Relationism

[mintoots]

Either way, this metaphysical worldview seems bad news for the political ideal of human emancipation against oppression.

Hmm. I see. So far, I am seeing that to view Indra's Net as philosophical would be overreaching. That being said, how much of religion is truly a philosophy? If philosophy is grounded on logic, then to my humble knowledge, only Confucianism has a great potential fit. Sorry I'm not well versed in this but I am nonetheless interested. I have tried to read about it but I usually get too lost in it to be able to digest it. I learn better in conversation, so here I am. I hope you don't mind.

 

[Ren]

Hmm. I see. So far, I am seeing that to view Indra's Net as philosophical would be overreaching. That being said, how much of religion is truly a philosophy? If philosophy is grounded on logic, then to my humble knowledge, only Confucianism has a great potential fit. Sorry I'm not well versed in this but I am nonetheless interested. I have tried to read about it but I usually get too lost in it to be able to digest it. I learn better in conversation, so here I am. I hope you don't mind.

Haha, of course I don't mind Don't be silly!

I think it really depends on the religion. Theology and philosophy are quite close and have the same source, really, but it's true that most religious philosophies tend to have a set of axioms whose truth is simply posited as such, which would not satisfy most philosophers. Usually in any genuinely philosophical system, the truth of an axiom cannot be taken for granted. That being said, I have found that sometimes, when you take certain things for granted which may not have been rationally established as such, you may accede to insights that you wouldn't have reached had you remained conservatively within the remit of what it is "rationally permissible" to say. This is why I think mysticism and broadly religious viewpoints are still important philosophically. But perhaps this boils down to what one's priorities are when engaging in philosophy: whether one's priority is strictly the truth, or something qualitatively different, like an experience of the divine, connectedness, the void, etc.

 

[mintoots]

Haha, of course I don't mind Don't be silly!

I think it really depends on the religion. Theology and philosophy are quite close and have the same source, really, but it's true that most religious philosophies tend to have a set of axioms whose truth is simply posited as such, which would not satisfy most philosophers. Usually in any genuinely philosophical system, the truth of an axiom cannot be taken for granted. That being said, I have found that sometimes, when you take certain things for granted which may not have been rationally established as such, you may accede to insights that you wouldn't have reached had you remained conservatively within the remit of what it is "rationally permissible" to say. This is why I think mysticism and broadly religious viewpoints are still important philosophically. But perhaps this boils down to what one's priorities are when engaging in philosophy: whether one's priority is strictly the truth, or something qualitatively different, like an experience of the divine, connectedness, the void, etc.

Is having faith an act of taking knowledge and logic for granted?

Don't be silly!

Meh. It's an INFJ thing.

 

[Ren]

Is having faith and act of taking knowledge and logic for granted?

Hm, to an extent yes. For example, the faithful believe that God exists prior to any logical proof of His existence being given. Since arguably this proof could not be given empirically, it would have to be given logically. And there have certainly been attempts to prove the existence of God by logical means — including by Descartes himself, although in his case (as for many other philosophers, like Leibniz) the proof was not so much religiously motivated as motivated by a need to account for 'gaps' in his metaphysics. But if you take someone like Thomas Aquinas, for example, who is still the authority for Catholic philosophy, the different logical proofs that he gives for the existence of God are still in some sense 'subordinated' to the truth of the existence of God given by revelation. And the vast majority of committed Catholics are not familiar with Aquinas's logical proofs; they just believe because they have faith.

I guess there are also instances of mystics who believe in actual logical contradictions; but there have also been logicians interested in proving the truth of certain contradictions (Graham Priest being one of them).

 

[Ren]

https://aeon.co/essays/how-marxism-and-buddhism-complement-each-other

Very curious your take.

I am reading everyone's thoughts and the article @Deleted member 16771 attached. Still pondering and reflecting. Would love your thoughts on the article specifically as well...

