and I have power to take it again. This commandment have I received of my Father." John 10:17, 18.

(I just finished a book on this subject.)

Waggoner, E.J., Christ and His Righteousness, New York, New York, Pacific Press Publishing Co., 1890. pp. 21-22.

White, James, The Throne of Grace (sermon), March 5, 1870,

 

[o2b]

Heck, it had the entire post in italices. Now, I lost most of them. Maybe later, I'll edit it some more.

 

[Ren]

The Trinity says there are three independent conscious existences operating simultaneously through time. That is a logical fallacy. I don't care if we're talking gophers, dogs, people, angels, and even God, personhood and being are synonymous terms.

One essence, three persons. It's certainly difficult to make logical sense of this. But the tradition consistently emphasises the 'mystery' of the Trinity, implying that it defies logic. The question is whether it is acceptable to say that God transcends the laws of logic.

Note that in regard to Jesus Christ as Son of God, christology itself is based on a mystery. Christ is supposed to be one being, fully man and fully God. One person, two natures. Prima facie, this doesn't make logical sense either. He is not alternately one or the other, but both at the same time, and as one person.

I have Augustine's On the Trinity on my reading list, hopefully it will address these questions in detail.

I've been exploring Christian theology a bit lately so by all means, expand on it as much as you want.

 

[mintoots]

I know the Church literally set it as this but I now don't see why the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit had to be separated and differentiated entities. I've come closer to a personal interpretation of the Trinity = Universe. However my view is based mostly on personalized and instinctive opinion, formed out of poor logical deduction so I'm not quiet confident about its philosophical argument. If you would humor me though, it's mostly based on recognizing the danger in accepting simplified biblical statements. There's always the possibility of the writings being flawed whether in the way it is verbalized or the way it is interpreted. This leaves the Bible with a lot of open endings for me.

 

[John K]

One essence, three persons. It's certainly difficult to make logical sense of this. But the tradition consistently emphasises the 'mystery' of the Trinity, implying that it defies logic. The question is whether it is acceptable to say that God transcends the laws of logic.

Note that in regard to Jesus Christ as Son of God, christology itself is based on a mystery. Christ is supposed to be one being, fully man and fully God. One person, two natures. Prima facie, this doesn't make logical sense either. He is not alternately one or the other, but both at the same time, and as one person.

I have Augustine's On the Trinity on my reading list, hopefully it will address these questions in detail.

I've been exploring Christian theology a bit lately so by all means, expand on it as much as you want.

I think the doctrine of the Trinity is a very Greek attempt to understand intellectually and philosophically something that isn't expressible in rational conceptualisation. If a lump of rock could conceptualise, would it think of human beings as a sort of lump of rock? Would it have some valid grasp of the truth? It would only be a very limited and partial one at best, but actually it sounds ridiculous to even consider it, yet human beings are probably more distant than this from the true nature of God the Father - which is why Christ is so significant.

I wonder if it helps to investigate what is meant by a person? Our only experience of persons are of the human variety, and there is little trouble thinking of Christ the man as a person. What about the other two though? Can a bodiless spirit be thought of as a person in the same way as an embodied individual? If so, what qualities do they possess that allows us to consider them so? Could we conceive of a disembodied human person? Perhaps so, but it isn't easy though fantasy literature has plenty of attempts. God the Father in particular is infinitely challenging because in one sense he is a spirit and has no body, but in another sense everything, including you and me, is his body (?his? - it's perjorative isn't it).

There is a major problem with time too, because persons we are familiar with live in linear time - even Jesus did when he was present on earth. God doesn't though and is eternally present at all times and places for everyone and everything that exists - this is a very weird sort of person lol.

It's an intriguing idea that there is structure within God - full marks to the early Christians for coming up with such an idea. There seems to be no logical reason why someone of infinite power could not express themselves as more than one focus of individuality. Maybe if there are alien civilisations, there are Jesus equivalents for each of them - or more likely they are all Jesus in a myriad of manifestations. Jesus is that aspect of God that relates to sentient beings, but that is only a small part of God, most of which is related to things beyond our horizons.

