The infamous "I" mentality

[dragulagu]

The states of affairs which do exist could have been otherwise. This means that states of affairs are either actual (existent) or possible. It is the totality of states of affairs—actual and possible—that makes up the whole of reality. The world is precisely those states of affairs which do exist.

Having developed this analysis of world-thought-language, and relying on the one general form of the proposition, Wittgenstein can now assert that all meaningful propositions are of equal value. Subsequently, he ends the journey with the admonition concerning what can (or cannot) and what should (or should not) be said (7), leaving outside the realm of the sayable propositions of ethics, aesthetics, and metaphysics.

So far so good..

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/wittgenstein/#TracLogiPhil


Ogden translation Pears/McGuinness translation
1. The world is everything that is the case. The world is all that is the case.
2. What is the case, the fact, is the existence of atomic facts. What is the case—a fact—is the existence of states of affairs.
3. The logical picture of the facts is the thought. A logical picture of facts is a thought.
4. The thought is the significant proposition. A thought is a proposition with sense.
5. Propositions are truth-functions of elementary propositions. A proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions.
(An elementary proposition is a truth function of itself.) (An elementary proposition is a truth function of itself.)
6. The general form of truth-function is [p¯,ξ¯,N(ξ&#x00AF]" role="presentation" style="display: inline; line-height: normal; letter-spacing: normal; word-spacing: normal; overflow-wrap: normal; white-space: nowrap; float: none; direction: ltr; max-width: none; max-height: none; min-width: 0px; min-height: 0px; border: 0px; padding: 0px; margin: 0px; position: relative;">[p¯,ξ¯,N(ξ¯)][p¯,ξ¯,N(ξ¯)]. The general form of a truth-function is [p¯,ξ¯,N(ξ&#x00AF]" role="presentation" style="display: inline; line-height: normal; letter-spacing: normal; word-spacing: normal; overflow-wrap: normal; white-space: nowrap; float: none; direction: ltr; max-width: none; max-height: none; min-width: 0px; min-height: 0px; border: 0px; padding: 0px; margin: 0px; position: relative;">[p¯,ξ¯,N(ξ¯)][p¯,ξ¯,N(ξ¯)].
This is the general form of proposition. This is the general form of a proposition.
7. Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent. What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.

(yeah i left that one in intentionally)

>>Will BBL with more intro/extraspection

 

[sassafras]

A little late to this convo...

It all depends on context. A 'we' mentality can be a positive force when a group of individuals is united under the banner of a common goal or philosophy through their own volition and free will. But the need to be needed, the desire to belong and to connect with others can also be exploited for nefarious purposes. See: propaganda, cults, your common pitchfork mob, etc. It's rarely good to lose yourself to others completely. The human mind is highly permeable and prone to social influence. You have to be careful with whom you associate with and make sure your 'we' includes multiple perspectives.

A good balance requires one to respect the human in everyone - after all, there wouldn't be a we if there weren't multiple 'me's' involved too.

This is really good when the members of the 'We' share the same aims, values and broad situation, etc. It can be awful when they don't. I hate it when someone tries to include me in a 'we' that I don't identify with and it just sets my fillings aching. I think your military example is spot on when the guy giving the orders is in the same risk as the soldiers, but it's likely to just lead to cynicism when the same approach is tried on insincerely and conventionally by a relatively remote staff officer sitting safely in HQ a hundred miles away. The staff officer may of course be able to create a very successful We with his immediate subordinates in the line of command. On the other hand the truly great major leaders are absolutely superb at creating a 'We' that adulates them and will do just about anything for them. This can be a good thing, but it can lead to people abandoning all rational and ethical sense as happened with Hitler for example. That's on a grand scale of course, but I've seen it happen in small teams too where an inclusive leader has lead the team willingly over a metaphorial cliff. It seems to me that a strong sense of 'I' is also important, because that's how we keep critical perspective.

So where have we got to? As a build on top of the core idea, we seem to be concluding that it's good to sincerely lead others who have common objectives, and who share group identity, by nurturing an inclusive sense of 'We' - but to encourage a strong sense of 'I' too, without which the group can lack essential critical judgement from its individuals.