I read the whole article and although I like some of the insights it offers, I can't say I find it very sound philosophically.

The feasibility of the Marxist project is grounded in the benevolent communal nature of the human being. Some might argue that the idea that once humanity realises its interconnectedness it would turn away from cruelty and towards compassion is wishful thinking – a justified objection. The 18th-century German philosopher Immanuel Kant understood cruelty and hatred to be each individual’s fault and deeply ingrained in the nature of human existence. This thought is widespread today, and studies in clinical psychology support it. But for Marx, it is the socioeconomic conditions that are to blame for cruelty, hatred and crime. The human, he would hold, is inherently benevolent and compassionate. Who has got it right?

This just seems a bit of a caricature of the thinking of both Marx, Kant, and the others. I've engaged with plenty of Marxist writings and never got the sense that the Marxist project was grounded in "the benevolent communal nature of the human being", or that Marx believed that human beings were "inherently benevolent and compassionate". (Notice again how referring to human beings as "inherently benevolent and compassionate" is in contradiction to the non-substantial thinking of Buddhism.) The Marxist project is grounded in dialectical materialism, not in the supposed 'benevolence' of human beings. I think the author is getting Marx mixed up with Rousseau and workers with Rousseau's 'noble savages'.

Then there is the whole part about suffering and how the Buddhist conception of suffering is akin to the Marxist one. I won't even go into the detail of it because I don't agree with how suffering is conceptualized for Marxism, but roughly speaking, suffering from the Buddhist viewpoint is intrinsic to human existence, i.e. it is a function of impermanence; while for Marxism it is (at best) extrinsic, i.e. fostered by the capitalist system. So it doesn't really seem to make much sense to equate one with the other.

 

[jn56uytrx]

I read the whole article and although I like some of the insights it offers, I can't say I find it very sound philosophically.

That helps! Thanks for offering your insight and the underlying reasons for your perspective. I am still slowly making my way through the Hegel article @Deleted member 16771 posted, but I am taking in information and reflecting. I do eventually hope to come back here with some thoughts.

In the meantime, I would love to also hear from you what insights from the article you liked.

~~~~~~~

I have realized in reading what has already been posted that I am not leaning as much in my own questioning toward the bare minimum rules of what logic would permit us to say we "know." I realize now, this is very much a part of my spiritual quest. I am simply looking for some spiritual ground that feels right enough to move forward with some stability on, even if it is an act of faith. Logic is definitely not a strong skill for me, nor do I have much philosophical knowledge. I am much more of a "go by feel" kind of person who then hopes things hold together. I appreciated some of the discussion here to help me clarify that. I think that self-understanding may help me frame explorations more clearly in the future.