Another thought - the way the three persons of the Trinity are expressed sounds tantalisingly like saying one God, three Personas. That is quite a different angle on it.

 

[Ren]

I think the doctrine of the Trinity is a very Greek attempt to understand intellectually and philosophically something that isn't expressible in rational conceptualisation. If a lump of rock could conceptualise, would it think of human beings as a sort of lump of rock? Would it have some valid grasp of the truth? It would only be a very limited and partial one at best, but actually it sounds ridiculous to even consider it, yet human beings are probably more distant than this from the true nature of God the Father - which is why Christ is so significant.

I wonder if it helps to investigate what is meant by a person? Our only experience of persons are of the human variety, and there is little trouble thinking of Christ the man as a person. What about the other two though? Can a bodiless spirit be thought of as a person in the same way as an embodied individual? If so, what qualities do they possess that allows us to consider them so? Could we conceive of a disembodied human person? Perhaps so, but it isn't easy though fantasy literature has plenty of attempts. God the Father in particular is infinitely challenging because in one sense he is a spirit and has no body, but in another sense everything, including you and me, is his body (?his? - it's perjorative isn't it).

There is a major problem with time too, because persons we are familiar with live in linear time - even Jesus did when he was present on earth. God doesn't though and is eternally present at all times and places for everyone and everything that exists - this is a very weird sort of person lol.

It's an intriguing idea that there is structure within God - full marks to the early Christians for coming up with such an idea. There seems to be no logical reason why someone of infinite power could not express themselves as more than one focus of individuality. Maybe if there are alien civilisations, there are Jesus equivalents for each of them - or more likely they are all Jesus in a myriad of manifestations. Jesus is that aspect of God that relates to sentient beings, but that is only a small part of God, most of which is related to things beyond our horizons.

Another thought - the way the three persons of the Trinity are expressed sounds tantalisingly like saying one God, three Personas. That is quite a different angle on it.

Great post, John. I'm actually very excited to talk theology!

I'll come back to this later, as you might know that France is playing against Hungary in the Euro championships very soon. But I don't believe you care much about football

 

[John K]

I'll come back to this later, as you might know that France is playing against Hungary in the Euro championships very soon. But I don't believe you care much about football

LOL I'm not a great football fan - but I hope France does well in the match today.
It's hard to work out the UK football team - one God three persons is hard enough, but one nation four countries with their own teams is mind boggling.

 

[o2b]

This is exciting!

 

[o2b]

Hey Ren,

Emphasize by use of bold text and italics is mine. So, in that sense, I am modifying your words.

One essence, three persons. It's certainly difficult to make logical sense of this. But the tradition consistently emphasises the 'mystery' of the Trinity, implying that it defies logic. The question is whether it is acceptable to say that God transcends the laws of logic.

Note that in regard to Jesus Christ as Son of God, christology itself is based on a mystery. Christ is supposed to be one being, fully man and fully God. One person, two natures. Prima facie, this doesn't make logical sense either. He is not alternately one or the other, but both at the same time, and as one person.

I have Augustine's On the Trinity on my reading list, hopefully it will address these questions in detail.

I've been exploring Christian theology a bit lately so by all means, expand on it as much as you want.

This is from my book:

Chapter 25
What About After the Resurrection?

Just to be clear, the miracle of the incarnation included the Son of God being emptied of His divine attributes. One cannot have two natures at the same time. Christ could not be omniscient and at the same time know not the time of the Second Coming. He cannot be subject to physical death and at the same time be all powerful.

If I were to be condescended from a man to a dog, I cannot have my human intelligence while having the intelligence of a dog. I cannot have a dog’s tail at the same time I have no tail. And so on. Again, one cannot have two natures at the same time.

The implications of this are staggering and beg a million-dollar question. At Christ’s resurrection or perhaps His ascension to heaven, did He recover His divine attributes?

