Greece: Watch List
Greece, 1967. After CIA-backed coup, the army and police seized almost 10,000 prisoners, mostly left-wing militants, though political leaders of all shades taken including prime minister Kanelopoulos and members of his Cabinet, trade union members, journalists, writers, etc. The lists had been provided by the sympathizers in the police and the secret service. Final lists kept up to date by COL George Ladas. Details of fate of the arrestees. Tompkins, P. (Unpublished manuscript). Strategy of Terror, pp. 13-8
Guatemala: Watch List
Guatemala, 1954. Death squads and target lists. Schlesinger, S., & Kinzer, S. (1983). Bitter Fruit 197, pp. 207-8, 221
Guatemala, 1954. Goal of CIA was apprehension of suspected communists and sympathizers. At CIA behest, Castillo Armas created committee and issued decree that established death penalty for crimes including labor union activities. Committee given authority declare anyone communist with no right of defense or appeal. By 11/21/1954 committee had some 72,000 persons on file and aiming to list 200,000. Schlesinger, S., & Kinzer, S. (1983). Bitter Fruit, p. 221
Guatemala, 1954. The U.S. Ambassador, after overthrow of Arbenz government, gave lists of radical opponents to be eliminated to Armas's government. NACLA 2/1983, p 4. The military continued up to at least 1979 to use a list of 72,000 proscribed opponents, drawn up first in 1954. NACLA (magazine re Latin America) 2/1983, p. 13
Guatemala, 1954. After Armas made president, labor code forgotten and worker organizers began disappearing from united fruit plantations. Hersh, B. (1992). The Old Boys, p. 353
Guatemala, 1954. Department of State Secretary Dulles told Ambassador Peurifoy to have the government scour the countryside for communists and to slap them with criminal charges. A few months later the government began to persecute hundreds for vague communist crimes. The Nation, 10/28/1978, p. 444
Guatemala, 1954 U.S. Ambassador Peurifoy, after Arbenz resigned, gave Guatemalan army's chief of staff a list of "communists" to be shot. The chief of staff declined. The Nation 6/5/1995, pp. 792-5
Guatemala, 1981-89. Israeli Knesset member General Peled said in Central America Israel is 'dirty work' contractor for U.S. Helped Guatemala regime when Congress blocked Reagan administration. Israeli firm Tadiran (then partly U.S.-owned) supplied Guatemalan military with computerized intelligence system to track potential subversives. Those on computer list had an excellent chance of being "disappeared." It was "an archive and computer file on journalists, students, leaders, leftists, politicians and so on." Computer system making up death lists. Cockburn, A. & Cockburn, L. (1991). Dangerous Liaison, p. 219
Guatemala, 1985-93. CIA collected intelligence re ties between Guatemalan insurgents and Cuba. CIA passed the information to U.S. military, which was assisting Guatemalan army extinguish opposition. Washington Post, 3/30/1995, A1,10
Guatemala, 1988-91. CIA station chief in Guatemala from 1988 to 1991 was a Cuban American. He had about 20 officers with a budget of about $5 million a year and an equal or greater sum for "liaison" with Guatemalan military. His job included placing and keeping senior Guatemalan officers on his payroll. Among them was Alpirez, who recruited for CIA. Alpirez's intelligence unit spied on Guatemalans and is accused by human rights groups of assassinations. CIA also gave Guatemalan army information on guerrillas. New York Times, 4/2/1995, A11
Guatemala: Death Squads
Guatemala, 1953-84. For 30 years the CIA has been bankrolling a man reported to be behind right-wing terror in Central America. The CIA's protégé, Mario Sandoval Alarcon, former Vice President Of Guatemala, now heads the National Liberation Movement (NLM) founded in 1953 by CIA as a paramilitary force to overthrow Arbenz. By mid-1960s Sandoval emerged as head of the organization. The White Hand or La Mano Blanco with close ties to the NLM was responsible for as many as 8000 deaths in the 1960s plus more in the 1970s. Sandoval a pillar of the World Anti-communist League. The CIA still funds Sandoval. Jack Anderson, Washington Post, 1/30/1984
Guatemala, 1954-76. Effect of CIA coup organized labor all but wiped out. Union membership dropped 100,000 to 27,000 immediately and continued decline thereafter, in part due to death squad activity. Barry, T., and Preusch, D. (1986). AIFLD in Central America, p. 21
Guatemala. Police trained by AID public safety program murdered or disappeared 15,000 people. Lernoux, P. (1982). Cry of the People, p. 186
Guatemala, 1954-84. See Jack Anderson column "Links Reported Among Latin Death Squads." Washington Post, 1/12/1984, N. VA., p. 15
Guatemala, 1970-72. Under Arana presidency, with Mario Sandoval Alarcon and others involved in right-wing terrorism, Arana unleashed one of the most gruesome slaughters in recent Latin American history (only in Chile, following the coup against Allende was the degree of violence greater). The New York Times reported in June 1971 that at least 2000 Guatemalans were assassinated between 11/1970 and 5/1971; most corpses showed signs of torture. Most of killing attributed to the officially supported terrorist organizations Ojo Por Ojo (an eye for an eye) and Mano Blanca. Jones, S., and Tobis, D. (Eds.). (1974). Guatemala, pp. 202-3
Guatemala, 1970-87. Violence by security forces organized by CIA, trained in torture by advisors from Argentina, Chile. Supported by weapon, computer experts from Israel. Marshall, J., Scott P.D., and Hunter, J. (1987). The Iran-Contra Connection, p. 133
Guatemala. 1960-82. Trained military death squads who used "terror tactics" from killing to indiscriminate napalming of villages. Special Forces almost certainly participated in operations despite Congressional prohibition. Marshall, J., Scott P.D., and Hunter, J. (1987). The Iran-Contra Connection, p. 193
Guatemala, 1954. The U.S. ambassador, after overthrow of Arbenz government, gave lists to Armas of radical opponents to be eliminated. NACLA (magazine re Latin America) 2/1983, p. 4
Guatemala, 1985. The World Anti-communist League's point man, Mario Sandoval Alarcon, remains a League member even after exposed as a death squad patriarch who was on the CIA payroll. Jack Anderson, Washington Post, 8/9/1986
Guatemala, 1989. Climate of terror grips Guatemala. Killers, bombers said to target civilian rule. Washington Post, 9/29/1989, A 45
Guatemala, circa 1968-70. U.S. counterinsurgency program turned area into bloody war zone taking the lives of thousands of peasants. Formed Mano Blanca or White Hand. Plan used through out country in 1970. NACLA (magazine re Latin America), 3/74, p. 19
Guatemala. Article by Gary Bass and Babette Grunow on the Guatemalan counterinsurgency forces. Lies of our Time, 6/1993, pp. 11-13
Guatemala. At least three of recent G-2 chiefs were paid by CIA. Crimes are merely examples of a vast, systematic pattern; [the guilty] are only cogs in a large U.S. government apparatus. Colonel Hooker, former DIA chief for Guatemala, says, "it would be an embarrassing situation if you ever had a roll call of everybody in Guatemalan army who ever collected a CIA paycheck." Hooker says CIA payroll is so large that it encompasses most of Army's top decision-makers. Top commanders paid by CIA include General Roberto Matta Galvez, former army chief of staff, head of presidential General Staff and commander of massacres in El Quiche department; and General Gramajo, defense minister during the armed forces' abduction, rape and torture of Dianna Ortiz, an American nun. Hooker says he once brought Gramajo on a tour of U.S. Three recent Guatemalan heads of state confirm CIA works closely with G-2. Gen. Oscar Humberto Mejia Victores (military dictator from 1983 to 1986) how death squads had originated, he said they started "in the 1960s by CIA." General Efrain Rios Montt (dictator from 1982 to 1983 and the current congress president), who ordered main high-land massacres (662 villages destroyed, by army's own count), said CIA had agents in the G-2. CIA death squads by Allan Nairn. The Nation, 4/17/1995
Guatemala. CIA works inside a Guatemalan army unit that maintains a network of torture centers and has killed thousands of Guatemalan civilians. G-2, since at least 60s, has been advised, trained, armed and equipped by U.S. undercover agents. One of American agents who works with G-2, is Randy Capister. He has been involved in similar operations with army of neighboring El Salvador. A weapons expert known as Joe Jacarino, has operated through out Caribbean, and has accompanied G-2 units on missions into rural zones. Jacarino [possibly a CIA officer]. Celerino Castillo, a former agent of DEA who dealt with G-2 and CIA in Guatemala, says he worked with Capister as well as with Jacarino. Colonel Alpirez at La Aurora base in Guatemala Denied involvement in deaths of Bamaca and Devine. He said CIA advises and helps run G-2. He praised CIA for "professionalism" and close rapport with Guatemalan officers. He said that agency operatives often come to Guatemala on temporary duty, and train G-2. CIA gives sessions at G-2 bases on "contra-subversion" tactics and "how to manage factors of power" to "fortify democracy." During mid-1980s G-2 officers were paid by Jack McCavitt, then CIA station chief. CIA "technical assistance" includes communications gear, computers and special firearms, as well as collaborative use of CIA-owned helicopters that are flown out of piper hangar at La Aurora civilian airport and from a separate U.S. Air facility. Guatemalan army has, since 1978, killed more than 110,000 civilians. G-2 and a smaller, affiliated unit called Archivo have long been openly known in Guatemala as the brain of the terror state. With a contingent of more than 2,000 agents and with sub-units in local army bases, G-2 coordinates torture, assassination and disappearance of dissidents. CIA Death Squads by Allan Nairn. The Nation, 4/17/1995