~~~~~

Thanks everyone who offered thoughts. Still reading. Still processing.

~~~~~~~

Off to more reading....

 

[Ren]

In the meantime, I would love to also hear from you what insights from the article you liked.

Sure!

I think what I like most about the article is that it is philosophically daring. It takes two philosophies that are apparently very distant from each other — Marxism on the one hand, and Buddhism on the other — and tries to reconcile them into a unified framework. I personally don't think it succeeds, for reasons I have already given in part, but I still think the intention is not only praiseworthy but also very important for the sake and health of philosophy as a discipline. The more professional or 'academic' kind of philosophy is usually more conservative about what it can attempt, to an extent that is sometimes discouraging and, dare I say, unexciting. This relates back to what @MINFJToothFairy and I were talking about regarding axioms. If you're conservative about the axioms you're allowed to use, you're perhaps more likely to end up 'speaking the truth', but you're also less likely to come across some very interesting insights. In the end, I prefer a philosophical position with which I wildly disagree, but that I find thought-provoking, to an agreeable position that I feel nothing about.

More specifically perhaps, I find this attempt to unify substantial and 'insubstantial' metaphysics very stimulating. This has to do with my attraction for paradox, I believe. (Incidentally, this is also to a large extent what I attempt to do in my own framework, Open Monism, albeit with different 'poles' to unify, namely immanent relationism and existentialism.) What is a shame about the article is not so much that it fails at this reconciliation as that (in my opinion) it never really gets the chance to fail or succeed because it seems to misunderstand Marxism. Intuitively, I do think that if a more developed attempt were to be made in this vein, it would be better to start with Hegel and not with Marx, at least while laying down the metaphysical part of the argument.

 

[Deleted member 16771]

This just seems a bit of a caricature of the thinking of both Marx, Kant, and the others. I've engaged with plenty of Marxist writings and never got the sense that the Marxist project was grounded in "the benevolent communal nature of the human being", or that Marx believed that human beings were "inherently benevolent and compassionate". (Notice again how referring to human beings as "inherently benevolent and compassionate" is in contradiction to the non-substantial thinking of Buddhism.) The Marxist project is grounded in dialectical materialism, not in the supposed 'benevolence' of human beings. I think the author is getting Marx mixed up with Rousseau and workers with Rousseau's 'noble savages'.

I agree that the article makes caricatures of several positions (including what 'clinical psychology' apparently shows), but there's plenty in Marxism to support the view that they conceived of human beings as possessing a 'benevolent communal nature', even in the shortest comprehensive text (The Communist Manifesto) - primitive communism.

The whole idea of Historical Materialism's teleological trajectory was that human beings have been further and further abstracted from this ideal state of 'primitive communism' in parallel with the development of the means of production, but that ultimately the final state of 'communism' will be in accord with our essential human nature as 'benevolent, communal' creatures once the means of production have been sufficiently developed.

Then there is the whole part about suffering and how the Buddhist conception of suffering is akin to the Marxist one. I won't even go into the detail of it because I don't agree with how suffering is conceptualized for Marxism, but roughly speaking, suffering from the Buddhist viewpoint is intrinsic to human existence, i.e. it is a function of impermanence; while for Marxism it is (at best) extrinsic, i.e. fostered by the capitalist system. So it doesn't really seem to make much sense to equate one with the other.

This point contradicts the one you made above, but is self-consistent.

Sorry to be a dick about this, but I don't think the article did misunderstand Marxism on a fundamental level - the only objections that can be leveled at it really are that it caricatures it, but none of what it 'caricatures' are key to the argument.

Apart from that, though, there are parallels to be drawn between Marxism and Buddhism - resonant positions - more than there are divergences, so I'm not sure what the basis of your critique is. It's a short, popular article that makes a simple point; it can't be expected to capture much nuance or complexity.

 

[Ren]

but there's plenty in Marxism to support the view that they conceived of human beings as possessing a 'benevolent communal nature', even in the shortest comprehensive text (The Communist Manifesto) - primitive communism.

Are you sure primitive communism is predicated upon the benevolence of human beings? This doesn't seem obvious to me.

This point contradicts the one you made above, but is self-consistent.

