Relativism says "there is no absolute truth, all is relative", right? I've wondered about if there is a philosophical ideology that says that there is an absolute truth, but since we all are percievers we cannot fully see this truth, and therefor our perceptions are somewhat relative. In other words; "both relativism and absolutism are being true!"
Do you know any ideology that fits? Maybe we should come up with one.
The philosophical ideology that opposes relativism is objectivism. The idea that things have an objective truth beyond our sensory perception. It is the most standardly accepted view in philosophy probably, and is one of the fundamental assumptions in scientific inquiry.
When you say that there is an absolute truth, but we cannot
see the absolute truth because of our status is a personal favorite discussion topic of mine

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Ok, so when talking about reality and the status of its existence, you are talking about the ontology of reality, or its state of being. Is the status of reality mind dependent or mind independent? If we grant mind independence (objectivity), then we can start questioning what we
know of reality. In so doing, we switch our question to epistemology, or the theory of knowing in philosophy. This is what you are asking when you say "seeing this truth". Now there is some very interesting modern philosophical discussion on this topic. You might enjoy reading this article about epistemological skepticism:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/#LIM
The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy is an excellent resource, and is far more reliable than google searches. It's always recommended in my philosophy classes. The point you are questioning relates to an epistemological closure principle, or the idea that, under a certain approach/situation, you are limited in what you are capable of knowing. In this article, it applies to the brain-in-a-vat example, but it applies to many more things. For example, one Professor McGinn applied the closure principle to theory of mind in claiming that being a mind, we cannot understand the nature of the mind necessarily. I disagreed with his argument for many reasons, but he at least demonstrates an alternative application of the principle.
Other applications of closure principles can be grounded in approaches to inquiry. A nice simple example is to consider a kinematic vs a probabilistic analysis of a pool table. A probabilistic analysis can only tell us where a pool ball is likely to go while an accurate kinematic analysis can tell is where the pool ball WILL go. The probabilistic approach is limited in what it can tell us by what the approach is necessarily.
We can extend this then to measures of reality like you are saying. Some examples of reality that we necessarily couldn't understand would be some sort of substance dualist or soul. By definition, these are things that are immaterial. Suppose that such things exist. Because are sensory perception is grounded in the physical, such things would be beyond our sensory perception, and beyond our ability to understand necessarily. In this sense, some parts of reality can very much escape us depending one the approach we use to discover it.