What kind of philosophy do you enjoy the most?
- Thread starter Ren
- Start date
Thanks for this @Roobarb&Custard ! There was a lot to unpack in your message but I think I have a better idea now of what makes the Mahayana branch unique within Buddhism. I know very little about this, so if I unwittingly distort your meaning don't hesitate to let me know.
First of all, let me make a nerdy joke and say that I wish Schopenhauer had known about the Mahayana branch, it probably would have made him less of a pessimist in his thinking about the Will. Anyway!
I like this idea of inclusiveness and interrelatedness between the 10 worlds, and I see how this metaphysical foundation allows, in 'practical life' decisions, for the possibility for genuine value creating and turing crisis into opportunity. I have two questions: First of all, what do you mean by potential when you say 'hell has the potential for buddhahood'? Do you mean the potential to become it, or bleed into it? And second, I'm wondering about free will. Does Buddhism, and the Mahayana branch and particular, accept free will as, vulgarly speaking, a western humanist would? I am interested to know how somebody can come to 'decide' to turn crisis into opportunity, what allows them to make that decision.
Let me know if my questions make no sense
@Ren
In one stance ... (again, in the context of multiple filterings through the minds of men.)
We find examples of the critical stance both in some Platonic dialogues and in some sophistic writings. The starkest expression of the opposition between nomos and phusis is that expressed in the Gorgias by Callicles, a pupil of Gorgias (though there is no suggestion in the dialogue or elsewhere that Gorgias himself held that position): Callicles holds that conventional morality is a contrivance devised by the weak and unintelligent to inhibit the strong and intelligent from doing what they are entitled by nature to do, viz. exploit their inferiors for their own advantage. He is thus an inverted moralist, who holds that what it is really right to do is what it is conventionally wrong to do. The true, authoritative norms are those which prevail in nature, as shown by the behavior of non-human animals such as beasts of prey; those who act in accordance with these norms ‘do these things in accordance with the nature of justice and … the law of nature, but perhaps not in accordance with this one which we lay down’ (Plato, Gorgias, 483e). The sophist Thrasymachus maintains a similar position in Book I of the Republic, though without Callicles' daring inversion of values. He agrees with Callicles in praising the ruthless individual (above all the tyrant) who is capable of overcoming the restraints of morality, but whereas Callicles calls such self-assertion naturally just, Thrasymachus abides by conventional morality in calling it unjust. Both agree that a successful life of ruthless self-assertion is supreme happiness, and that that is what nature prompts us to seek; both, then, accept the normative authority of nature over nomos. The difference between them is that Callicles takes the further step of identifying the authority of nature with that of real, as opposed to conventional morality, whereas for Thrasymachus there is only one kind of morality, conventional morality, which has no authority. In Book II Glaucon presents a modified version of Thrasymachus' position; while maintaining, as Protagoras does in the Great Speech, that humans adopt moral conventions as a necessary survival strategy in a hostile world, he insists that this involves a stunting of human nature, since people are obliged for self-protection to abandon the goal of self-satisfaction to which nature, as Thrasymachus insists, prompts them. This assertion of egoism is supported by the thought-experiment of Gyges' ring; if, like the legendary Gyges, we had a magic ring which rendered us invisible, and hence immune from sanctions, we would all seek our own interest without restraint. We find a similar down-grading of convention in favor of nature (though one lacking the immoralist conclusions) in Hippias' speech in the Protagoras (337c–d), where he urges that intellectuals such as are gathered in the house of Callias ought not to quarrel, since, though according to artificial political conventions they are citizens of many different cities, by nature they are all akin.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sophists/#NomPhu
In addition http://quatr.us/greeks/philosophy/rationality.htm
In one stance
... (again, in the context of multiple filterings through the minds of men.)We find examples of the critical stance both in some Platonic dialogues and in some sophistic writings. The starkest expression of the opposition between nomos and phusis is that expressed in the Gorgias by Callicles, a pupil of Gorgias (though there is no suggestion in the dialogue or elsewhere that Gorgias himself held that position): Callicles holds that conventional morality is a contrivance devised by the weak and unintelligent to inhibit the strong and intelligent from doing what they are entitled by nature to do, viz. exploit their inferiors for their own advantage. He is thus an inverted moralist, who holds that what it is really right to do is what it is conventionally wrong to do. The true, authoritative norms are those which prevail in nature, as shown by the behavior of non-human animals such as beasts of prey; those who act in accordance with these norms ‘do these things in accordance with the nature of justice and … the law of nature, but