I don't think so, but perhaps my phrasing of "suffering is intrinsic to human existence" was misleading. I think there is, roughly speaking, a distinction between what characterizes essence and what characterizes existence. If human being is defined as "inherently benevolent", this points to an essential characteristic of human being that it has in itself. That human being suffers, by contrast, is not characteristic of human being in itself but rather in the context of its existence, insofar as this existence involves impermanence, etc. What I would add, though, and which perhaps goes more in your direction, is that I'm not sure the Buddhist position (if I'm doing any justice to it with my words) is ultimately consistent, because it would have to account for why human being experiences impermanence in such a way as to suffer, whereas other beings presumably do not experience this suffering; and this seems to 'single out' human being in comparison with other beings.

Sorry to be a dick about this, but I don't think the article did misunderstand Marxism on a fundamental level - the only objections that can be leveled at it really are that it caricatures it, but none of what it 'caricatures' are key to the argument.

Apart from that, though, there are parallels to be drawn between Marxism and Buddhism - resonant positions - more than there are divergences, so I'm not sure what the basis of your critique is. It's a short, popular article that makes a simple point; it can't be expected to capture much nuance or complexity.

I consider that I have fairly well articulated the basis of my critique. You're free to disagree with it, but I'm afraid I can't say much more than I have already developed. Maybe we just disagree, and that would be okay?

 

[Deleted member 16771]

Are you sure primitive communism is predicated upon the benevolence of human beings? This doesn't seem obvious to me.

No, but the truth-condition of my statement isn't the logical necessity of primitive communism being predicated upon the benevolence of human beings, but the empirical reality of whether the Marxists/early Marxists entertained such a belief. I'm pretty sure that they did, at least by implication, but proving that would involve more reading than either of us would be willing to do, I'm sure, lol.

Apart from this, it would be easy to imagine some game-theoretic conditions whereby 'primitive communism' was the 'rational', 'self-interest-driven', result, and so no, I don't think that either intrinsic 'benevolence' or an intrinsic communal instinct is necessary for it.

I don't think so, but perhaps my phrasing of "suffering is intrinsic to human existence" was misleading. I think there is, roughly speaking, a distinction between what characterizes essence and what characterizes existence. If human being is defined as "inherently benevolent", this points to an essential characteristic of human being that it has in itself. That human being suffers, by contrast, is not characteristic of human being in itself but rather in the context of its existence, insofar as this existence involves impermanence, etc. What I would add, though, and which perhaps goes more in your direction, is that I'm not sure the Buddhist position (if I'm doing any justice to it with my words) is ultimately consistent, because it would have to account for why human being experiences impermanence in such a way as to suffer, whereas other beings presumably do not experience this suffering; and this seems to 'single out' human being in comparison with other beings.

Hmm, again we're coming up against empirical questions here, in that we need to be able to say that other conscious beings who experience impermanence do not suffer, and I'm not sure either that this is true or that we can readily find out the answer.

As to your distinction between essence and existence, here we seem to be back towards this idea of 'relationism' in tovlo's words, since I cannot imagine how the 'essence' of human being could ever be abstracted out from its existence/experience.

For example, take this thought experiment: is it possible to place a human being in something like a 'controlled laboratory condition' whereby variables are removed? Suppose we tried to do this by having a person live out their entire lives in a blank white box - would we figure out anything meaningful about the 'essence' of human being as distinct from its various social contexts? It seems to me that it is not possible to remove variables as much as set them to minimal levels.

Now imagine if we could design a scenario whereby every human need was satisfied - would this person then experience suffering? If yes, then suffering looks like it's inherent to human essence; if no then suffering is only inherent to experience/existence. The former might look like Buddhism, the latter the 'Marxist metaphysics' imagined by the article.

I'm tired and waffling, but I hope you see what I'm getting at (which is to agree with you, I think).

 

[Deleted member 16771]

Now imagine if we could design a scenario whereby every human need was satisfied - would this person then experience suffering? If yes, then suffering looks like it's inherent to human essence; if no then suffering is only inherent to experience/existence. The former might look like Buddhism, the latter the 'Marxist metaphysics' imagined by the article.

