Nietzsche meets Wittgenstein

[Ren]

This guy is probably the greatest philosopher in history.

On what basis?

Not a rhetorical question, just genuinely wondering what standards you have in mind.

He's pretty gut.

 

[Pin]

@Deleted member 16771

I'd marry Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe.

 

[Ren]

Wittgenstein wrote a long-ass book to basically say, maybe there's a God. Lots of stuff about language, logic. I just don't understand why he did anything.

Tractatus is 75 pages long.

 

[Ren]

@Deleted member 16771

I'd marry Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe.

I believe she's taken (by INTP philosopher and Analytical Thomist Peter Geach FYI)

 

[Ren]

I sure can't wait to get back to this in a couple of weeks.

I remember browsing through Tractatus about a year ago and I immediately saw some parallels, but I can't find anything now. That was also when I was in the middle of reading BGE, so the connections would have been fresher.

No problem, maybe further posts will stimulate you / cause you to reminisce a bit!

 

[Sidis Coruscatis]

I think they're more hopeful than Nietzsche, Camus, and Sartre.

What I will say is this, Camus is the most hopeful and pleasant to read of the three when he writes about playing on the beach (hard to find that essay).

I don't know Pin, Camus has that sort of wistful longing but seems to me that Nietzsche was rather one of the most hopeful ones. For all his condemnations and contempt towards the state of humanity, he cared A LOT. More importantly, he was trying to bring joy back into this life instead of relegating it to the afterlife.

 

[Pin]

On what basis?

Not a rhetorical question, just genuinely wondering what standards you have in mind.

He's pretty gut.

When I read Aristotle, I can clearly follow the progression to Aquinas on the topic of virtue ethics, theism, and natural law.

 

[Pin]

Tractatus is 75 pages long.

Yeah, but it takes like 5 hours to read man. It's written so awkwardly.

 

[Pin]

@Ren

But yeah, I'll go back and try to understand Wittgenstein's metaphysical view because my sense was that he was rehashing much of Plato.

 

[Ren]

@Ren

But yeah, I'll go back and try to understand Wittgenstein's metaphysical view because my sense was that he was rehashing much of Plato.

You won't find a metaphysical view as such, or at least not explicitly. In any case, hopefully you'll get a glimpse into that when I develop the point sketched in my original post.

 

[Ren]

Yeah, but it takes like 5 hours to read man. It's written so awkwardly.

I think it's beautifully written actually!

 

[Sidis Coruscatis]

This is another detour from the original topic, but I'm currently reading Chesterton and I see some overlap with Nietzche's metaphysics, despite Chesterton not being a fan of him. Consider these passages:

"It is foolish, generally speaking, for a philosopher to set fire to another philosopher in Smithfield Market because they do not agree in their theory of the universe. That was done very frequently in the last decadence of the Middle Ages, and it failed altogether in its object. But there is one thing that is infinitely more absurd and unpractical than burning a man for his philosophy. This is the habit of saying that his philosophy does not matter, and this is done universally in the twentieth century, in the decadence of the great revolutionary period. General theories are everywhere contemned; the doctrine of the Rights of Man is dismissed with the doctrine of the Fall of Man. Atheism itself is too theological for us to-day. Revolution itself is too much of a system; liberty itself is too much of a restraint. We will have no generalizations. Mr. Bernard Shaw has put the view in a perfect epigram: "The golden rule is that there is no golden rule." We are more and more to discuss details in art, politics, literature. A man's opinion on tramcars matters; his opinion on Botticelli matters; his opinion on all things does not matter. He may turn over and explore a million objects, but he must not find that strange object, the universe; for if he does he will have a religion,and be lost. Everything matters--except everything."