Guatemala, 1954-95. For at least five years, Colonel Alpirez was also a well-paid agent for CIA and a murderer, a U.S. Congressman says. Alpirez has been linked to the murder of Michael Devine, an American innkeeper who lived and worked in the Guatemalan jungle, and the torture and killing of Efrain Bamaca Velasquez, a leftist guerrilla who was the husband of Jennifer Harbury. CIA ties began in 1954, when Alpirez was about five years old. The CIA engineered a coup in Guatemala that overthrew a leftist president and installed a right-wing military regime. CIA's station in Guatemala began recruiting young and promising military officers who would provide information on the left-wing guerrillas, the internal workings of Guatemala's intertwined military and political leadership, union members, opposition politicians and others. Alpirez was sent in 1970 to School of the Americas (SOA), an elite and recently much-criticized U.S. Army academy at Fort Benning, Ga. Human-rights groups and members of congress point out that SOA's graduates include Roberto D'Aubuisson, leader of death squads in El Salvador; 19 Salvadoran soldiers named in the 1989 assassination of six Jesuit priests and three soldiers accused of the 1980 rape and murder of four U.S. church workers; Lt. Gen. Raoul Cedars and other leaders of the military junta that ran Haiti from 1991 to 1994; General Hugo Banzer, dictator of Bolivia from 1971 to 1978, and General Manuel Antonio Noriega of Panama, now imprisoned in U.S. In 1970s Alpirez was an officer in a counterinsurgency unit known as Kaibiles. Kaibiles became notorious in the early 1980s, known as scorched earth years, when tens of thousands of Indians were killed as military swept across rural Guatemala, systematically destroying villages. Guatemalan government's own count, campaign left 40,000 widows and 150,000 orphans. In late 1980s, Alpirez served as a senior official of an intelligence unit hidden within the general staff and became a paid agent of CIA who paid him tens of thousands of dollars a year. Intelligence unit, known as "Archivo," or archives, stands accused of assassination, infiltration of civilian agencies and spying on Guatemalans in violation of the nation's Constitution. Archivo works like the CIA. "It was also working as a death squad." New York Times, 3/25/1995
Guatemala, 1954-95. U.S. Undercover agents have worked for decades inside a Guatemalan army unit that has tortured and killed thousands of Guatemalan citizens, per the Nation weekly magazine. "working out of the U.S. Embassy and living in safe houses and hotels, agents work through an elite group of Guatemalan officers who are secretly paid by CIA and implicated personally in numerous political crimes and assassinations ''unit known as G-2 and its secret collaboration with CIA were described by U.S. and Guatemalan operatives and confirmed by three former Guatemalan heads of state. Colonel Julio Roberto Alpirez, Guatemalan officer implicated in murders of guerrilla leader Efrain Bamaca Velasquez — husband of an American lawyer — and rancher Michael Devine discussed in an interview how intelligence agency advises and helps run G-2. He said agents came to Central American country often to train G-2 men and he described attending CIA sessions at G-2 bases on "contra-subversion" tactics and "how to manage factors of power" to "fortify democracy" the Nation quoted U.S. and Guatemalan intelligence sources as saying at least three recent G-2 chiefs have been on CIA payroll — General Edgar Godoy Gatan, Colonel Otto Perez Molina and General Francisco Ortega Menaldo. `It would be embarrassing if you ever had a roll call of everybody in Guatemalan army who ever collected a CIA paycheck,'' report quoted Colonel George Hooker, U.S. DIA chief in Guatemala from 1985 to 1989, as saying. Human rights group Amnesty International has said Guatemalan army killed more than 110,000 civilians since 1978 with G-2 and another unit called Archivo known as main death squads. Reuters, 3/30/1995
Guatemala, 1960-90. Human rights groups say at least 40,000 Guatemalans "disappeared" in last three decades. Most were poor Indians. Anthropologists, led by Clyde Snow, dug away at a village site. Maria Lopez had a husband and a son in one grave. She said on morning of Valentine's Day 1982, members of anti-guerrilla militia took her husband and others. They had refused to join militias known as civil self-defense patrols and were killed. Six unknown clandestine graves in San Jose Pacho. Human rights groups blame most disappearances on army-run civil self-defense patrols set up under presidencies of General Lucas Garcia and Brig. Gen. Rios Montt. There are hundreds of clandestine graves filled with victims of the militias, right-wing death squads and brutal counterinsurgency campaigns. Washington Times, 8/5/1992, p. A9
Guatemala, 1970-95. Jennifer Harbury's story. Time, 4/3/1995, p. 48
Guatemala, 1981-95. DIA reports re MLN particularly disturbing, as they raise grave questions about extent of U.S. knowledge of MLN activities in earlier years when MLN leader Mario Sandoval Alarcon was tied to Reagan Administration's efforts to support Contras. Having come to power in 1954 with the CIA-backed overthrow of Colonel Jacobo Arbenze, MLN leader Sandoval was accused in 1980 by Elias Barahona, former press secretary to the Guatemalan Interior Minister, of having worked for CIA. Head of National Congress from 1970 to 1974, at which time he was made vice president, a position he kept until his term expired in 1978, Sandoval is widely regarded as father of Latin America's "death squads." In 1970's, he had a close relationship with Roberto D'Aubuisson, deputy chief of El Salvador's national security agency (Anseal). D'Aubuisson reportedly was behind El Salvador's death squads. Sandoval was so close to Reagan administration that he was one of only two Guatemalans invited to attend Reagan's inauguration. Intelligence — a computerized intelligence newsletter published in France, 4/24/1995, p. 1
Guatemala, 1984-95. Article, "Murder as Policy." Washington was supporting Guatemalan army in a number of ways: green berets trained Kaibul massacre force, the army's self-proclaimed "messengers of death." U.S. openly sold weapons to Guatemala — used in massacre in Santiago Atitlan. Hundreds of U.S. troops (mostly National Guard) helped civic action and road building in massacre zones. The Nation, 4/24/1995, pp. 547-8
Guatemala, 1985-93. CIA collected intelligence re ties between Guatemalan insurgents and Cuba — CIA passed the information to U.S. military, which was assisting Guatemalan army extinguish opposition. Washington Post, 3/30/1995, A1,10
Guatemala, 1985-95. Bombings against military-reformist Christian Democratic Party (DCG) of then President Vinicio Cerezo to topple Cerezo, who perceived as being too soft on rebels. A 10/1988 DIA intelligence report alerted American authorities that MLN, which was involved in "plotting a coup against Cerezo in the past," is "now apparently prepared to use violent tactics to undermine DCG government." MLN "is reportedly planning a bombing campaign directed against members of ruling DCG. MLN intends to use recently obtained explosives to target personal vehicles of DCG Congressional representatives in order to frighten them. After assessing their impact, MLN will consider initiating a second stage of its anti-DCG campaign that will include killing of various individuals. MLN has selected potential targets in Guatemala city. U.S. Army and DIA, getting regular, high-level intelligence from senior Guatemalan army officers and other sources about crimes, notably murder, being committed by Guatemalan army personnel. Source and depth of intelligence raises questions about what U.S. Government actually knew about Guatemalan army complicity in civilian murders in that country throughout the 1980s, including alleged involvement of Guatemalan Colonel Julio Roberto Alpirez, then a CIA agent, in 1990 and 1992 murders of American innkeeper Michael Devine and guerrilla fighter Efrain Bamaco Velazquez, husband of an American, Jennifer Harbury." Intelligence — a computerized intelligence newsletter published in France, 4/24/1995, p. 1
Guatemala, 1988-91. CIA station chief in Guatemala from 1988 to 1991 was a Cuban American. He had about 20 officers with a budget of about $5 million a year and an equal or greater sum for "liaison" with Guatemalan military. His job included placing and keeping senior Guatemalan officers on his payroll. Among them was Alpirez, who recruited others for CIA. Alpirez's intelligence unit spied on Guatemalans and is accused by human rights groups of assassinations. CIA also gave Guatemalan army information on the guerrillas. New York Times, 4/2/1995, A11
Guatemala, 1989. 25 students in two years killed by squads. Entire university student association has been silenced. U.S. backed governments in virtual genocide have more than 150,000 victims. AI called this genocide a "government program of political murder." The Nation, 3/5/1990, cover, p. 308
Guatemala, 1990-95. Member of House Intelligence Committee, Robert G. Torricelli (D- NJ.) said, in letter to President Clinton, that a Guatemalan military officer who ordered killings of an American citizen and a guerrilla leader married to a North American lawyer was a paid agent of CIA. CIA knew of killings, but concealed its knowledge for years. Another member of House Intelligence Committee confirmed Torricelli's claims. Torricelli wrote in letter to President that the "Direct involvement of CIA in the murder of these individuals leads me to the extraordinary conclusion that the agency is simply out of control and that it contains what can only be labeled a criminal element." Colonel Julio Roberto Alpirez, Bamaca, and Michael Devine. Tim Weiner, New York Times, 3/23/1995
Guatemala, 1990-95. Article, El Buki's Tale — Murder of Michael Devine. Covert Action Information Bulletin (Quarterly), Summer 1995, pp. 32-37
Guatemala, 1990-95. Article, The Agency, Off Target. Two Deaths, a Rogue CIA Informant and a Big Pot of Trouble. Re deaths of Michael Devine and Efrain Bamaca Velasquez — Harbury's husband. CIA paid Colonel Alpirez $43,000 after it learned of cover up of deaths. U.S. News & World Report, 4/10/1995, p. 46
Guatemala, 1990-95. Assassin of Michael Devine and of the husband of Jennifer Harbury, Colonel Julio Roberto Alpirez, was on CIA's payroll and had attended School of Americas (SOA) on two separate occasions. In January 1995 when State and NSC pieced together what CIA knew, the ambassador demanded removal of CIA's station chief. CIA fought to stop disclosure of its relationship with the Colonel. Administration officials began to mistrust what CIA was saying about the case. The Colonel first came to U.S. In 1970 as an army cadet at SOA. He returned to SOA in 1989, to take year long Command and General Staff course when he was already on CIA payroll. In 1990, Michael Devine, who ran a hotel, apparently stumbled on a smuggling operation involving Guatemalan military. He was killed. New York Times, 3/24/1995, A3
Guatemala, 1990-95. CIA last month removed its station chief in Guatemala for failing to report promptly information linking a paid CIA informer to the slaying of a Guatemalan guerrilla fighter married to Jennifer Harbury. Guatemalan army Colonel Julio Roberto Alpirez, was paid $44,000 by CIA in 1992 for secretly supplying intelligence on the civil war. At time of payment CIA had evidence linking him to the slaying of U.S. citizen Michael Devine (after he found about a military smuggling operation or because he had a weapon). Washington Post, 3/25/1995, A1,20