Or much simpler - we could imagine someone living out their entire lives in chemically-induced bliss, but even here there are parts of his brain dedicated to managing experiences he will never have.

 

[Ren]

Hmm, again we're coming up against empirical questions here, in that we need to be able to say that other conscious beings who experience impermanence do not suffer, and I'm not sure either that this is true or that we can readily find out the answer.

Very true. Perhaps other beings experiencing impermanence suffer as well, in their own way; this is in fact quite close to some arguments I sketch in my own writings. Maybe this position is bound to remain speculative at this point.

s to your distinction between essence and existence, here we seem to be back towards this idea of 'relationism' in tovlo's words, since I cannot imagine how the 'essence' of human being could ever be abstracted out from its existence/experience.

For example, take this thought experiment: is it possible to place a human being in something like a 'controlled laboratory condition' whereby variables are removed? Suppose we tried to do this by having a person live out their entire lives in a blank white box - would we figure out anything meaningful about the 'essence' of human being as distinct from its various social contexts? It seems to me that it is not possible to remove variables as much as set them to minimal levels.

(...)

I'm tired and waffling, but I hope you see what I'm getting at (which is to agree with you, I think).

Yes, I do think we agree here I also think such an experiment would set the variables at minimal levels rather than remove them.

What indirectly convinced me of this was a series of arguments in Wittgenstein's Investigations. I've to head to Milan soon lol but I'll try to think of re-outlining them and do justice to their intuitive power.

 

[Krypton]

The current discussion seems like an extension of the nature vs. nurture debate, and since we know that there are some genetic predispositions to personality traits I don't think you can say that people are solely a product of their relations.

In fact, I'd go a step further and say you could treat their previous nurture in a similar way to their genetics. It made them what they are, but it is still them, and the actions that are the product of it are from their cultivated personality.

So yeah, Compatibilism ftw.

 

[jn56uytrx]

philosophical terms what you're grasping is the nature of Hegel's Geist as it pertains to the self of Cartesian Cogito ('I think therefore I am' as a foundational basis of reality). I'll attach an article that explains it, but I'll be back, too.

I finally finished the article!!!!

Then I went back and re-read your summary post.

It makes sense. It makes so much sense to me.

Not in a way I can practically integrate yet, but in a way that seems like it's drilling in toward something I already know, and have always known.

You are real as an I Think, as the perceiving core of the universe. Nothing can be known to be real, except you. Not 'you', as in your history, your relationships or even your personality, but the 'you' that is the active perception of the universe right in this moment; i.e. the I Think.

Yes. Following.

In this moment, as you perceive the universe, you are the expression of Geist; of the 'universal consciousness'. 'You' are nothing else. That is an altogether different thing than what people see when they look at the 'empirical you', your body

Yes. This feels like what I know and have chased after when I have seen angles of it in the funhouse mirrors that are human life...or Indra's jewels.

This is the Western equivalent of that Buddhist 'no-self' and it captures the formlessness of consciousness which you describe.

I was interested in the idea of "no-ownership theory of consciousness" mentioned at the end. If you have more to direct me towards on this front, I would welcome it.

So 'you', as the Geist, are the universal perceiver of the universe - it's absolute centre - and so everything that can be said to exist must, by definition, be reflected into you; be perceived by you; by 'mind'.

Yes.

This means that the 'you' that is the Geist/Cogito/I Think cannot escape being connected with every horror that you perceive. In fundamental ways, you are those horrors, because you perceive and understand them literally as the universe perceives them.

Yes.

However, there is a 'body' vaguely connected to, and under the control of this universal mind, and that we can call a 'self'. It's perfectly possible to animate this self with your will by choosing those facets you wish it to exhibit, but this can only be done moment to moment, when presented with choices.

Yes. This is where it gets more into how to practically live this understanding. Again, if you have more information/thoughts on this, I welcome them.

You are nothing but the memory of choices you think you have made, and so in that sense all you are is relational, yes. If you think about this too hard, it is very easy to dissolve your entire sense of self/body into nothingness because ultimately the experience of Geist - of the universal consciousness - is incapable of being individuated, it just 'is'.