perhaps not in accordance with this one which we lay down’ (Plato, Gorgias, 483e). The sophist Thrasymachus maintains a similar position in Book I of the Republic, though without Callicles' daring inversion of values. He agrees with Callicles in praising the ruthless individual (above all the tyrant) who is capable of overcoming the restraints of morality, but whereas Callicles calls such self-assertion naturally just, Thrasymachus abides by conventional morality in calling it unjust. Both agree that a successful life of ruthless self-assertion is supreme happiness, and that that is what nature prompts us to seek; both, then, accept the normative authority of nature over nomos. The difference between them is that Callicles takes the further step of identifying the authority of nature with that of real, as opposed to conventional morality, whereas for Thrasymachus there is only one kind of morality, conventional morality, which has no authority. In Book II Glaucon presents a modified version of Thrasymachus' position; while maintaining, as Protagoras does in the Great Speech, that humans adopt moral conventions as a necessary survival strategy in a hostile world, he insists that this involves a stunting of human nature, since people are obliged for self-protection to abandon the goal of self-satisfaction to which nature, as Thrasymachus insists, prompts them. This assertion of egoism is supported by the thought-experiment of Gyges' ring; if, like the legendary Gyges, we had a magic ring which rendered us invisible, and hence immune from sanctions, we would all seek our own interest without restraint. We find a similar down-grading of convention in favor of nature (though one lacking the immoralist conclusions) in Hippias' speech in the Protagoras (337c–d), where he urges that intellectuals such as are gathered in the house of Callias ought not to quarrel, since, though according to artificial political conventions they are citizens of many different cities, by nature they are all akin.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sophists/#NomPhu
In addition http://quatr.us/greeks/philosophy/rationality.htm
Last edited:
@Sandie33 thanks for this. That is one hell of a paragraph@Ren
In one stance
We find examples of the critical stance both in some Platonic dialogues and in some sophistic writings. The starkest expression of the opposition between nomos and phusis is that expressed in the Gorgias by Callicles, a pupil of Gorgias (though there is no suggestion in the dialogue or elsewhere that Gorgias himself held that position): Callicles holds that conventional morality is a contrivance devised by the weak and unintelligent to inhibit the strong and intelligent from doing what they are entitled by nature to do, viz. exploit their inferiors for their own advantage. He is thus an inverted moralist, who holds that what it is really right to do is what it is conventionally wrong to do. The true, authoritative norms are those which prevail in nature, as shown by the behavior of non-human animals such as beasts of prey; those who act in accordance with these norms ‘do these things in accordance with the nature of justice and … the law of nature, but perhaps not in accordance with this one which we lay down’ (Plato, Gorgias, 483e). The sophist Thrasymachus maintains a similar position in Book I of the Republic, though without Callicles' daring inversion of values. He agrees with Callicles in praising the ruthless individual (above all the tyrant) who is capable of overcoming the restraints of morality, but whereas Callicles calls such self-assertion naturally just, Thrasymachus abides by conventional morality in calling it unjust. Both agree that a successful life of ruthless self-assertion is supreme happiness, and that that is what nature prompts us to seek; both, then, accept the normative authority of nature over nomos. The difference between them is that Callicles takes the further step of identifying the authority of nature with that of real, as opposed to conventional morality, whereas for Thrasymachus there is only one kind of morality, conventional morality, which has no authority. In Book II Glaucon presents a modified version of Thrasymachus' position; while maintaining, as Protagoras does in the Great Speech, that humans adopt moral conventions as a necessary survival strategy in a hostile world, he insists that this involves a stunting of human nature, since people are obliged for self-protection to abandon the goal of self-satisfaction to which nature, as Thrasymachus insists, prompts them. This assertion of egoism is supported by the thought-experiment of Gyges' ring; if, like the legendary Gyges, we had a magic ring which rendered us invisible, and hence immune from sanctions, we would all seek our own interest without restraint. We find a similar down-grading of convention in favor of nature (though one lacking the immoralist conclusions) in Hippias' speech in the Protagoras (337c–d), where he urges that intellectuals such as are gathered in the house of Callias ought not to quarrel, since, though according to artificial political conventions they are citizens of many different cities, by nature they are all akin.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sophists/#NomPhu
In addition http://quatr.us/greeks/philosophy/rationality.htm
Just as an aside though, I am of course excited to know more about the Sophists, but I am also genuinely interested in your own take on it. I often get a lot of inspiration from people's original take on well-known ideas.