Guatemala, 1990-95. Clinton has threatened to fire anyone in CIA who withheld information from him about activities of its informant in Guatemala, Colonel Julio Roberto Alpirez. What is more likely to be agency's undoing is its failure to tell congress that only six months after he graduated from command-level courses at School of Americas Colonel Alpirez, a member of military intelligence on agency's payroll, ordered murder of a U.S. citizen, William Devine, and then torture-murder of husband of an American woman. White House officials, and President Clinton in particular, were very angry about Guatemalan affair but NSC Anthony lake was arguing that there is no evidence that CIA tried to deceive president. Los Angeles Times reported that late last year State Department found information about Devine murder in its files that appeared to have originated with CIA and had not been passed on to White House. This discovery prompted State Department and White House to ask CIA for more information. State initially asked CIA for information on rebel Commandante Efrain Bamaca Velasquez and received a few modest files. Several weeks later, State again asked CIA for information but this time on "Commandante Everardo," which was Commandante Bamaca's well-known nom de guerre. Only then did CIA produced incriminating data that it held solely under that name. CIA has tried to ease situation with a rare "leak" about itself to press. On 3/24, Los Angeles Times quoted "CIA sources" as saying Agency was only told after the fact that its Guatemalan informant, Colonel Alpirez, was present at killing in 1990 of Devine, a U.S. citizen who ran a popular tourist resort in Guatemala. CIA insisted to the paper that it cut ties with Colonel at that point, but, significantly, sources did not put a date on rupture. That gave it "wiggle room" to say it didn't find out about Colonel's involvement in March 1992 torture-murder of Bamaca until early this year. CIA gave Colonel Alpirez a "final payment" of $44,000 at about time of Bamaca's murder. Per National public radio commentator Daniel Schorr, CIA station chief in Guatemala has been fired for failing to relay information. But New York Times says he was reassigned to Langley in January, after U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala accused him of withholding information. CIA has assigned its inspector General, Fred Hitz, to investigate. CIA station chief in Switzerland, who held a top position at Department of Operations (DO) Latin American Division from 1990 to 1992, is now being questioned, as is Jack Devine, who headed division from January 1983 until last October. He was appointed Associate Deputy Director of Operations in October after John MacGaffin was removed from that post for secretly giving an award to a senior operative who had just been disciplined in Ames case. Devine's successor is a woman, first to direct a DO division. She is in her 50s, was previously station chief in El Salvador, and is said by officials outside CIA to be very forthcoming about case. Intelligence — a computerized intelligence newsletter published in France, 3/27/1995, p. 30
Guatemala, 1990-95. Guatemalan soldiers killed Michael Devine under orders from Colonel Mario Garcia Catalan, per convicted soldier, Solbal. He killed as the army convinced he had bought a stolen rifle. They tortured him before killing him. Solbal says Colonel Alpirez gave food and shelter to the killers. Washington Times, 5/15/1995, A13
Guatemala, 1990-95. Letter from Congressman Torricelli to President Clinton about involvement of CIA in two murders in Guatemala. 3/22/1995
Guatemala, 1990-95. Rep. Robert Torricelli, D-NJ., who is on the HPSCI, has requested an investigation from the Justice Department on role of the CIA in the murder of Michael Devine and Efrain Bamaca Velasquez. Request was made in a letter to President Clinton. Guatemalan intelligence officer who ordered the murders, Colonel Julio Roberto Alpirez, was a paid agent of the CIA. Torricelli claims that the NSA, CIA, State Department., and NSC covered up the involvement of a paid agent in the murders. Devine, who was killed in 1990, was an American citizen and Velasquez, who was killed in 1992, was married to an U.S. Citizen. CNN Headline News, 3/23/1995 and AP, 3/23/1995
Guatemala, 1990-95. Revelations about a CIA informer linked to two murders (Devine and Bamaca) in Guatemala helped exhume embarrassing relationship between U.S. military and intelligence personnel and a Central American regime notorious for human rights violations. Washington Post, 4/2/1995, A29
Guatemala, 1990-95. Tim Weiner article "A Guatemalan Officer and the CIA." Colonel is recalled as a "good soldier" and a murdering spy. New York Times, 3/26/1995
Guatemala, 1990-95. Two colonels suspended in Guatemala for covering up 1990 killing of Michael Devine. One was a paid CIA informant at time of killing. Colonel Mario Garcia Catalan also suspended. Washington Post, 4/27/1995, A29
Guatemala, 1990-95. Wife of Michael Devine discusses slaying of her husband. New York Times, 3/28/1995, A1,6
Guatemala, 1991-94. State Department reported in 1991, that "military, civil patrols and police continued to commit a majority of major human rights abuses, including extrajuridicial killings torture and disappearances." Guatemalan counterinsurgency campaign devised by U.S. counterinsurgency experts Caesar Sereseres and Colonel George Minas. Former served as a consultant to RAND Corporation and State Department's Office of Policy Planning. Minas served as military attache in Guatemala in early 1980s. Both encouraged population control such as Vietnam-style military-controlled strategic hamlets and civilian defense patrols. Today Guatemala is largest warehouse for cocaine transshipments to U.S. Drug trade run by military which tries to blame the leftists. Covert Action Information Bulletin (Quarterly), Spring 1994, pp. 28-33
Guatemala, 1991-95. U.S. Had information in 10/1991 linking a paid CIA informer in slaying of a U.S. citizen. Colonel Roberto Alpirez was dropped from CIA's payroll but remained a contact through 7/1992 — when he allegedly ordered another killing of Efrain Bamaca Velasquez — husband of Jennifer Harbury. Washington Post, 3/24/1995, A1,27
Guatemala, 1992. Rights abuses in Guatemala continue, paramilitary civilian patrols — self defense patrols — accused of campaign of terror, control rural areas. Patrols answer to military. Washington Post, 10/4/1992, A35
Guatemala, 1995. President Clinton said he would dismiss any CIA official who withheld information on death of Jennifer Harbury's husband. Rep Torricelli said CIA withheld information for years. Washington Times, 3/25/1995, A3
Guatemala, 1970-95. Discussion of Torricelli, Harbury, Devine, Bamaco, etc. The death of husband of Harbury not a rogue operation. This was standard operating procedure in El Salvador and Guatemala and elsewhere around the globe. CIA organized death squads, financed them, equipped them, trained them, etc. That's what the CIA does. Once in a decade the U.S. public hears about this. CIA should be abolished. The CIA mislead Congress about the Devine case. Getting rid of CIA is not enough — the CIA did not act alone. The National Security Agency and the Army may have been involved in Guatemala. The Progressive, 5/1995, pp. 8,9
Haiti: Watch List
Haiti, 1986-93. In 1986 the CIA funded the national intelligence service (SIN) under guise of fighting narcotics — but SIN never produced drug intelligence and used CIA money for political operations. Sin involved in spying on so-called subversive groups...they doing nothing but political repression...they targeted people who were for change. CIA used distorted data to discredit Aristide. NACLA (Magazine re Latin America), 2/1994, p. 35
Haiti, 1990-94. Emannuel Constant, leader of Haiti's FRAPH hit squad, worked for CIA and U.S. intelligence helped launch FRAPH. Haiti's dreaded attaches paid for by a U.S. Government-funded project that maintains sensitive files on Haiti's poor. The Nation, 10/24/1994, 458
Haiti, 1990-94. U.S. officials involved in refugee policy have backgrounds suggestive of Phoenix-like program activities. Luis Moreno, State Department, has background in counterterrorism. Gunther Wagner, senior intelligence officer at INS's southwest regional office, assigned to investigate repression against repatriated refugees. Wagner had served as public safety adviser to Vietnamese National Special Branch for 5 years and later advised Somoza's National Guard. INS database on all asylum interviews at Guantanamo. INS, on demand, gave State Department unrestricted access to all interview files. U.S. Officers hand Haitian authorities computer print-outs of names of all Haitians being repatriated. CIA funded service intelligence nacionale (SIN), who's de facto primary function was a war against popular movement — including torture and assassination — a fact admitted by a CIA officer to an official in Aristide's government. U.S. shares "anti-narcotics intelligence" with Haitian military. The Progressive, 4/1994, p. 21
Haiti, 1991-94. Asylum-promoting project gets family information that fed into a computer project that could be used to target for repression. The Progressive, 9/1994, pp. 19-26
Haiti, 1991-94. Seven chief attaches arranged killings and brought victims to houses. Four of the seven worked for Centers for Development and Health (CDS), funded by U.S. AID. One was Gros Sergo, and other was Fritz Joseph who chief FRAPH recruiter in Cite Soleil. Two others are Marc Arthur and Gors Fanfan. CDS files track every family in Cite Soleil. The Nation, 10/24/1994, p. 461
Haiti, 1994. AID programs for Haitian popular groups; Immigration and Naturalization service, with computerized files on 58,000 political-asylum applicants and army intelligence S-2 section of 96th Civil Affairs Battalion assigned to monitor refugees at Guantanamo Bay. Per Capt. James Vick, unit develops networks of informants and works with marine corps counterintelligence in "identifying ringleaders of unrest and in weeding out troublemakers." 96th's files enter military intelligence system. Gunther Wagner, a former Nazi, served with U.S. In Phoenix operation in Vietnam, and in Nicaragua — now heads State Department's Cuba-Haiti task force. Pentagon's Atlantic command commissioned Booz, Allen, Hamilton, to devise a computer model of Haitian society. Results of study given. Priority of study to build an "organized information bank...." no change expected in ruling clique of Haiti. Article by Allan Nairn. The Nation, 10/3/1994, pp. 344-48
Haiti: Death Squads
Haiti. CIA officer assigned 1973-75 Coordination with Ton-Ton Macoute, "Baby Doc" Duvalier's private death squad. Covert Action Information Bulletin (Quarterly), 9/1980, p. 16
Haiti, 1985-93. CIA created an intelligence service in Haiti: National Intelligence Service, (SIN) from its initials in French, to fight cocaine trade, but unit became instrument of political terror whose officers engaged in drug traffic, killings and torture. Unit produced little drug intelligence. U.S. cut ties to group after 1991 military coup. New York Times, 11/14/1993 pp. 1,12
Haiti, 1986-93 INS database on all asylum interviews at Guantanamo. INS, on demand, gave State Department unrestricted access to all interview files. U.S. officers hand Haitian authorities computer print-outs of names of all Haitians being repatriated. CIA funded service intelligence nacionale (SIN), who's de facto primary function was a war against popular movement — including torture and assassination — a fact admitted by a CIA officer to an official in Aristide's government. U.S. shares "anti-narcotics intelligence" with Haitian military. The Progressive, 4/1994, p. 21