And

"When everything about a people is for the time growing weak and ineffective, it begins to talk about efficiency. So it is that when a man's body is a wreck he begins, for the first time, to talk about health. Vigorous organisms talk not about their processes, but about their aims. There cannot be any better proof of the physical efficiency of a man than that he talks cheerfully of a journey to the end of the world. And there cannot be any better proof of the practical efficiency of a nation than that it talks constantly of a journey to the end of the world, a journey to the Judgment Day and the New Jerusalem. There can be no stronger sign of a coarse material health than the tendency to run after high and wild ideals; it is in the first exuberance of infancy that we cry for the moon. None of the strong men in the strong ages would have understood what you meant by working for efficiency. Hildebrand would have said that he was working not for efficiency, but for the Catholic Church. Danton would have said that he was working not for efficiency, but for liberty, equality, and fraternity. Even if the ideal of such men were simply the ideal of kicking a man downstairs, they thought of the end like men, not of the process like paralytics. They did not say, "Efficiently elevating my right leg, using, you will notice, the muscles of the thigh and calf, which are in excellent order, I--" Their feeling was quite different. They were so filled with the beautiful vision of the man lying flat at the foot of the staircase that in that ecstasy the rest followed in a flash. In practice, the habit of generalizing and idealizing did not by any means mean worldly weakness. The time of big theories was the time of big results. In the era of sentiment and fine words, at the end of the eighteenth century, men were really robust and effective. The sentimentalists conquered Napoleon. The cynics could not catch De Wet. A hundred years ago our affairs for good or evil were wielded triumphantly by rhetoricians. Now our affairs are hopelessly muddled by strong, silent men. And just as this repudiation of big words and big visions has brought forth a race of small men in politics, so it has brought forth a race of small men in the arts. Our modern politicians claim the colossal license of Caesar and the Superman, claim that they are too practical to be pure and too patriotic to be moral; but the upshot of it all is that a mediocrity is Chancellor of the Exchequer."

Both of them point at a shift in the Western mode of viewing the world - namely that intuition itself has been devalued and grand narratives have become embarrassing. One is too ashamed to believe today, he is only allowed to know. But for both, there exists an existential imperative to shake off the delusions of "objectivity" (in the sense of objective scientific value being the highest truth) and create our higher ideals if we are to function in a healthy manner and build a healthy society. As a side note, they are also the most quotable writers I've ever seen.

 

[Sidis Coruscatis]

Okay, I'll add one more but just because it cracks me up.

Every one of the popular modern phrases and ideals is a dodge in order to shirk the problem of what is good. We are fond of talking about "liberty"; that, as we talk of it, is a dodge to avoid discussing what is good. We are fond of talking about "progress"; that is a dodge to avoid discussing what is good. We are fond of talking about "education"; that is a dodge to avoid discussing what is good. The modern man says, "Let us leave all these arbitrary standards and embrace liberty." This is, logically rendered, "Let us not decide what is good, but let it be considered good not to decide it." He says, "Away with your old moral formulae; I am for progress." This, logically stated, means, "Let us not settle what is good; but let us settle whether we are getting more of it." He says, "Neither in religion nor morality, my friend, lie the hopes of the race, but in education." This, clearly expressed, means, "We cannot decide what is good, but let us give it to our children."

 

[Ren]

This guy is probably the greatest philosopher in history.

Bertrand Russell doesn't agree with you. How do you counter his points?

------

Russell:

"In its general outlines, the philosophy of Aquinas agrees with that of Aristotle, and will be accepted or rejected by a reader in the measure in which he accepts or rejects the philosophy of the Stagyrite. The originality of Aquinas is shown in his adaptation of Aristotle to Christian dogma, with a minimum of alteration. In his day he was considered a bold innovator; even after his death many of his doctrines were condemned by the universities of Paris and Oxford. He was even more remarkable for systematizing than for originality. Even if every one of his doctrines were mistaken, the Summa would remain an imposing intellectual edifice. When he wishes to refute some doctrine, he states it first, often with great force, and almost always with an attempt at fairness. The sharpness and clarity with which he distinguishes arguments derived from reason and arguments derived from revelation are admirable. He knows Aristotle well, and understands him thoroughly, which cannot be said of any earlier Catholic philosopher.

These merits, however, seem scarcely sufficient to justify his immense reputation. The appeal to reason is, in a sense, insincere, since the conclusion to be reached is fixed in advance. Take, for example, the indissolubility of marriage. This is advocated on the ground that the father is useful in the education of the children, (a) because he is more rational than the mother, (b) because, being stronger, he is better able to inflict physical punishment. A modern educator might retort (a) that there is no reason to suppose men in general more rational than women, (b) that the sort of punishment that requires great physical strength is not desirable in education. He might go on to point out that fathers, in the modern world, have scarcely any part in education. But no follower of Saint Thomas would, on that account, cease to believe in lifelong monogamy, because the real grounds of belief are not those which are alleged.

Or take again the arguments professing to prove the existence of God. All of these, except the one from teleology in lifeless things, depend upon the supposed impossibility of a series having no first term. Every mathematician knows that there is no such impossibility; the series of negative integers ending with minus one is an instance to the contrary. But here again no Catholic is likely to abandon belief in God even if he becomes convinced that Saint Thomas's arguments are bad; he will invent other arguments, or take refuge in revelation.