So far as I can tell, we are not directly told. However, there are a couple of Bible passages that seem to hint at His present attributes. Two are in Revelation.

Revelation 1:1
The Revelation of Jesus Christ, which God gave Him to show His servants—things which must shortly take place. And He sent and signified it by His angel to His servant John

Why would God give the revelation of Jesus Christ to Jesus Christ? Perhaps Christ does not have perfect recall of the revelation of Himself.

Revelation 14:14-15
14 Then I looked, and behold, a white cloud, and on the cloud sat One like the Son of Man, having on His head a golden crown, and in His hand a sharp sickle. 15 And another angel came out of the temple, crying with a loud voice to Him who sat on the cloud, “Thrust in Your sickle and reap, for the time has come for You to reap, for the harvest of the earth is ripe.”

Once the saints are prepared for the harvest, the Second Coming is near. It appears, just as during His earthly life, Jesus does not know the time of His Second Coming.

Someone might opine that Revelation is so cryptic, it may not be correct to force such a literal interpretation. Perhaps so, but there are other texts.

Galatians 4:5
6 And because you are sons, God has sent forth the Spirit of His Son into your hearts, crying out, “Abba, Father!”

John 14:26
26 “But, the Helper, the Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send in My name, He will teach you all things, and bring to your remembrance all things that I said to you.”

Why can’t Christ send forth His own Spirit? Since the revelation of Jesus Christ would seem to be His Spirit, Galatians 4 and John 14:26 may be partner texts with Revelation 1.

I am not certain of this view, but it is my best guess, for want of a better term. Still, it troubles me somewhat as I am comforted in the idea that Jesus fully knows all the details of my life and can even read my mind. (But how can a man distribute his spirit to billions of beings at the same time?)

It is important to be mindful that Jesus came to reunite God and man. He is our atoning sacrifice. Perhaps I am troubled because I have yet to experience all of the comfort wrapped up in being one with the Father.

If Jesus remains a man forever, consider the sacrifice of God in giving His Son. Imagine God no longer having one to relate to in the way He once could do so with His Son. I cannot fathom such a sacrifice!

 

[o2b]

This is crucial.

Chapter 31
The Faith of Jesus

This discussion of Christ’s Sonship has a glaring hole. What is being probed is who His divine person is, but what does that have to do with His earthly life when He sojourned as a man? Since Jesus walked entirely by faith and of His own self He could do nothing and His Father did all the works (John 5:30; John 14:10-12), His divinity cannot be understood to be an advantage with respect to His earthly life.

Or can it?

Just to be clear, the miracle of the incarnation included the Son of God being emptied of His divine attributes. As already explained, one cannot have two natures at the same time.

When contemplating the relationship of God the Father and His Son, something occurred to me that for me beautifully enhances my confession of Christ - the faith of Jesus. This is especially so with my understanding that no matter one’s character, sinful flesh is a source of the wages of sin (Romans 6:23; 7:23-24).

This is how Christ was subject to the wages of sin; painful feelings such as guilt and shame (Romans 7:9,13; Isaiah 1:28-29; Hebrews 12:2). The more He beheld His Father, the more the flesh He was encumbered with revealed its sinful tendencies.

This explains how Christ could be subject to the wages of sin though His character was spotless. In the human realm, an evil character is not the only venue for being burdened with sin’s wage. Whether perceiving oneself to be evil through sinful flesh or one’s sinful character, the burden is the same.

Consider Revelation Chapters 4 and 5 (absolute favorites of mine!). The imagery in Revelation 4 includes two characteristics. It is a scene of intense divine revelation, what with its referral to thrones, lightnings, thunderings, voices, and lamps of fire. Also pictured is intense perception of divine revelation by creation, given the four living creatures just loaded with eyes all around.

Is it possible that humanity could survive such a scene? Well, in the very next chapter John is asked who can unseal all seven seals. I suggest that packed into that question is if humanity, laden with sinful flesh, can survive the full disclosure of soul that naturally results from being subject to the intense divine revelation such as is depicted in the previous chapter.