That being said, I shall face this Titan-like paragraph very shortly and hopefully contribute some interesting insights.
Thanks for this and glad to see you back among us. This reminded me of a quote from Either/Or that I somehow kept in my campus room for years:
"If someone possessed a letter which he knew or believed contained information concerning what he had to consider his life’s blessedness, but the written characters were thin and faded, and the handwriting almost illegible, he would read it and reread it, with anxiety and disquiet certainly, but with passion. At one moment he would get one meaning out of it, the next another. When he was quite sure he had managed to read a word, he would interpret everything in the light of that word. But he would never pass beyond the same uncertainty with which he began. He would stare, more and more anxiously, but the more he stared the less he saw; sometimes his eyes filled with tears, but the more that happened, again the less he saw. In due course the writing became weaker and less distinct; finally the paper itself crumbled away and he had nothing left but eyes blinded with tears." (Shadowgraphs)
Yes, I was a chirpy young lad.
Hey guys!
As a massive philosophy fan, and a newbie on this forum, I thought I'd start a conversation about what 'movements' you like most in this most amazing of disciplines.
Are you more into ethics, metaphysics, epistemology, logic, the philosophy of history, aesthetics? Are you most excited by, say, Marxism, Existentialism, Idealism, the Presocratics, the Philosophy of Religion?
Do you like philosophers who lead with insight, like Nietzsche and Wittgenstein? With great rational systems, like Kant and Descartes? Or with a huge heart, like Spinoza and Epictetus?
I want to know all, and I'm really excited to start talking about my life's greatest passion
They aren't discrete organisms; philosophy is like The Blob, just rolling around, always aggregating and incorporating and growing more unwieldy.
Although the West has co-opted his ideas for profit, no one could embrace American values and Taoism, because they are directly opposed, at times.
Tao Te Ching
Fourty-Four
"Fame or integrity: which is more important?
Money or happiness: which is more valuable?
Success of failure: which is more destructive?
If you look to others for fulfillment,
you will never truly be fulfilled.
If your happiness depends on money,
you will never be happy with yourself.
Be content with what you have;
rejoice in the way things are.
When you realize there is nothing lacking,
the whole world belongs to you."
“A good traveler has no fixed plans and is not intent on arriving.”
― Lao Tzu
"Simplicity, patience, compassion.
These three are your greatest treasures.
Simple in actions and thoughts, you return to the source of being.
Patient with both friends and enemies,
you accord with the way things are.
Compassionate toward yourself,
you reconcile all beings in the world.”
― Lao Tzu, Tao Te Ching
We instinctively run from a threat; we veer away from a brawl. All animals strive for harmony because it is logical! Constant stress is not a natural state; we develop brain injury, immune system vulnerabilities, and fail to reach our potential.
This is why I hate Ayn Rand, I guess. Her values.
Hi @Lurk, and thanks for sharing this about Taoism. I have to admit that I know little about it. Would you have a good introductory article to recommend?
About philosophical disciplines as discrete organisms: of course they are not. Did anybody claim such a thing here?
Of course, for a number of reasons, including conversational clarity and precision, the division into disciplines is welcome and probably even necessary. Disciplines do not necessarily share the same methods, and some methods are very specific to certain disciplines. It's also important to be able to refer, within a given discipline, to different sub-disciplines corresponding to different approaches. For example, if one wishes to discuss Ethics, one may enjoy being easily able to refer to what is involved in consequentialist ethics, virtue ethics, or the ethics of duty.