Truthfully, I feel it is a life's journey to dissolve my entire sense of self/body into nothingness. I don't know why I believe this, I just know I believe I came from nothingness into "me" (whatever that is) and that life is a process of fully experiencing "me" and then letting it dissolve back into nothingness.

Perhaps I (and all of us) are the spark of light reflecting from jewels on the net.

I feel on the cusp of letting "me" go. On the cusp of really knowing the fleeting nature of "me" and letting that influence how I reflect while I still reflect.

It makes sense that I am wrestling with interpersonal dynamics/spirituality, if so. I need to understand the relationships to understand "me," perhaps.

 

[Deleted member 16771]

I was interested in the idea of "no-ownership theory of consciousness" mentioned at the end. If you have more to direct me towards on this front, I would welcome it.

Hmm, not that I can think of, but I'll keep an eye open. Robert C. Solomon's other works might provide a window, but I'm not sure.

Yes. This is where it gets more into how to practically live this understanding. Again, if you have more information/thoughts on this, I welcome them.

'How to practically live this understanding'... I'll have to get back to you on this, but essentially it might entail a divorce from the perceiving you (Cogito/I Think/Geist) and the collection of past choices that you imagine to constrain you by way of your 'personality'. In other words, it might allow you to make completely 'free' choices when the expectations of 'self' are seen to be fictitious.

 

[jn56uytrx]

'How to practically live this understanding'... I'll have to get back to you on this, but essentially it might entail a divorce from the perceiving you (Cogito/I Think/Geist) and the collection of past choices that you imagine to constrain you by way of your 'personality'. In other words, it might allow you to make completely 'free' choices when the expectations of 'self' are seen to be fictitious.

Whoa. I'm going to have to sit with that for a bit.

I welcome further thoughts.

 

[Ifur]

The current discussion seems like an extension of the nature vs. nurture debate, and since we know that there are some genetic predispositions to personality traits I don't think you can say that people are solely a product of their relations.

In fact, I'd go a step further and say you could treat their previous nurture in a similar way to their genetics. It made them what they are, but it is still them, and the actions that are the product of it are from their cultivated personality.

So yeah, Compatibilism ftw.

I think this is highly relevant here, one can say there is a distribution of types, ranging from intelligence; to where neuroscientists that have looked at too many brain scans, are able to guess what the brain looks like w.r.t. folds depending on the shape of the head. Another thing learned here is for example how high maths ability seem to use the mind more efficiently, perhaps due to not needing as much cognitive compensation, or having knowledge and thought patterns more readily available.

Jung speaks about the naive type and sentimental type in much of the same way to differentiate what may seem to be a preference and distnction between the personal journey in the natural world or imagining it differently. Without having read too much however, some may be interested in that as well, as it deals with poetry in connection with his analysis of many authors treatment of types. So think it is correct to mention this in contrast with nature vs. nurture debate, and this topic wasn't covered in great depth, something similar can perhaps be said about "engineers" and being prior to the more detailed descriptions, gives more room to discuss what attitudes contribute, introversion or extroversion, as an "aww" this could have been done better, or "aww" this can be fixed quickly -- seeing someone else doing it, or abstractin own experiences and so on, ah well.... There might be room for taking a mark to discuss this, as many of these terms are useful in navigating, going across and sideways a little.

Edit: Had to clean up, I was not worthy of likes. And think I managed to use "taking mark" correctly?

 

[Ren]

The current discussion seems like an extension of the nature vs. nurture debate, and since we know that there are some genetic predispositions to personality traits I don't think you can say that people are solely a product of their relations.

In fact, I'd go a step further and say you could treat their previous nurture in a similar way to their genetics. It made them what they are, but it is still them, and the actions that are the product of it are from their cultivated personality.

So yeah, Compatibilism ftw.

I'd personally be inclined to agree with you, but I think it is possible to conceive of both genetic predispositions and environmental nurturing in terms of relations. In a way, if you you broaden the concept of relation a little, genetic predispositions express a functional relation to your ancestry. They don't indicate selfhood by themselves. I think the debate is more about substantiality vs asubstantiality.

 

[Deleted member 16771]

I think the debate is more about substantiality vs asubstantiality.

What the fuck is that?

 

[Ren]

What the fuck is that?

In-itself versus no in-itself?

Substance versus no substance. I guess insubstantiality would have been less confusing ^^