Boom. Yes.

Like John says, sometines the 'we' is dysfunctional, and then it takes a strong 'I' to reform a new 'we'.

This means that the 'I' is a necessary and critical part of any healthy 'we'. While it's all well and good to criticise the 'I' mentality in favour of the 'we', it can be ultimately counter-productive.

Any healthy 'we' needs everybody to feel like their 'I' is important, otherwise you have a collectivist nightmare. This applies to all social groupings, from to societies to marriages.

Yes, exactly.

 

[just me]

My time. I cannot speak about your time, as I have no idea. We have healthy uses of "I" and they are necessary. Had I said "our time", it would have been a large assumption. Love the gif.

My wife and I are in the bed together. We are in the bed together. Not really the point, though. In leadership roles, which is the point of this, "we" gets farther down the road than "I want you to do this."

Concerning God, "I Am" means more than we understand now. In the beginning was the Word; and the Word was with God: and the Word was God.
"Whom shall We send, and whom shall go for Us? Then said I: take me, Lord. I will go for Us. He who goes for God is with God and never alone.

Great responses and good discussions.

 

[just me]

Lol...a little irony in this topic? Given the Op is "justMe"?

It was intended to show meekness.

 

[just me]

I'm myself leans toward I am, which is only part of the conjugation of the verb "to be".

 

[John K]

Nah I was just being a smartass, sowwie

Wittgenstein has an interesting proof against solipsism in the Tractatus which he considers decisive, though my brain power right now is too low to recall it in detail.

But what if Wittgenstein is just a figment of my imagination? What if my own sense of ‘I’ is part of the same fiction? And what if these are worldview forming primary perceptions not conclusions? The rabbit hole is a black one .... resistance is useless ....

Just joking! .... am I? ..... Hello! .... Is anyone else there?

 

[Ren]

So far so good..

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/wittgenstein/#TracLogiPhil


Ogden translation Pears/McGuinness translation
1. The world is everything that is the case. The world is all that is the case.
2. What is the case, the fact, is the existence of atomic facts. What is the case—a fact—is the existence of states of affairs.
3. The logical picture of the facts is the thought. A logical picture of facts is a thought.
4. The thought is the significant proposition. A thought is a proposition with sense.
5. Propositions are truth-functions of elementary propositions. A proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions.
(An elementary proposition is a truth function of itself.) (An elementary proposition is a truth function of itself.)
6. The general form of truth-function is [p¯,ξ¯,N(ξ&#x00AF]" role="presentation" style="display: inline; line-height: normal; letter-spacing: normal; word-spacing: normal; overflow-wrap: normal; white-space: nowrap; float: none; direction: ltr; max-width: none; max-height: none; min-width: 0px; min-height: 0px; border: 0px; padding: 0px; margin: 0px; position: relative;">[p¯,ξ¯,N(ξ¯)][p¯,ξ¯,N(ξ¯)]. The general form of a truth-function is [p¯,ξ¯,N(ξ&#x00AF]" role="presentation" style="display: inline; line-height: normal; letter-spacing: normal; word-spacing: normal; overflow-wrap: normal; white-space: nowrap; float: none; direction: ltr; max-width: none; max-height: none; min-width: 0px; min-height: 0px; border: 0px; padding: 0px; margin: 0px; position: relative;">[p¯,ξ¯,N(ξ¯)][p¯,ξ¯,N(ξ¯)].
This is the general form of proposition. This is the general form of a proposition.
7. Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent. What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.

(yeah i left that one in intentionally)

>>Will BBL with more intro/extraspection

There it is.

---------------------------------------------------

5.6 The limits of my language mean the limits of my world.

5.61 Logic fills the world: the limits of the world are also its limits. We cannot therefore say in logic: This and this there is in the world, that there is not. For that would apparently presuppose that we exclude certain possibilities, and this cannot be the case since otherwise logic must get outside the limits of the world: that is, if it could consider these limits from the other side also. What we cannot think, that we cannot think: we cannot therefore say what we cannot think.