Last edited:
Hi @Lurk, and thanks for sharing this about Taoism. I have to admit that I know little about it. Would you have a good introductory article to recommend?
About philosophical disciplines as discrete organisms: of course they are not. Did anybody claim such a thing here?
I worried I sounded bitchy! I didn't mean to.
I can name a few people who changed how I perceive the world:
John Stewart Mill
Roland Barthes
Jacques Derrida
Ferdinand de Saussure
It's been over a decade.
You didn't sound bitchy, just INTP-esqueI worried I sounded bitchy! I didn't mean to.
I can name a few people who changed how I perceive the world:
John Stewart Mill
Roland Barthes
Jacques Derrida
Ferdinand de Saussure
It's been over a decade.
Your list of people who changed how you perceive the world is very interesting for how diverse it is. You have a utilitarian, a post-structuralist, a semiologist and a white-haired wizardly deconstructionist in there! A testament to your intellectual curiosity in miniature.
Does lack of time explain why it's been ten years?
I hope you guys will enjoy this nerdy joke.
The most? My own. For now.
Might sound quite egoistic but it would be a really shitty one if it was of no good to myself.
Might sound quite egoistic but it would be a really shitty one if it was of no good to myself.
You can be as egoistic as you want my dear @Disguised - you revived my beloved thread and I thank you for that
HahahaYou can be as egoistic as you want my dear @Disguised - you revived my beloved thread and I thank you for that
I'm not, believe me. I get no feelings from compliments, which might seem "cold". Sharing is much more pleasant. I think that everyone forms their own philosophies in the end.
*edit* Your compliments @Ren have brought me energy to share more though, so thank you for that!
I'm being a bit lazy here and not referring to quotes or theory but to say it simply 'hell has the potential for Buddhahood' because we are constantly moving from life state to life state. Have you noticed that, you get a tax rebate, wahaayy! You miss the bus and have an argument or misunderstanding with a colleague at work (not so good)...we go through a myriad of emotions and experiences from moment to moment. We can feel angry, benevolent, relaxed, stressed, irritated, serene etc etc. all in one day.
As well as experiencing all the life states in one day we also experience than on a wider scale in our life, usually with a predominance to being in one state - although we experience them all...But this life condition does not have to be permanent. If we understand why we keep feeling angry we can stop being habitually angry. If we stop feeling powerless in our lives we are no longer residing in hell. If we stop looking down on others or using them we can some out if the world of anamality etc.etc.
Hell has the potential for Buddhahood when we see that there is that potential to change something in that moment (or any moment). But more important that seeing it is feeling it, which is really believing in it. So we call this 'ichinen' which means 'strong, unwavering intention'. It is also the awareness that when you observe your mind through a meditative practice (in my case chanting) you become more aware of, and see your mind and it's different life states and that these are changing states and are not permanent. If you observe your mind change you know that it can change. (I think it's interesting that in Buddhism the mind is also the same as the heart, So here were not thinking about the 'thinking' mind but a changing heart that comes about through faith).
What allows someone to believe that they can decide to turn a crisis into an opportunity is probably in broad terms 'faith', and also importantly, the experience of 'proof' that they have accumulated in their lives of examples of when they have been able to transform moments of crisis into an opportunity predominantly through their own awareness and intention.
Last edited:
Not lazy at all @Roobarb&Custard - there's no need for quotes if you can explain something that well. Thank you for enlightening me on Mahayana and the fluidity of the different states, it sounds very interesting. I might do a bit of research into this concept of having the 'experience of proof' as I find it particularly striking.
http://www.sgi.org/content/files/resources/introductory-materials/winning_life.
pdfhttps://www.facebook.com/SokaGakkaiSgi/posts/191830534294456
https://chantforabetterlife.wordpress.com/tag/actual-proof/
http://www.nichirenbuddhist.org/LearnBuddhism/IntroBook/ch7.html
@Ren I hope these sources are useful in answering your line of enquiry
.
Last edited:
@Roobarb&Custard Yes, very much! Thank you! The introductory pdf could be a good start.