Haiti, 1990-94. Clinton administration denied report CIA helped set up Haiti's pro-army Militia — FRAPH. Officials refused to comment whether FRAPH leader Emmanuel Constant was a paid CIA informant. "Nation" article said Constant worked for both the CIA and the DIA. Colonel Collins of DIA and Donald Terry of CIA were his contacts. Collins urged Constant to set up FRAPH. Mr. Constant, per Washington Times, was a paid U.S. Informant on Haitian political activities and assisting anti-drug efforts. Relationship broken off early this year. FRAPH has been linked to murders, public beatings and arson. CIA officers in past worked with Haiti's national intelligence service. Washington Times, 10/7/1994, A16
Haiti, 1990-94. Emannuel Constant, leader of Haiti's FRAPH hit squad, worked for CIA and U.S. Intelligence helped launch FRAPH. Haiti's dreaded attaches paid for by a U.S. Government-funded project that maintains sensitive files on Haiti's poor. In 10/3/1994, issue of Nation carried Nairn's article "The Eagle is Landing," he quoted a U.S. official praising Constant as a young republican that U.S. Intelligence had encouraged to form FRAPH. Constant confirmed that account. He first said his handler was Colonel Patrick Collins, DIA attache in Haiti, and later claimed another U. S. official urged him to form FRAPH. Collins first approached Constant while he taught a course at HQs of CIA-run national intelligence service (SIN) and built up a computer data base at Bureau of Information and Coordination. FRAPH originally was called Haitian Resistance League. Constant was working for the CIA at SIN while it attacked the poor. The Nation, 10/24/1994, p. 458
Haiti, 1991-94. Emmanuel Constant (son of a Duvalier general), who had been on the CIA payroll since the mid-'1980s. With U.S. intelligence advice, formed FRAPH, a political front and paramilitary death squad offshoot of the Haitian army, that began to systematically target democratic militants and hold the country hostage with several armed strikes. On 10/11/1993, day U.S.S. Harlan County and U.S. and Canadian soldiers were to land, even though CIA had been tipped off, FRAPH organized a dockside demonstration of several dozen armed thugs. Ship turned around. U.S. asylum processing program hand-picked and exported almost 2,000 grassroots leaders. In three years after coup, 7,000-man army and its paramilitary assistants killed at least 3,000 and probably over 4,000 people, tortured thousands, and created tens of thousands of refugees and 300,000 internally displaced people. Covert Action Information Bulletin (Quarterly), Winter 1994/1995, pp. 7-13
Haiti, 1991-94. Haitian paramilitary chief spied for CIA. Emmanuel "Toto" Constant, head of Haiti's notorious FRAPH, secretly provided information to U.S. intelligence while his group killed people. Constant paid by CIA for giving intelligence officers information about Aristide beginning shortly after Aristide ousted in 9/1991 coup. CIA dropped him last Spring. Constant's organization blamed for killing hundreds of supporters of Aristide — and organizing demonstration that drove off U.S. troop-carrying Harlan County last October. In "Nation" article, U.S. Defense Attache, Colonel Patrick Collins, had encouraged Constant to form FRAPH. U.S. intelligence agencies had extensive penetration of Haitian military and paramilitary groups. Using Constant as source may explain why CIA's reporting on Aristide was skewed. FRAPH not formed until 8/1993, 9 months after Collins left Haiti. Washington Post, 10/9/1994, A1,30
Haiti, 1993. Young men kidnapped by armed thugs seldom reappear. Under de facto government, as many as 3000 may have been killed. Aristide negotiating his return with UN. The Nation, 5/3/1993, p. 580
Haiti, 1995. Interview with Allan Nairn, April 1995 "Criminal Habits." Z Magazine 6/1995, pp. 22-9
Honduras: Death Squads
Honduras, 1981-87. Florencio Caballero, who served as a torturer and a member of a death squad, said he was trained in Texas by the CIA. He said he was responsible for the torture and slaying of 120 Honduran and other Latin American citizens. The CIA taught him and 24 other people in a army intelligence unit for 6 months in interrogation. psychological methods — to study fears and weaknesses of a prisoner, make him stand up, don't let him sleep, keep him naked and isolated, put rats and cockroaches in his cell, give him bad food, throw cold water on him, change the temperature. Washington Post, 6/8/1988, B3
Honduras, circa 1982-87. Army Battalion 3/16, a special counterinsurgency force which many considered a kind of death squad, was formed in 1980. Florencio Caballero, a former battalion member, described a clandestine paramilitary structure for repressing leftists. Caballero, who studied interrogation techniques in Houston, said the CIA was extensively involved in training squad members. NACLA 2/1988, p. 15, from New York Times, 5/2/1987
Honduras, March 1986. Apart from CIA training of a battalion implicated in death squad activities and torture, Honduran army defector said CIA arranged a fabricated forced "confession" by kidnapped prisoner that he headed a guerrilla front and had planned attacks against U.S. installations. This in operation truth. Chomsky, N. (1988). The Culture of Terrorism, p. 239
Honduras. General G. Alvarez Martinez, CIA-Contra point man in Honduras, had death squad operation run by Ricardo Lau. Alvarez godfather to new CIA Chief of Station's daughter. Marshall, J., Scott P.D., and Hunter, J. (1987). The Iran-Contra Connection, pp. 78-9
Honduras, 1982-86. Zuniga told congressional staffers about the 316 Battalion established with the knowledge and assistance of the U.S. Embassy. By 1984 more than 200 Honduran teachers, students, labor leaders, and opposition politicians had been murdered. The CIA had knowledge of the killings. Zuniga killed in 9/1985. Mother Jones, 4/1987, p. 48
Honduras. Capt. Alexander Hernandez, a graduate of U.S. International Police services training program, has played a central role in Honduran death squad activities and the war in Nicaragua. Early 1986 New York Times reports that CIA was providing "training and advice in intelligence collection" to Hernandez' unit "as part of a program to cut off arms shipments from Nicaragua to leftist rebels in Honduras and El Salvador." New York Times also says that CIA knew of the assassinations but "looked the other way." The Nation, 6/7/1986, p. 793
Honduras, circa 1981-84. Honduran government established a secret unit that seized, interrogated, tortured, and murdered more than 130 people between 1981-84. Unit named Battalion 316. Unit operated with CIA supervision and training and received U.S. instruction in interrogation, surveillance and hostage rescue. Commander of unit in first years was a graduate of International Police Academy. NA, 2/20/1988, pp. 224-5 The clandestine houses and command post of 316 were visited by CIA agents. NA, 1/23/1988, p. 85
Honduras, Nicaragua, 1982. A Contra commander with the FDN admitted he helped organize a death squad in Honduras with the approval and cooperation of the CIA. Honduran government agreed to host the death squad and provide it with cover, since the group would kill Honduran dissidents at the government's request. The commander admitted he participated in assassinations. CIA "Colonel Raymond" congratulated the squad. The Progressive, 8/1986, p. 25
Honduras, Nicaragua, 1984-85. Honduran army investigators report that Contras have been involved in death-squad killings in Honduras. At least 18 Hondurans and an unknown number of Salvadorans and Nicaraguans have been killed by the Contras. Washington Post, 1/15/1985, A12
Honduras, 1980-83. Agents of Battalion 316, a Honduran death squad, received interrogation training in Texas from CIA in 1980. CIA agents maintained contact with unit in early 1980's, visiting detention centers during interrogation and obtaining intelligence gleaned from torture victims. See Americas Watch "Human Rights in Honduras" (May 1987). Dillon, S. (1991). Commandos, p. 101
Honduras, 1980-83. Gustavo Alvarez, formerly head of police, in 1981 a general running entire armed forces. Worked closely with U.S. on Contras. Alvarez had organized military intelligence Battalion 316 — first Honduran death squad. Argentines sent 15-20 officers to work with Alvarez on Contras. Senior officer Osvaldo Riveiro. Garvin, G. (1992). Everybody Has His Own Gringo, p. 41
Honduras, 1980-89. CIA and State Department worked with a Honduran military unit called Battalion 316 during the 1980s. Unit was responsible for cracking down on dissidents. AP, 6/12/1995. Honduran special prosecutor for human rights asking the U.S. to turn over classified information on Ambassadors John Negroponte and Chris Arcos and several CIA agents connected to the disappearance of dissidents in the 1980s. AP, 6/13/1995
Honduras, 1980-89. Colonel Gustavo Alvarez Martinez shot to death in 1989. Alvarez spent years networking with fascists and ultra right terrorists who in World Anti-communist League and its sister organization, the Latin American Anti-communist Confederation, or CAL. He most famous for streamlining Honduras's death squads and uniting them under his control. Alvarez gathered together the National Front for the Defense of Democracy, the Honduran Anti-communist Movement (MACHO), and the Anti-communist Combat Army — death squads all — and combined them with several governmental forces, including the Fuerzas de Seguridad Publica (FUSEP), Departmento Nacional de Investigaciones (DIN), and Tropas Especiales Para Selva y Nocturnas (TESON). With Director of Central Intelligence Casey, Alvarez and Negroponte turned Honduras into a staging ground for Contra incursions into Nicaragua. Honduran Congress issued Decree 33, which declared terrorist anyone who distributed political literature, associated with foreigners, joined groups deemed subversive by the government, damaged property, or destroyed documents. Alvarez's forces murdered upwards of 500 people. He ousted as Honduras's dictator in 1984 and became special consultant to RAND Corporation. Lies of our Time, 3/1994, pp. 3-5
Honduras, 1980-89. Eleven senior officers who are believed to have been involved with Battalion 316 have been convicted on charges of kidnapping, torturing and attempting to murder six students in 1982. Officers include one general, nine colonels, and one captain. AP, 7/25/1995
Honduras, 1980-89. See entry in Liaison from Baltimore Sun, 6/11-18/1995