Revelation 5:2-3
2 Then I saw a strong angel proclaiming with a loud voice, “Who is worthy to open the scroll and to loose its seals?” 3 And no one in heaven or on the earth or under the earth was able to open the scroll, or to look at it.

No way. No way anyone could possibly survive the ordeal of having all seven seals peeled away. John the Revelator is so convinced that he is weeping. But he is told there is One who did just that – the Lion of the tribe of Judah prevailed to unseal all seven seals!

Revelation 5:4-5
4 So I wept much, because no one was found worthy to open and read the scroll, or to look at it. 5 But one of the elders said to me, “Do not weep. Behold, the Lion of the tribe of Judah, the Root of David, has prevailed to open the scroll and to loose its seven seals.”

As Christ had to depend entirely on His Father by faith, He was able to unseal all seven seals through His faith.

Why could no one in heaven or on earth or under the earth open and read the scroll or to look at it? Not even the angel Gabriel! What sets Christ apart from all others?

I suggest what sets Him apart is the faith He had. It was a greater faith than even Gabriel would have had should he have been incarnated into the human realm. This leads to a crucial question.

How did Jesus have the faith He had?

This may be a bit heady, but faith is a property of conscious existence. A rock cannot have faith, but sufficiently intelligent beings can. So, when Mary was conceived, Jesus, not yet having consciousness, could not yet have had faith.

But, when Jesus developed to the point of having moral consciousness (if this happens at the same time consciousness first develops I have no idea), at that very point in time, He must have had faith. But how?

The reason for the occurrence and the substance of that faith cannot be arbitrary. There must be a reason Christ could do something no created being could.

I am convinced there must be a connection between Christ’s relationship with His Father as His Son before the incarnation and the occurrence and quality of His initial faith after the incarnation. In other words, even though emptied of the divine attributes that were His before His amazing condescension at the incarnation, Jesus prevailed to loose all seven seals because He is the Son of God!

This is how He could accomplish what even the angel Gabriel could not. This is how Jesus could be the Savior of the world. Though divested of His divine attributes, Christ had the faith He had because He is the Son of God. His faith is proof of the truth that He is the divine Son of God.

 

[o2b]

LOL I'm not a great football fan - but I hope France does well in the match today.
It's hard to work out the UK football team - one God three persons is hard enough, but one nation four countries with their own teams is mind boggling.

Hey John,

Did you read the post I wrote that examined the Greek theos?

The biblical evidence that God is the Father only is vast.

When Christ asked His disciples who He is, Peter did not answer, You are God the Son! He answered, You are the Son of the Living God!

Christ did not correct Peter. He praised His confession to the skies.

 

[o2b]

There is a major problem with time too, because persons we are familiar with live in linear time - even Jesus did when he was present on earth. God doesn't though and is eternally present at all times and places for everyone and everything that exists - this is a very weird sort of person lol.

I happen to believe time is linear for God. Regardless, isn't your assertion a postulate, meaning an unproven assertion from which other things are deduced (sort of like the postulates in Euclidean geometry)? If unproven, how is it known to be true?

If God does stand outside of time and past reality is as much reality as present reality, I feel bad for Him. Because I believe the presence of evil is something God has contingencies for, such that eventually evil no longer exists and never will.

I would hope that eventual state of things is the entirety of His "reality" and the converse, the idea that this season of evil with all its attendant pain is as much God's reality as that future state, is bigtime discouraging.

Revelation 21:4
And God will wipe away every tear from their eyes; there shall be no more death, nor sorrow, nor crying. There shall be no more pain, for the former things have passed away.”

Will this not be the entirety of God's reality as well? Can He not wipe away His tears as well? Or is the reality of death and tears always every bit as much His reality?

For His sake, I hope not.

 

[Professor Snep]

Will this not be the entirety of God's reality as well? Can He not wipe away His tears as well? Or is the reality of death and tears always every bit as much His reality?

Thales approves of watery tears