5.62 This remark provides a key to the question, to what extent solipsism is a truth. In fact what solipsism means, is quite correct, only it cannot be said, but it shows itself. That the world is my world, shows itself in the fact that the limits of the language (the language which only I understand) mean the limits of my world.

5.63 I am my world. (The microcosm.)

5.631 The thinking, presenting subject; there is no such thing. If I wrote a book “The world as I found it”, I should also have therein to report on my body and say which members obey my will and which do not, etc. This then would be a method of isolating the subject or rather of showing that in an important sense there is no subject: that is to say, of it alone in this book mention could not be made.

5.632 The subject does not belong to the world but it is a limit of the world.

5.633 Where in the world is a metaphysical subject to be noted? You say that this case is altogether like that of the eye and the field of sight. But you do not really see the eye. And from nothing in the field of sight can it be concluded that it is seen from an eye.

5.634 This is connected with the fact that no part of our experience is also a priori. Everything we see could also be otherwise. Everything we can describe at all could also be otherwise. There is no order of things a priori.

5.64 Here we see that solipsism strictly carried out coincides with pure realism. The I in solipsism shrinks to an extensionless point and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it.

5.641 There is therefore really a sense in which in philosophy we can talk of a non-psychological I. The I occurs in philosophy through the fact that the “world is my world”. The philosophical I is not the man, not the human body or the human soul of which psychology treats, but the metaphysical subject, the limit—not a part of the world.

 

[Ren]

This is awesome!

Wittgenstein is a genius

I should add that it is technically more an argument than a proof against solipsism. I find it fascinating in the way it turns solipsism on its head, so to speak.

The idea that the subject is a limit of the world is also a powerful one.

...Sapir-Whorf?(do I see a linguistics connection here in philosophy?)

Yeah, the 20th century saw a rift between so-called analytic philosophy, at the heart of which linguistic and logical analysis plays a central role, and continental philosophy, which rejects this central role because of what it sees as nefarious consequences on the scope of what philosophy can legitimately discuss.

Interestingly, Karl Popper, who in many ways saw himself as an adversary of Wittgenstein, has a totally different argument against solipsism. It follows from his principle of falsificationism, according to which the openness to being falsified by empirical observation provides the line of demarcation between scientific and non-scientific theories. Solipsism cannot be empirically falsified (he argues), therefore it is not scientific; therefore it is very unlikely to be true, etc.

 

[Ren]

But what if Wittgenstein is just a figment of my imagination?

He is also a figment of my imagination. But maybe I am also a figment of your imagination. Or is it you who is a figment of mine?!!

 

[John K]

He is also a figment of my imagination. But maybe I am also a figment of your imagination. Or is it you who is a figment of mine?!!

We can relax because it’s all ok really. This depends on imagination - which is of course also a figment of something that’s just a figment of ..... something.
Logic - that’s just a fiction too, a metaphysical opium dream. But there’s no real dreamer.
Did someone say something?

I’m intrigued by the conclusion that Wittgenstein reached - that the philosophical subject is a limiting point of the world it perceives but not part of that world (but then - how can they interact? ). As well as a fascinating logical analysis, this reduction is an important meditation for anyone who would like to understand what is meant by ‘I’.

 

[dragulagu]

There it is.

---------------------------------------------------

5.6 The limits of my language mean the limits of my world.

5.61 Logic fills the world: the limits of the world are also its limits. We cannot therefore say in logic: This and this there is in the world, that there is not. For that would apparently presuppose that we exclude certain possibilities, and this cannot be the case since otherwise logic must get outside the limits of the world: that is, if it could consider these limits from the other side also. What we cannot think, that we cannot think: we cannot therefore say what we cannot think.

5.62 This remark provides a key to the question, to what extent solipsism is a truth. In fact what solipsism means, is quite correct, only it cannot be said, but it shows itself. That the world is my world, shows itself in the fact that the limits of the language (the language which only I understand) mean the limits of my world.