Honduras, 1980-93. CIA-trained death squad issue in presidential campaign. In early 1980s, Battalion 3-16, of Honduran military whose members instructed by and worked with CIA "disappeared" scores of activists. Both candidates accusing other of connections to Battalion 3-16. In 1980 25-Honduran officers to U.S. for training per sworn testimony in International Court by Honduran intelligence officer who participated — Florencio Caballero. Group trained in interrogation by a team from FBI and CIA. Training continued in Honduras. U.S. Trainers joined by instructors from Argentina and Chile — sessions focused on surveillance and rescuing kidnap victims. Battalion 3-16 engaged in a program of systematic disappearances and murder from 1981 to 1984. By March 1984, 100-150 students, teachers, unionists and travelers picked up and secretly executed. Squads, according to Inter-American Court of Human Rights, belonged to 3-16. Squads modus operandi included weeks of surveillance of suspects followed by capture by disguised agents using vehicles with stolen license plates, interrogation, torture in secret jails followed by execution and secret burial. CIA's connection to 3-16 confirmed by General Alvarez, who created and commanded squad from 1980 through 1984. He later became chief of police and then head of the armed forces. Alvarez said CIA "gave good training, lie detectors, phone-tapping devices and electronic equipment to analyze intelligence." CIA men informed when 3-16 abducted suspected leftists. When bodies found, 3-16 put out story they killed by guerrillas. CIA looked other way. Ambassador Negroponte in 1982 denied existence of death squads. State Department was attacking as communist, anti-democratic and a terrorist group, Committee for Defense of Human Rights in Honduras that was exposing 3-16. In a barracks coup, Alvarez forced into exile in Miami and became paid consultant to Pentagon writing study on low-intensity conflict. Members of 3-16 still in positions of power in government. Congressional intelligence committee in 1988 looked into CIA's role with 3-16, but findings never published. Op-ed by Anne Manuel. Washington Post, 11/28/1993, C5
Honduras, 1982-83. Ex-guard Benito "Mack" Bravo reportedly killed dozens of Contra recruits at his La Ladosa training base near El Paraiso. Mack suspected many were Sandinista infiltrators. In one case, FDN ordered four ex-guardsmen executed for insubordination and allegedly selling arms to El Salvador's FMLN. They also had been accused of killing recruits. Honduran military participated in the execution. Dillon, S. (1991). Commandos, pp. 118-124
Honduras, 1988. Director human rights commission in Honduras and associate killed by assassins. The Progressive, 2/1990, p. 46
Honduras, 1988. Honduran human rights leader Ramon Custodio Lopez accused Battalion 3-16 of murdering a politician and a teacher on 14 January 1988. Custodio relied on testimony by former battalion member sergeant Fausto Caballero. In 11/30/1988. Honduras was condemned by Inter-American Court of Human Rights in 1988 for disappearance of Angel Manfredo Velazquez. Battalion 3-16, along with DNI (Directorate of National Intelligence), and FUSEP (National Police) were implicated, all of which have received training from CIA. Intelligence Parapolitics, 9/1988, p. 8
Honduras, 1988. Jose Isaias Vilorio, an intelligence officer and former death squad member, was shot dead on 1 January 1988. Isaias was to testify before Inter-American Court on Human Rights (New York Times, 20 January 1988). Human rights leader and legislator Miguel Pavon was killed on 14 January 1988 after testifying before Inter-American Court. Also killed was Moises Landaverde, a teacher who was riding in Pavon's car at the time of attack. Intelligence Parapolitics, 3/1988, p. 12
Honduras, Argentina, 1980-89. A survivor tells her story: treatment for a leftist — kicks and freezing water and electric shocks. In between, a visitor from CIA. CIA worked closely with the Honduran military while the military tortured and killed dissidents during the 1980s, human rights groups said. A government official also said Argentine military advisers, with U.S. support, were brought in to help monitor leftist activism. "At least nine Argentine military (officers), supported by the CIA, trained many Honduran officers to prevent communism from entering Honduras," said Leo Valladares of the government's human rights commission. Bertha Oliva, head of committee of relatives of the disappeared, claimed CIA knew of disappearances by Honduran security forces and that "the U.S. Embassy had absolute power in this country." in the first of a series of four articles, the Baltimore Sun reported Sunday that CIA and the State Department collaborated with a secret Honduran military unit known as Battalion 316 in the 1980s in cracking down on Honduras dissidents. Following a 14-month investigation. In order to keep up public support for Reagan administration's war efforts in Central America, U.S. officials misled congress and the public about Honduran military abuses. Collaboration was revealed in classified documents and in interviews with U.S. and Honduran participants. Among those interviewed by the Sun were three former Battalion 316 torturers who acknowledged their crimes and detailed the battalion's close relationship with CIA. Ramon Custodio, president of non-government human rights commission, said a former member of Battalion 316, Florencio Caballero, disclosed that CIA in early 1980s took 24 soldiers to the U.S. for training in anti-subversive techniques. At the time, Custodio said, "Honduras' policy was oriented to detaining and summarily executing those who did not please the government or the military." Battalion 316 was created in 1984 and its first commander was General Luis Alonso Discua, current armed forces chief. A government report subsequently blamed it in the cases of 184 missing people. Baltimore Sun, 6/15/1995
Honduras, Israel. During Contra war Honduran military intelligence officers on double salary from CIA and Colombian drug cartels, who saw advantage of using Honduran airstrips for transiting cocaine under cover of war effort. Israelis also trained Honduran death squads. Cockburn, A. and Cockburn, L. (1991). Dangerous Liaison, p. 225
Honduras, Assassinations, 1980-84. CIA and Contras accused of running Honduran death squads, killing over 200. CIA officials "looked the other way" when people disappeared. Violence tapered off after ouster of CIA backed military commander Alvarez. Ricardo Lau running Contra intelligence, also death squads. Accused arranging assassination Archbishop Romero in El Salvador. Marshall, J., Scott P.D., and Hunter, J. (1987). The Iran-Contra Connection, pp. 132-3
Indonesia: Watch List
Indonesia, 1963-65. U.S. trained unionist spies laid groundwork for post 1965 coup gestapu massacre of leftists by gathering intelligence on leftist unionists. Counterspy, Winter 1979, p. 27
Indonesia, 1965-66. "U.S. officials' lists aided Indonesian blood bath in '60s." U.S. officials supplied the names of thousands of members of Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) to the army that was hunting them down and killing them in a crackdown branded as one of the century's worst massacres, former U.S. Diplomats and CIA officials say. Robert J. Martens, Former member of embassy's political section said, "it really was a big help to the army.... They probably killed a lot of people..." Martens said. He headed an embassy group of state Department and CIA officials that spent two years compiling the lists. He said he delivered them to an army intermediary. The lists were a detailed who's who of the leadership of the PKI that included names of provincial, city and other local PKI members and leaders of mass organizations. Ambassador Marshall Green, his deputy Jack Lydman, and political section chief Edward Masters admitted approving the release of the names. Army intermediary was an aide to Adam Malik. The aide, Tirta Kentjana Adhyatman, confirmed that he had met with Martens and received lists of thousands of names...given to Sukarno's HQs. Information on who captured and killed came to Americans from Suharto's HQs, according to former CIA deputy chief of station Joseph Lazarsky. Lazarsky said "we were getting a good account in Jakarta of who was being picked up,"..."the army had a 'shooting list' of about 4,000 to 5,000 people." Lazarsky said the check-off work was also carried out at CIA's intelligence directorate in D.C. By end of January 1966, "the checked off names were so numerous the CIA analysts in Washington concluded the PKI leadership had been destroyed." Washington Post, 5/21/1990, A5
Indonesia, 1965-66. In response to Kathy Kadane's May 21 article in Washington Post, Robert J. Martens responds "it is true I passed names of PKI leaders and senior cadre system to non-communist forces during the six months of chaos between the so-called coup and the ultimate downfall of Sukarno. The names I gave were based entirely on Indonesian communist press and were available to everyone. This was senior cadre system of the PKI few thousand at most out of the 3.5 millions claimed party members. I categorically deny that I headed an embassy group that spent two years compiling the lists." Washington Post, 6/2/1990, A18
Indonesia, 1985. Indonesia: years of living dangerously. CIA's role in bloody coup in Indonesia in 1965. Utne Reader. 2/1991, p. 38, two pages
Indonesia: Death Squads
Indonesia, 1965-66 Indonesian generals approached U.S. for equipment "to arm Moslem and nationalist youths for use in central Java against the PKI." Washington responded by supplying covert aid, dispatched as "medicines." Washington Post, 6/13/1990, A 22
Indonesia, 1965-66. Kathy Kadane's story for States News Service disclosed part played by CIA and State Department officials in 1965-66 blood bath in Indonesia. Kadane reported that U.S. officials in Jakarta furnished names of about 5,000 communist activists to the Indonesian army and then checked off the names as the army reported the individuals had been killed or captured. The Nation, 7/9/1990, p. 43
Indonesia, 1965. CIA and State Department officials provided name lists to Indonesian army that killed 250,000. The Progressive, 7/10/1990, p. 9
Indonesia, 1965. Ex-agents say CIA compiled death lists for Indonesians. San Francisco Examiner, 5/20/1990
Indonesia, 1965-66. Article by Michael Vatikiotis and Mike Fonte; Rustle of Ghosts. (1965 Indonesian coup). Far Eastern Economic Review, 8/2/1990, 2 pages
Indonesia, 1965-85. Death squads roam at will, killing subversives, suspected criminals by thousands. Blum, W. (1986). The CIA A Forgotten History, p. 221
Iran: Watch List
Iran, 1953-54. CIA gave Shah intelligence on Tudeh party facilitate anti-Tudeh Campaign. Gasiorowski, M.J. (1990). "Security Relations Between the United States and Iran, 1953-1978," p. 150
Iran, 1953-64. CIA station chiefs in regular contact with Shah and working level liaison relationship with SAVAK established by 5-man training team and smaller unit in SAVAK HQs for several years after training team left. CIA and SAVAK exchanged intelligence including information on Tudeh party. Gasiorowski, M.J. (1990). "Security relations between the United States and Iran, 1953-1978," pp. 255-56
Iran, 1953. CIA prepared an arrest list for the overthrow operation. Copeland, M. (1989). The Game Player, p. 190
