Basically that it's probably one of the very first things, seemingly trivial but crucial, to add in when one wants to move towards intelligence.
That bit was so interesting man, thanks for that I like how you managed to "reconcile" Popper's view with the pragmatist's utility-based approach that I tried to express - from an outsider's perspective - in one of my earlier posts.Also, for those who suggest that the fact something hasn't been falsified till now does not imply much confidence about the future, Popper is still addressing that. He's saying that, if our theory is highly falsifiable, we'd find that it can be destroyed quite easily. So, one might surmise, if it hasn't been destroyed yet, it's proven its use {BTW, in reference to some of Ren's discussions, here's when there's some sliver of pragmatism that creeps into a theory that's nonetheless aiming for truth, not just to be useful}.
That bit was so interesting man, thanks for that I like how you managed to "reconcile" Popper's view with the pragmatist's utility-based approach that I tried to express - from an outsider's perspective - in one of my earlier posts.
@wolly.green Do you think this is consistent with Popper's arguments in Conjectures and Refutations?
There seem to be various flavors of pragmatism.
I think the main point that would be contested by some of the modern pragmatists (who reject logical positivism about as thoroughly as Popper would) is whether we can falsify theories. The reason this is crucial is that Popper draws the distinction between knowing one's theory is wholly true and knowing it is false.... that we can know it's false is part of why he views what some frame as induction as actually deductive.
Now someone like Hume perhaps would ask: so what if we falsified a theory -- even if we know certain regularities do not always hold, perhaps they will in the future, and perhaps they won't. That we falsify a theory that they always hold doesn't do much, by this view, because the prediction is part of the theory, and the predictive range is also something we can vary. Since we can vary it as much as we like, perhaps radical skepticism beckons again. That is, if a theory suggesting certain predictions has held till some point in time, unfortunately we can't, it seems, tell between a variation that says they hold till that point and don't from then on out.... until we in fact discover it wasn't falsified.
This ties in with the black swan theoryThis thread is about induction. So is induction possible? Is it possible to derive scientific knowledge – or any knowledge for that matter – from inductive inferences? Sunrise is the famous example that is used to illustrate induction, so we will start with that. Don’t worry if you’re scratchy on the details, it will all make sense soon.
We have all experienced a sunrise. It’s that time of day when the sun ascends above the horizon and into the sky. Over the years, we have come to not only know what a sunrise is, but to actively expect it. Morning after morning, we all expect the sun will rise, even if we cannot see it beyond a cloudy sky. And surely enough, morning after morning our expectations are verified. But how did we come to know and expect that the sun will rise? Induction says that we “know” the sun will rise because we have extrapolated it from experience. Day after day, we have exactly the same experience of the sun ascending above the horizon, and thus extrapolate from those experiences that it will ascend again in the future. However, is this really how we come to “know”? Do we really gain knowledge about what to expect by extrapolating from experience? I want to argue that this cannot be the case. One problem to consider is: how do we ever know when two experiences are the same?
How do I know when two experiences are identical? I may have experienced a sunrise today, but how do I know that I have experienced a sunrise in the past? I may label these two experiences with the same name – I may call them both ‘a sunrise’ – but how do I know they are the same? One answer is: I can say two experiences are identical if I experience them under the same conditions. For example, I know that one condition for a ‘sunrise’ is that it must happen in the morning. I know another is that it cannot without a sun. But this leads to a further question: how do you know which conditions are related to which experience? The answer, I think, is because our explanations tell us so. The fact that a particular experience is related to some set of conditions is itself a conjecture; a creative leap of imagination. But if we come to know two things are related though conjecture, then our prediction that the sun will rise in the future has nothing to do with extrapolation. Which implies that knowledge cannot be derived through induction.
What about a law? There could be a law of induction that tells us when two experiences are identical. If we had such a law, we could use it to make inductive inferences because it answers our question: how do we know two experiences are the same? However, the problem with this approach is that no one has yet discovered such a law. No one has yet to formulate one that is useful for deriving knowledge from experience. Therefore, until it has been discovered, it cannot be used to ‘justify’ induction.
In short, experience cannot be used to make predictions about the future. Nor can it be used to derive knowledge about anything. Thoughts?
This ties in with the black swan theory
I can’t use big words like you doHi Flufiang.
What is Black Swan Theory and how does it relate?
Shared experience might have the ability to predict some determination in future.Most of the time, I believe experience does determine the future.
That's a nice one @PinHowever, it's important to have the foresight to know when that doesn't ring true.
Shared experience might have the ability to predict some determination in future.
That's a nice one @Pin