5.63 I am my world. (The microcosm.)

5.631 The thinking, presenting subject; there is no such thing. If I wrote a book “The world as I found it”, I should also have therein to report on my body and say which members obey my will and which do not, etc. This then would be a method of isolating the subject or rather of showing that in an important sense there is no subject: that is to say, of it alone in this book mention could not be made.

5.632 The subject does not belong to the world but it is a limit of the world.

5.633 Where in the world is a metaphysical subject to be noted? You say that this case is altogether like that of the eye and the field of sight. But you do not really see the eye. And from nothing in the field of sight can it be concluded that it is seen from an eye.

5.634 This is connected with the fact that no part of our experience is also a priori. Everything we see could also be otherwise. Everything we can describe at all could also be otherwise. There is no order of things a priori.

5.64 Here we see that solipsism strictly carried out coincides with pure realism. The I in solipsism shrinks to an extensionless point and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it.

5.641 There is therefore really a sense in which in philosophy we can talk of a non-psychological I. The I occurs in philosophy through the fact that the “world is my world”. The philosophical I is not the man, not the human body or the human soul of which psychology treats, but the metaphysical subject, the limit—not a part of the world.

Thanks Ren, that part is indeed the one on solipsism.

So in hindsight; there is world constraint in the perception of "I". There is a "we" to describe / propose this world in a broader context. Language dictates the ability to describe this world between us by exchanging our propositions/thoughts of this world. So "we" is valued more than "I" from a descriptive point of view of the world.
"we" however would be more prone to faults due to the (in)ability of language to be perceived / translated differently by each individual, based on their perception and collection of facts. There lies the difficulty in any discussion and the need for truth - simplex sigillum veri (simplicity is the sign of truth, as noted in the book).

The world is the totality of facts. It does not need our description to exist.

<might correct some stuff later here after I did some re-reading>

PS: That book was not easy to go through (went to a compressed 36 page version of it)...a lot of propositions towards logic, language, ... in a very...robotic kind of way. Not that much in regards to philosophy/psychology, except for the last chapters and a paragraph here and there. Will have to re-read it a couple times again though to properly understand it. But damn interesting!

My time. I cannot speak about your time, as I have no idea. We have healthy uses of "I" and they are necessary. Had I said "our time", it would have been a large assumption. Love the gif.

My wife and I are in the bed together. We are in the bed together. Not really the point, though. In leadership roles, which is the point of this, "we" gets farther down the road than "I want you to do this."

Concerning God, "I Am" means more than we understand now. In the beginning was the Word; and the Word was with God: and the Word was God.
"Whom shall We send, and whom shall go for Us? Then said I: take me, Lord. I will go for Us. He who goes for God is with God and never alone.

Great responses and good discussions.

Sorry, I was trolling. Solid reasoning. The point I wanted to make is that we need to learn to say both "I" and "We" where and when necessary.
As your OP picture is a solid example of it.

 

[Deleted member 16771]

Interestingly, Karl Popper, who in many ways saw himself as an adversary of Wittgenstein, has a totally different argument against solipsism. It follows from his principle of falsificationism, according to which the openness to being falsified by empirical observation provides the line of demarcation between scientific and non-scientific theories. Solipsism cannot be empirically falsified (he argues), therefore it is not scientific; therefore it is very unlikely to be true, etc.

The problem with that is that 'falsification' takes non-solipsism as axiomatic anyway - it couldn't work in any other way.

 

[dragulagu]

The problem with that is that 'falsification' takes non-solipsism as axiomatic anyway - it couldn't work in any other way.

I wonder...couldn't solipsism be falsified by breaking down the concept of one's own reality of the world from a neurological/biological (biochemical,physical,mathematical) point of view?

Also...something is chiming here with contradiction as argumentation of taking non-solipsism as an axiomatic on the falsification of solipsism...depending from which point of view you are proposing (the solipsism point of view or the non-solipsism point of view). The one excludes the other...I don't know...

4.46 Among the possible groups of truth-conditions there are two extreme cases. In the one case the proposition is true for all the truth-possibilities of the elementary propositions. We say that the truthconditions are tautological. In the second case the proposition is false for all the truthpossibilities. The truth-conditions are self-contradictory. In the first case we call the proposition a tautology, in the second case a contradiction.