Iran, 1953. U.S. Army colonel working for CIA under cover of military attache worked to organize and train intelligence organization for Shah. Trained on domestic security, interrogation. Primary purpose of (Bakhtiar's intelligence unit later to become SAVAK) to eliminate threats to Shah. Gasiorowski, M.J. (1990). "Security Relations Between the United States and Iran, 1953-1978" p. 150
Iran, 1954. Year after coup American cryptographic experts and CIA agent played important part in rooting out conspiracy army officers linked to Tudeh Party. Kwitny, J. (1984). Endless Enemies, p. 165
Iran. During Shah's reign, thousands people killed. Many killed at Shah's directive. Rafizadeh, M. (1987). Witness, p. 134
Iran, 1983. CIA identifies to Iranian government 200 leftists who were then executed. The Nation, 12/13/1986, p. 660
Iran, 1983. In 1983, when the Tudeh party was closed down, the CIA gave the Khomeni government a list of USSR KGB agents operating in Iran. Two hundred suspects were executed, 18 USSR diplomats expelled and Tudeh party leaders imprisoned. Washington Post, 1/13/1987, A1,8
Iran, 1983. To curry favor with Khomeni, the CIA gave his government a list of USSR KGB agents and collaborators operating in Iran. The Khomeni regime then executed 200 suspects and closed down the communist Tudeh party. Khomeni then expelled 18 USSR diplomats, and imprisoned the Tudeh leaders. Washington Post, 11/19/1986, A28
Iraq: Watch List
Iraq, 1963. CIA supplied lists of communists to Baath party group that led coup so that communists could be rounded up and eliminated. Cockburn, A. and Cockburn, L. (1991). Dangerous Liaison, p. 130
Israel: Death Squads
Israel. Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir headed a special hit squad during his ten years in Mossad. Shamir headed the assassination unit from 1955-64 that carried out attacks on perceived enemies and suspected Nazi war criminals. Shamir recruited former members of the Stern Gang. Washington Times, 7/4/1992, A8
Israel, 1992. Article, "How Israeli Commandos Are Waging an Undercover War In Occupied Territories." In January 1992, Israeli army launched all-out offensive to end "Red Intifadeh." Undercover units "Arabized" produced a rash of deaths under controversial circumstances leading to claims commando units are death squads. Since Intifadeh began in 1987, 775 Palestinians killed; 680 more slain by their brethren mostly for collaboration. Human-rights organizations contend Sayarot shoot first and ask questions later. Time 8/31/1992, pp. 49-50
Israel, 1992. Israel's assassination squad, Duvdevan or Cherry has killed one of its own by mistake. Intelligence Newsletter, 7/23/1992, p. 5
Israel, 1992. Israeli army had discharged commander of undercover unit for issuing orders to shoot at Palestine activists. Unit code-named Samson has had three commanders fired or placed on trial within three years. More than 30 Palestinians killed this year by undercover troops, who usually dress as Arabs. Washington Post, 8/26/1992, A14
Israel, Honduras, 1981-89. In 1981 Leo Gleser, "co-owner" of International Security and Defense Systems (ISDS) — a leading Israeli "security" firm (Israeli Foreign Affairs 2/1987, 5/1987, /1987, 2/1988, 3/1989) identified repeatedly as an Israeli entity — began building Battalion 316, a unit of Honduran military intelligence which disappeared, tortured, then killed its victims. Honduran General Walter Lopez Reyes who C-I-C Honduran armed forces 1984-86, said "we had Israeli advisers in Special Forces. They seconded to Special Forces by Israeli mod, although they came officially as non-governmental." Their front [was] they [were] training security groups but [they really gave] special operations courses on how take over buildings, planes, hostages...Contras also taking courses... coordination between them and CIA. Israeli Foreign Affairs, 4/1989, p. 1,4
Israel, South Africa, 1986-91. Israel trained members of Inkatha hit squads aimed at African National Congress, a disillusioned former leader of Zulu organization has revealed. Israeli Foreign Affairs, 2/20/1992, p. 3
Israel. Ranks as fifth largest exporter of arms in world, according CIA estimates, and has become essential element global counterinsurgency business. "Hit lists" used by death squads in Guatemala have been computerized with Israeli assistance and Uzi machine guns the standard weapon of death squads. Covert Action Information Bulletin (Quarterly), Summer 1988, p. 5
Italy: Watch List
Italy, 1950-59. All Italian "SIFAR" counterespionage officers collected biographies on every deputy and senator. List increased to include Ecclesiastics: 45,000 dossiers on them alone, 157,000 altogether, 30,000 dealing with Italians in world of business and industry. Drop copies went to CIA. De Lorenzo's outfit to become a tool for CIA. Tompkins, P. (Unpublished manuscript). Strategy of Terror, pp. 8-12
Italy, 1959-67. Carabinieri drew up plan Piano Solo — for paramilitary to intervene in order to restore public order. Secret services had massive program of surveillance of Italian political and business figures. This partly intended to identify left-wing suspects who would be rounded up and imprisoned in concentration camps on Sardinia. Investigation revealed creation of personal intelligence dossiers began in 1959 and 157,000 files amassed. SIFAR (military intelligence) dossiers emphasized unfavorable significance. SIFAR dossiers routinely deposited at CIA HQs. SIFAR planed microphones in Papal apartments and President's Rome residence. Operation ordered by de Lorenzo at request of CIA station chief Colby. Some years earlier Rome CIA station chief Thomas Karamessines had asked General de Lorenzo, then head of SIFAR, for dossiers on [left-leaning] politicians and in particular for Moro's circle of collaborators. Willan, P. (1991). Puppetmasters, pp. 35-7
Italy, 1960-70. General de Lorenzo, whose SIFAR became SID, implemented new Gladio project to neutralize subversive elements. Known as parallel SID, it reached into nearly every institution. Group set up at request of Americans and NATO. Knights of Malta, as well as freemasonry, and its most notorious lodge — Propaganda Due, or P-2, far more influential. Licio Gelli, a knight. Joined U.S. Army's CIC. To ferret out dissidents, they prepared watch lists on thousands. 157,000 files found in Ministry of Interior. CIA obtained duplicates. Covert Action Information Bulletin (Quarterly), Summer 1994, p. 24
Italy, 1960-70. Operation Solo — a planned coup against a leftist government did not occur — but it was based on Operation Gladio. Giovanni de Lorenzo, as chief of secret services, compiled dossiers, including tapes and photos, on some 150,000 people — priests, politicians and unionists. He drew up plan to arrest many politicians, take over radio and TV, seize offices and newspapers of left-wing parties. De Lorenzo was organizing a duplicate of Operation Gladio in case left gained too much power. "Statewatch" compilation, filed June 1994
Latin America: Death Squads
Latin America, labor. AIFLD collected detailed information about Latin American labor leaders under pretext surveys necessary for AID-financed worker's housing projects. AIFLD able obtain personal and political history union members, with address and photos. Given CIA role in Chile, Uruguay and Brazil coups, among others, it probable this information passed to military regimes and their secret police. DL p. 238 from Lernoux, P. (1982). Cry of the People. pp. 212, 220
Liaison, 1960. Target lists maintained by all Western Hemisphere division stations. Maintain in case local government asks for assistance in preventive detention of dangerous persons. Agee, P. (1975). Inside the Company: CIA Diary, p. 114
Latin America. CIA organizes right wing terrorist organizations that attack and assassinate leftist politicians and others without implicating foreign governments. Groups include "La Mano Blanco" and "Ojo Por Ojo" (Guatemala), "La Banda" (Dominican republic), and "Death Squad" (Brazil). Counterspy, 3/1973, p. 4
Latin America. CIA trained assassination groups such as Halcones in Mexico, the Mano Blanca in Guatemala, and the Escuadron de la Muerte in Brazil. NACLA (magazine re Latin America) 8/1974, p. 11
Latin America, 1953-84. The activities of the death squads, formed under CIA sponsorship in 1954 Are loosely controlled by an international organization known as La Mano Blanco (the White Hand). The front group is the CAL, Latin American Anti-communist Federation, the Latin American affiliate of the World Anti-communist League. Jack Anderson, Washington Post, 1/13/1984
Latin America. Terrorist groups created in most countries. Groups such as "La Mano Blanco" attack and assassinate leftist politicians and others feared by military governments, doing so without implicating police or military. CIA implicated in attempts to organize the right into terrorist organizations. Counterspy, __/1973, p. 4
Latin America, 1960-95. Colonel Alpirez accused killer of American innkeeper and guerrilla leader, graduated from School of Americas in 1989. Other notable alumni include: Manuel Noriega and Omar Torrijos, former Panamanian strongmen; Roberto D'Aubuisson, leader of Salvadoran death squads; Roberto Viola and Leopoldo Galtieri, leaders of argentine dirty war; Michael Francois, former Haitian police chief; 19 of 27 Salvadoran officers cited for murder of six Jesuit priests; 10 of 12 Salvadoran officers involved in El Mozote massacre; 105 of 247 Colombian officers cited for human rights violations in 1992; and, former dictators of Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru. Time. 4/10/1995, p. 20
Latin America, 1976. An Argentinean told Scherrer, legal attache (FBI) Santiago, that Operation Condor, a nascent program among military intelligence services of some Latin American countries designed to locate and eliminate one another's fugitive terrorists and exiled dissidents. Ambitious leader of Chilean DINA trying to institutionalize process. Branch, T. and Proper, E. (1983). Labyrinth, p. 123
Latin America, Operation Condor, Paraguay, 1970-92. 12/1992 a Paraguayan judge in a police station found documentary history of decades of repression and U.S. intelligence cooperation with Paraguay and other regional dictatorships. Archives detail fates of hundreds, possibly thousands, of Latin Americans secretly kidnapped by right-wing regimes of the 1970s. Paper trail revealing elusive conspiracy among security services of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay to eliminate foes without regard to borders. Sketchy outlines of Operation Condor, can be partially filled in. Some of documents already disappeared. Finders had unearthed jumbled mountain of papers outlining police and military intelligence activities during recently overthrown Stroessner regime. HQs of Paraguayan technical police revealed more documents. 4 tons records. Data confirmed arrest and killing of politicians and exchange of prisoners with Argentina, Chile and Uruguay. Discovered documents a bombshell that led to arrest of some of Stroessner's old regime. Southern Cone repression killed 50,000, disappeared 30,000 — the majority in Argentina and 400,000 imprisoned. U.S. gave inspiration, financing and technical assistance for repression. CIA's technical services division (TSD), provided electrical torture equipment. Covert Action Information Bulletin (Quarterly), Fall 1994, pp. 7-13
