This thread is intended to explore the commonalities in Wittgenstein's and Nietzsche's philosophies.
*drumroll*
A good starting point, I think, is that Wittgenstein and Nietzsche share a fundamental rejection of traditional metaphysics. Wittgenstein openly sought to reveal metaphysics as nonsense with his theory of logical atomism; while Heidegger says at several junctures of Being and Time that Western metaphysics ended with Nietzsche. I think that Nietzsche's critique of what he calls "hidden worlds" can be seen as a metaphorical equivalent of Wittgenstein's description of his post-metaphysical philosophy as "a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language" (i.e. the language of metaphysics).
That being said, each thinker has a peculiar and quite distinct ontology. What there is, from Wittgenstein's viewpoint, are facts or states of affairs. For Nietzsche there is (in my reading of him) will to power. Neither thinker wants to give a metaphysical definition of these ontological concepts, so we must assume that both Wittgensteinian facts and Nietzschean will to power are immanent within the world around us. In other words, they are not "hidden" under layers of intangible substances. Importantly, they cannot be reduced to essences, either.
I think it is the commitment to the un-hiddenness of the structure of the world which brings these two philosophers together. There is something aesthetic, perhaps almost religious, about their conception of truth. For them, the truth shows itself, it is something that we can see. Falsity has no essence except as the looking away from truth, either by means of hidden worlds (Nietzsche), abstruse metaphysical language or logical mistakes (Wittgenstein). Importantly, this implies that truth is not strictly a product of reason. A logically incorrect statement only fails to capture the truth of the fact---it is a failure of seeing, in a sense. Nietzsche also seeks clarity of vision, and though admittedly he emphasises intuition over logic, I don't think Wittgenstein conceives of logic in the way traditional logicians do. In his words, "logic pervades the world".
The trick is to investigate whether facts and will to power can be conceptually reconciled, and also whether, assuming this can be done, the result is/is not a metaphysical system unto itself. Are Wittgensteinian facts inherently perspectivistic? Is Nietzschean will to power translatable into facts?
Friends, the floor is yours!
PS. Let me know if I should word things in a simpler way for the philosophy dilettantes among us.
*drumroll*
A good starting point, I think, is that Wittgenstein and Nietzsche share a fundamental rejection of traditional metaphysics. Wittgenstein openly sought to reveal metaphysics as nonsense with his theory of logical atomism; while Heidegger says at several junctures of Being and Time that Western metaphysics ended with Nietzsche. I think that Nietzsche's critique of what he calls "hidden worlds" can be seen as a metaphorical equivalent of Wittgenstein's description of his post-metaphysical philosophy as "a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language" (i.e. the language of metaphysics).
That being said, each thinker has a peculiar and quite distinct ontology. What there is, from Wittgenstein's viewpoint, are facts or states of affairs. For Nietzsche there is (in my reading of him) will to power. Neither thinker wants to give a metaphysical definition of these ontological concepts, so we must assume that both Wittgensteinian facts and Nietzschean will to power are immanent within the world around us. In other words, they are not "hidden" under layers of intangible substances. Importantly, they cannot be reduced to essences, either.
I think it is the commitment to the un-hiddenness of the structure of the world which brings these two philosophers together. There is something aesthetic, perhaps almost religious, about their conception of truth. For them, the truth shows itself, it is something that we can see. Falsity has no essence except as the looking away from truth, either by means of hidden worlds (Nietzsche), abstruse metaphysical language or logical mistakes (Wittgenstein). Importantly, this implies that truth is not strictly a product of reason. A logically incorrect statement only fails to capture the truth of the fact---it is a failure of seeing, in a sense. Nietzsche also seeks clarity of vision, and though admittedly he emphasises intuition over logic, I don't think Wittgenstein conceives of logic in the way traditional logicians do. In his words, "logic pervades the world".
The trick is to investigate whether facts and will to power can be conceptually reconciled, and also whether, assuming this can be done, the result is/is not a metaphysical system unto itself. Are Wittgensteinian facts inherently perspectivistic? Is Nietzschean will to power translatable into facts?
Friends, the floor is yours!
PS. Let me know if I should word things in a simpler way for the philosophy dilettantes among us.