4.461 The proposition shows what it says, the tautology and the contradiction that they say nothing. The tautology has no truth-conditions, for it is unconditionally true; and the contradiction is on no condition true. Tautology and contradiction are without sense. (Like the point from which two arrows go out in opposite directions.) (I know, e.g. nothing about the weather, when I know that it rains or does not rain.)

4.4611 Tautology and contradiction are, however, not senseless; they are part of the symbolism, in the same way that “0” is part of the symbolism of Arithmetic.

4.462 Tautology and contradiction are not pictures of the reality. They present no possible state of affairs. For the one allows every possible state of affairs, the other none. In the tautology the conditions of agreement with the world —the presenting relations—cancel one another, so that it stands in no presenting relation to reality.

 

[Deleted member 16771]

I wonder...couldn't solipsism be falsified by breaking down the concept of one's own reality of the world from a neurological/biological (biochemical,physical,mathematical) point of view?

See that's exactly the point - no it couldn't.

 

[dragulagu]

See that's exactly the point - no it couldn't.

Because of solipsism...hmm...the empirical facts are mere illusion...

 

[Deleted member 16771]

Also...something is chiming here with contradiction as argumentation of taking non-solipsism as an axiomatic on the falsification of solipsism...depending from which point of view you are proposing (the solipsism point of view or the non-solipsism point of view). The one excludes the other...I don't know...

See that's exactly the point - no it couldn't.

The only 'point of view' that could be said to exist is the subjective - it's the only way through which any reality at all is experienced and thus absolutely foundational.

The subjective is the core, the centre, the 'ground' (to borrow a Rennism) of everything else. It can't be undermined.

 

[Deleted member 16771]

Because of solipsism...hmm...the empirical facts are mere illusion...

Yup. It's fucking annoying. Not Te at all, lol.

 

[John K]

See that's exactly the point - no it couldn't.

Quite. All the attempts to invalidate solipsism that I’ve come across can only do so by assuming some aspect of the thing it rejects. For example there’s no appeal possible to neuroscience because that assumes an objective material world.

 

[John K]

Quite. All the attempts to invalidate solipsism that I’ve come across can only do so by assuming some aspect of the thing it rejects. For example there’s no appeal possible to neuroscience because that assumes an objective material world.

In fact if we accept a materialist world view I can’t see how we can avoid an implication that each individual is locked into their own virtual reality

 

[just me]

World view, if that is permitted here, is totally subjective according to one's usage of the world. Few could possibly sum up the world in a book. Using it only as facts leaves too much out. The world is really the word? Oops: left the "L" out.
We should explain where the world is and its surroundings. Maybe we should explain the world's permeabilities? Should we mention love...and anger? Volcanoes? Pollution? Surely we do not think we understand all the facts. Do we each have our own world? Or do we all have the same world?



A man was working his retriever gathering ducks. Another man had a good duck down on a small island of grass, but no dog. He asked, "May I borrow your dog to get my duck?" The man with the dog yelled back, "He won't work for you."
The man without a dog said, "Then you won't mind if I try," and sent the dog right downwind of the duck and had the dog come to hand with the duck. The owner got angry and started yelling at his dog. The other guy sent the dog to its master after a pat on the head and a comforting, "good dog."

Some folk want to be all about themselves. Some people like to share. The dog was willing to help, as it was doing what he had been trained for. Innocence can be a great thing.

The "I" mentality always uses the word "I" in everyday speech. Many people grow tired of it after awhile. It can be a sore spot in lower leadership. After a man has been told what to do by the big boss, "we" need to do this and that to the workers sounds so much better. It is all in the making of a leader. Which sounds better? "I need to sit down and talk to you"....coming from a secondary boss, or "we need to sit down and talk." It does not infer everyone is of the same mind: it just sounds better.

Write a paragraph describing your accomplishments in meekness without the use of the word "I". Once again, we need first person singular; maybe just not all the time. Thanks for all the likes and participation.