Latin America, 1993. James Carroll wrote editorial about U.S. Army's School of Americas in Fort Benning. It is "the U.S. school that teaches militaries how to torture." Among renowned alumni are various Latin American strongmen, including dictators in Bolivia, Argentina, El Salvador and Panama. In Peru 6 of army officers charged with recent murders of 9 students were School of Americas alumni. In Honduras, 4 of the high-ranking officers who helped create "Battalion 316" death squad graduated from the school. In Columbia, the list of officers designated by human rights organizations as worst offenders reads like an honor roll from Fort Benning. In El Salvador, 2 of 3 officers cited for the assassination of Archbishop Romero, 3 of 5 convicted of killing 3 Maryknoll nuns and their lay associate, and 19 of the 26 officers implicated by United Nations. "Truth Commission" investigation of murder of Jesuits, were graduates. "For decades alumni of the School of Americas have helped fill morgues and mass graves of an entire continent." Colonel Louis Michel Francois has been most closely linked to Haiti death squads, and he is an alumni of the school just as is General Raoul Cedars one of those CIA agents. Z Magazine, 2/1994, p. 24
Mexico: Death Squads
Mexico, 1957-89. The Mexican DFS (Federal Security Directorate) like many Western-hemisphere intelligence organizations was creation of CIA. DFS has state of the art computer and records systems. Through DFS CIA able to keep tabs on all embassies in Mexico City. DFS works closely with U.S. In the suppression of leftists and political parties. In early 1970s, Nazar created the Brigada Blanca, a right-wing death squad that killed hundreds, probably thousands of Mexican students and political activists. Zacaris Osorio Cruz, a member of death squad, testified in Canada that, between 1977-82, he part of team that killed between 60-150 people. Penthouse, 12/1989
Mexico, 1977-89. U.S. looked the other way when Nazar, head of DFS used his infallible (interrogation) techniques on behalf American agencies while he carried out hundreds, perhaps thousands of political executions of Mexican leftists and political dissidents. DFS (Federal Security Directorate) administering drug traffic. Penthouse, 12/1989
Nicaragua: Watch List
Joseph Adams, a former Marine intelligence officer, who served as chief of security for Aldolfo Calero, helped maintain a list of civilians marked for assassination when Contra forces entered Nicaragua. The Progressive, 3/1987, p. 24
Nicaragua: Death Squads
Nicaragua, 1983-89. Enrique Bermudez, a Contra leader, said in Contra raids on economic targets in northern Nicaragua, particularly coffee plantations and farming cooperatives, any resistance brought brutal retribution. Commandantes in field authorized to select those to die. Bermudez ordered prisoners to have throats cut rather than waste bullets. Terrell, J., and Martz, R. (1992). Disposable Patriot, p. 149
Nicaragua, 1985-89. "Death squad" reports re Sandinistas first circulated by the CIA-funded Puebla Institute in 1991 as coming from the UN and OAS. When checked out, this proved to be not true. Unclassified, 9/1992, p. 14
Nicaragua, circa 1940-79. Under name Anti-Communist League Nicaragua. Conservative estimates say 30,000 died four decades prior 1978-79 civil war. Lernoux, P. (1982). Cry of the People. pp. 81, 94
Norway: Watch List
Norway, 1947-90. Operation Gladio, formed in 1947, kept track of communists and became part of intelligence service in 1948. Norwegian branch exposed in 1978, when an arms cache discovered. "Statewatch" compilation filed June 1994, p. 12
Panama: Watch List
Panama, 1989-90. U.S. says 90 prisoners now held in Panama. Most of those detained had been picked up by U.S. Forces based on wanted lists compiled by U.S. and Panamanian authorities. Washington Post, 1/19/1990, A16
Panama, 1989. Several hundred people on list Endarra government seeks to detain. They arrested by U.S. troops. Most political activists and labor leaders were wanted. The Nation, 1/29/1990, p. 115
Paraguay: Watch List
Paraguay, 1972-83. The Paraguayan government expelled an author and released a document supplied by the U.S. Embassy. The document, marked secret, includes the author among a list of Paraguayans said to have visited the USSR bloc. Washington Post 2/5/1983, A1,21
Philippines: Death Squads
Philippines. Article "Death Squads in the Philippines," by Doug Cunningham. Covert Action Information Bulletin (Quarterly), Winter 1988 pp. 22-3
Philippines. Military used hunter killer unit called scout rangers to find enemy and either attack or report back to battalion combat teams. Blaufarb, D.S. (1977). The Counterinsurgency Era, p. 28
Philippines. Probable U.S. support for vigilante death squads in the Philippines. Used in coordination with other programs making up a total low intensity conflict profile. National Reporter, Fall 1987, pp. 24-30
Philippines, 1950-54. Military man who helped Lansdale was Charles Bohannan and Lansdale's chief Filipino associate was Colonel Napoleon Valeriano whose "skull squadrons" beheaded suspected Huks. Karnow, S. (1989). In Our Image, p. 350
Philippines, 1969-83. Marcos' land reform failed and he approved creation of "Monkees" a group used to intimidate and even murder Marcos' rivals. Karnow, S. (1989). In Our Image. p.378
Philippines, 1973-83. In Philippines 1,166 persons were killed from 1972-83. Human rights groups say most of victims were opponents of President Marcos. Washington Post, 4/12/1984, A21
Philippines, 1986-87. "Vigilante Terror" a report of CIA-inspired death squads in the Philippines. National Reporter, Fall 1987, pp. 24-31
Philippines, 1986. See chapter "Direct U.S. Role in Counterinsurgency." includes psywar operations, vigilante and death squads. USIA anti-communist campaign of distributing films and written materials. Film "Amerika" shown. Use of Asian-American Free Labor Institute Operations. In 1985, AAFLI spent up to $4 million on organizational efforts, the money coming from the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). Bello, W. (1987). U.S. Sponsored Low Intensity Conflict in the Philippines
Philippines, March 1986. Reagan signs finding increasing CIA involvement in Philippine counterinsurgency operations. New Aquino government is allegedly perpetrating a purge of opposition, carried out by more than 50 death squads. Ramsey Clark, who investigated death squad activity in 1987, wrote in June that "the victims of vigilante violence are overwhelmingly poor farmers, workers, slum dwellers, and others who are pushing for significant land reform, wage increases and protection workers' rights, as well as those who oppose U.S. military bases." Upsurge in death squad activities are coincident with increased CIA aid and was preceded by visit to Philippines by Maj. Gen. John Singlaub. The Nation, 9/19/1987, pp. 259-60
Puerto Rico: Watch List
Puerto Rico. FBI has institutionalized repression. It created "subversive" lists with names of more than 150,000 "independentistas" who often find themselves thrown out of work. FBI agents organized and trained death squads within the Puerto Rican police department NACLA (magazine re Latin America), 8/1990, p. 5
Puerto Rico: Death Squads
Puerto Rico, 1978. "Puerto Rico's Death Squad Requiem on Cerro Maravilla: the Police Murders in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Government Cover-up." A book by Manuel Suarez reviewed in the Progressive, 12/1988, pp. 40-42
Russia: Watch List
Russia, 1994. FBI to open Moscow office with an eye on nuclear trafficking. FBI has about 20 posts abroad at U.S. Embassies with its agents serving as legal attaches. They range in size from one agent to as many as eight, plus support staff. FBI director Freeh said the FBI working to set up joint police/intelligence data base with authorities in Russia and Germany. Washington Times, 5/26/1994, A3
South Africa: Watch List
South Africa, 1962. A tip from a paid CIA informant led to 1962 arrest of Nelson Mandela leader of the African National Congress. A CIA officer claimed "we have turned Mandela over to the South African security branch." Washington Post, 6/11/1990, A18
South Africa: Death Squads
South Africa. Article, "South African Death Squad Plot: A Missing Piece to a Puzzle the Media Won't Solve," by Jane Hunter. Extra, 11/1992, p. 26 South Africa. See article "South African Death Squads." Covert Action Information bulletin (Quarterly) Summer 1990, pp. 63-66
South Africa, 1980-89. Details of South Africa's death squads by a former police Captain Dirk Coetzee. Group tracked and killed ANC activists in Swaziland, Botswana and Lesotho. Newsweek, 11/27/1989, p. 56
South Africa, 1980-90. Apartheid's fiercest warriors in 1980s were South Africa's army special forces, police force known as Koevoet (crowbar), and Portuguese-speaking "buffalo" battalion who ran a campaign of assassination and sabotage against the African National Congress. Newsweek, 9/14/1992, p. 45
South Africa, 1991-92. 75 COSATU (labor union) members killed during past two years by security forces. Many other attacks. Briarpatch magazine (Canada), 10/1992, pp. 55-6
South Africa, 1992. Slaughter in South Africa. Newsweek 9/21/1992, p. 57
South America: Watch List
South America, 1970-79. U.S. Legal attache Buenos Aires, FBI agent Robert Scherrer, sent cable to D.C. Describing operation. Operation Condor the code-name for collection, exchange and storage intelligence re leftists, communists and Marxists. Established between cooperating intelligence services in South America to eliminate Marxist activities. Operation provided for joint operation against targets in member countries...third and secret phase of operation involves formation of special teams from member countries who travel anywhere in world to carry out sanctions up to assassination against terrorists from member countries. Special team from Operation Condor could be sent to locate and surveil target. When located, a second team would be sent to carry out sanction. 1979 Senate Report, based on CIA files, says "such a phase three operation planned in 1974 and planned on killing 3 European leftists" — one Carlos. Plot foiled when CIA discovered it and warned host countries — France and Portugal. U.S. military officers sent under auspices of AID oversaw formation of technical police. One folder of archives has correspondence between Paraguayan ministers and U.S. Army Colonel Robert Thierry, who was serving as "public administration adviser," who supervised formation of the technical police. Letters from FBI agent Scherrer advising Paraguayan police re targets. CIA also worked with Paraguayans. Deputy DCI, Vernon Walters, visited country in 1976 who apparently approved abortive effort to get false passports for 2 Chilean DINA agents — Armando Fernandez and Michael Townley — who en route to U.S. To assassinate Orlando Letelier. The case of Eugenio Berios. Covert Action Information Bulletin (Quarterly) 12, 57, 8, 9