The contentions that God's essence and existence are one and the same, that God is His own goodness, His own power, and so on, suggest a confusion, found in Plato, but supposed to have been avoided by Aristotle, between the manner of being of particulars and the manner of being of universals. God's essence is, one must suppose, of the nature of universals, while His existence is not. It is not easy to state this difficulty satisfactorily, since it occurs within a logic that can no longer be accepted. But it points clearly to some kind of syntactical confusion, without which much of the argumentation about God would lose its plausibility.

There is little of the true philosophic spirit in Aquinas. He does not, like the Platonic Socrates, set out to follow wherever the argument may lead. He is not engaged in an inquiry, the result of which it is impossible to know in advance. Before he begins to philosophize, he already knows the truth; it is declared in the Catholic faith. If he can find apparently rational arguments for some parts of the faith, so much the better; if he cannot, he need only fall back on revelation. The finding of arguments for a conclusion given in advance is not philosophy, but special pleading. I cannot, therefore, feel that he deserves to be put on a level with the best philosophers either of Greece or of modern times."

History of Western Philosophy, pp. 462-463

 

[philostam]

@Ren, you recommended me History of Western philosophy, but I must say I really dislike this Russel guy.

There's too much judging going on in this book. I find his approach very superficial and counter productive. Like 15 pages per philosopher, and for a lot of them he basically says that in they are 'overrated' or 'wrong'.

 

[Ren]

@Ren, you recommended me History of Western philosophy, but I must say I really dislike this Russel guy.

There's too much judging going on in this book. I find his approach very superficial and counter productive. Like 15 pages per philosopher, and for a lot of them he basically says that in they are 'overrated' or 'wrong'.

Do you have examples?

 

[Ren]

Russell is very opinionated, but that's what I find so refreshing and entertaining about his book. He doesn't mince his words.

Another good and much less opinionated history of western philosophy is that of Anthony Kenny, if you find the latter's approach more to your taste.

 

[philostam]

Do you have examples?

Even just innocent comments like these bother me:

"Immanuel Kant ( 1724-1804) is generally considered the greatest of modern philosophers. I cannot myself agree with this estimate, but it would be foolish not to recognize his great importance."

This is not that bad, but why does he have to say it? If you want to introduce someone to philosophy or make them passionate about it, I would think you don't want to 'denigrate' the giants like Kant. Also, I want to judge for myself, and his judgements just get in the way.

It's after all just one guys opinion. It's his book and he's welcome to express it of course, but for me it's a wrong approach. It's kinda like a genius mathematician teaching basic algebra and showing no passion for it because it's too 'basic'.

Also who does he even like besides his pal Wittgenstein? xD

 

[philostam]

If I learned anything over the years, it's that judging a thing is easier than understanding it from the correct point of view (not from your perspective).

We all have opinions, but it's not helpful to just drop your opinions as fixed thing before someone else. Our opinions/conclusions are part of the process of education and were derived (hopefully) from laborious studying and reflection. Just presenting the conclusion of this process, without the process itself, is ineffective.

It's like learning a subject from Wikipedia. You get only conclusions, but not the process. Only that Russell is even worse than Wikipedia, because at least Wikipedia tries to remain impartial and professional.

Anyway, this is off topic. Please continue with your discussions...

 

[Sidis Coruscatis]

If I learned anything over the years, it's that judging a thing is easier than understanding it from the correct point of view (not from your perspective).

We all have opinions, but it's not helpful to just drop your opinions as fixed thing before someone else. Our opinions/conclusions are part of the process of education and were derived (hopefully) from laborious studying and reflection. Just presenting the conclusion of this process, without the process itself, is ineffective.

It's like learning a subject from Wikipedia. You get only conclusions, but not the process.

Anyway, this is off topic. Please continue with your discussions...

It's ineffective but often necessary. When you spend years pondering something abstract in order to understand it, you have to synthesize large amounts of information to produce more digestible truths. But the communication of these truths to others is not commensurable with the form in which they exist within yourself, because it's impossible to retain all those turning points that led you to your current conclusion - the whole process of learning and understanding is about simplification.

The only way how to go around this would be writing an actual book to provide a thorough systematic diagram of that conclusion, but then again understanding the book itself might necessitate reading other books that provide building blocks for a full interpretative framework. It's really a mess. I don't think this is a bad thing though - if everything was equally understandable, there would be no reason to pick one system over another because they all make sense, which subsequently leads to dissipation where nothing really matters because everything is correct.

But Russell is still kind of a dick lol.