South America: Death Squads
South America, 1976. Letelier killed by right wing Cuban exiles called "Gusanos" who are paid and trained by CIA and "Chilean Gestapo" DINA. Gusanos regularly engage in terrorism against Cuba and Latin American and Caribbean countries. Tactics include blowing up airplanes, embassies, fishing boats, and kidnappings. Gusanos connected with police of other right wing governments such as Venezuela. Certain gusano operations directed by CIA; Other unilateral operations of DINA. Counterspy, 12/1976, p. 10
Syria: Watch List
Syria, 1949. Following CIA coup of March 1949 CIA officer reported over "400 Commies" arrested. Middle East Journal 57
Syria, 1949. The Husni Za'im coup of 30 March result of guarantee CIA that once firmly in power, the U.S. would give de facto recognition with de jure to follow in a few days and pointed out targets to be seized. Gave him a list of all politicians who might be able to rally resistance. Copeland, M. (1989). The Game Player, p. 94
Thailand: Death Squads
Thailand, 1965. Death squads. Lobe, T. (1977). United States national security policy and aid to the Thailand police 67-70
Thailand, 1973-76. General Saiyut Koedphon, deputy head of CSOC and close ally of CIA, admitted that CIA was collaborating with a variety of Thai security agencies, including CSOC. Similarly, deputy director of police, Withun Yasawat, said he was receiving CIA advice and reports as late as 1974. American indoctrination of CSOC and border patrol police during 1960's produced U.S. desired objectives. "Nawaophon" created ISOC officers who in turn has close contacts with CIA, employed covert tactics to search out "subversive elements" within the Thai population. Counterspy, Summer 1980, p. 14
Thailand, 1973-76. The Krathin Daeng (Red Guars), were groups of rightist students with police support that had over 100,000 members including government employees, soldiers, policemen, etc. Group received support and assistance from the internal security command (where CIA had a presence) and the Thai Santiban aka Special Branch. The Red Guars implicated in numerous bombings, killings, shooting and harassment of labor leaders, peasant leaders, etc. Indochina Resource Center Study, 1/1977
Thailand, 1976. A high-ranking official of Seni Pramoj government told a foreign visitor few weeks before October 6 coup, both Nawapon and the Red Gaurs were being financed by CIA. Counterspy, 12/1976, p. 52
Thailand, 1976. Over 10,000 students, professors, political figures, labor and farm leaders arrested since coup. U.S. military aid increased. New junta used CIA-trained forces to crush student demonstrators during coup. 2 right-wing terrorist squads suspected for assassinations tied directly to CIA operations. Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, v9 #3, 9/1977, p. 2
Thailand, 1976. Red Gaurs, an organization of the extreme right, staged provocations against progressive students and assassinations of activists of farmers' federation of Thailand. The number of assassinations by right wingers soared in April 1976 during parliamentary elections. Defense minister Pramarn Adireksan, leader of right wing Thai National party, openly proclaimed the slogan "the right kill the left." Syrokonski. (1983). International Terrorism and the CIA, p. 117-118
Thailand, 1976. Thai border police, element of police most involved in counterinsurgency and which CIA concentrated most of its efforts, carried out an assault by fire against essentially unarmed students, killing at least 100. Counterspy, 12/1976, p. 52
Turkey: Watch List
Turkey, 1971. Coup carried out by counter-guerrilla, the CIA, the Turkey military and Turkish military intelligence (MIT). CIA solely interested in protecting American interests. CIA assisted MIT in 1960-69 in drafting plans for mass arrests of opposition figures similar to the pattern followed in Thailand, Indonesia and Greece. In single night generals ordered 4000 professors, students, teachers and retired officers arrested. They tortured. Counterspy, 4/1982, p. 25
Uruguay: Watch List
Uruguay. CIA agent associated with death squads. Every CIA station maintained subversive control watch list of most important left wing activists. Gave names families and friends. Frankovich, A. (1980). On Company Business. TV transcript, 5/9/1980, pp. 51-3
Uruguay, liaison, 1964. Biographical data and photos. Uruguay has national voter registration that effective identity card system. From liaison service CIA station gets full name, date and place of birth, parents names, address, place of work, etc. and id photos. Information invaluable for surveillance operations, for subversive control watch list and for a variety of other purposes. CID-361
Uruguay: Death Squads
Uruguay, 1970-72. CIA operations officer used cover of AID public safety advisor to help set up Department of Information and Intelligence (DII). DII served as a cover for death squad. Counterspy, 5/1979, p. 10
USSR: Watch List
USSR, 1990 KGB Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov said KGB to protect against anti-Communist forces. Said western intelligence exploiting current instability in USSR. Certain radical movements being masterminded by foreign support. Certain groups had written "blacklists" of people who must be neutralized. Washington Post, 12/12/1990, A18,20
USSR, 1990. KGB's Kryuchkov accuses CIA and other western intelligence agencies of gathering information on workers' movements. Washington Post, 12/23/1990, A1,22
USSR, East Germany, 1949-57. League of Free Jurists (UFJ) kept a blacklist of offenders against justice — particularly lawyers and police — and published their activities. Named were marked men, whether they came to West as refugees or as accredited representatives of East Germans. Hagan, L. (1969). The Secret War for Europe, p. 200
USSR, Iran, 1982. Vladimir Kuzichkin, a senior KGB officer in Tehran, defected to the British. CIA had a sharing agreement with MI6 and became privy to contents of two trunks full of documents. From those documents CIA prepared name lists of more than one hundred people, mostly Iranians, working as secret agents in Iran for the USSR. Casey allowed this list be handed to the Iranians — who executed them. Persico, J. (1991). Casey, p. 301
Vietnam: Watch List
Vietnam, 1965-68. U.S./Government of Vietnam create list of active NLF for assassination. After 1968 Tet offensive, names centralized to Phoenix coordinators. Collect names of tens of thousands NLF suspects. Military operations such as My Lai use Phoenix intelligence. By 1973, Phoenix generates 300,000 political prisoners in South Vietnam. Counterspy, May 1973, p. 22
Vietnam, 1965-70. Details re Vietnam. From 1965-68 U.S. and Saigon intelligence services maintained an active list of Viet Cong cadre marked for assassination. Phoenix program for 1969 called for "neutralizing" 1800 a month. About one third of Viet Cong targeted for arrest had been summarily killed. Security committees established in provincial interrogation centers to determine fate of Viet Cong suspects, outside of judicial controls. Green Berets and Navy Seals most common recruits for Phoenix program. Green Beret Detachment B-57 provided administrative cover for other intelligence units. One was Project Cherry, tasked to assassinate Cambodian officials suspected of collaborating with North Vietnamese, KGB. Another was Project Oak targeted against South Vietnamese suspected collaborators. They controlled by Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities, which worked with CIA outside of General Abrams's control. Stein. J. (1992). A Murder In Wartime, pp. 360-1
Vietnam, 1967-73 CIA developed Phoenix program in 1967 to neutralize: kill, capture or make defect Viet Cong infrastructure. Viet Cong infrastructure means civilians suspected of supporting Communists. Targeted civilians not soldiers. Phoenix also called Phung Hoang by Vietnamese. Due process totally nonexistent. South Vietnamese who appeared on black lists could be tortured, detained for 2 years without trial or killed. Valentine, D. (1990). The Phoenix Program, p. 13
Vietnam, 1967-73 District Intelligence Operations Coordination Center (DIOCC). Dien Ban center a model for all of Phoenix. Bldg 10' x 40'. Manned by two U.S. Soldiers, 2 Census Grievance, one Rural Development cadre, and one Special Branch. DIOCC intelligence clearinghouse to review, collate, and disseminate information. Immediate local reaction. Americans kept files of sources, Viet Cong infrastructure and order of battle. Reaction forces 100 police, 1 PRU unit, guides from census grievance. Marines screened civilian detainees using informants and DIOCC's blacklist. Valentine, D. (1990). The Phoenix Program, p.126
Vietnam, 1968-69. Until late 1968, Saigon had run a program under which 500,000 ID cards were issued. Viet Cong made fake ones and many stolen. Viet Cong during Tet assigned teams to go door-to-door to collect them. Saigon reissued cards in 10/1968. By 1 May 1969, number of cards issued was 1.5 million. Adams, S. (1994). War of Numbers, p. 181
Vietnam, 1968. Phoenix program quota of 1800 neutralizations per month. Viet Cong Infrastructure System (VCIS) fed 3000 names Viet Cong infrastructure into computer at Combined Intelligence Center political order of battle section. Beginning of computerized blacklist. In Saigon DIA, FBI and CIA used computers. Until 1970 computerized blacklist a unilateral American operation. Valentine, D. (1990). The Phoenix Program, 259
Vietnam, 1968. U.S. advisors worked with Government of Vietnam counterparts to establish a list of those who were active with the NLF and who were vulnerable to assassination. Counterspy, 5/1973, p. 21
Vietnam: Death Squads
Vietnam. Counterterror teams aka Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRU). Six or dozen men carried out carefully planned forays, capturing or killing identified communists. Blaufarb, D.S. (1977). The Counterinsurgency Era, pp. 210-11
Vietnam, 1960-93. Montagnards recruited in early 1960s by Special Forces to fight Viet Cong. Did not surrender until 1992, when they yielded weapons to UN forces in Cambodia and brought to U.S. About 600 live in North Carolina. Paul Campbell, former SF who first American to recruit them. Kay Reibold head of Vietnam highlands assistance project. Montagnards live in small apartments around Raleigh with low-paying jobs. In 10/1961 Campbell, then a SF Sergeant, sent by CIA to recruit Montagnards. They to form village security, but soon being used for long-range reconnaissance and in highly mobile strike forces that hunted Viet Cong for weeks at a time. "We killed many Vietnamese." Article by W. Booth. Washington Post, 12/27/1993
Vietnam, 1965. CIA station helped create census grievance units. CIA funded, trained and guided counter terror teams who per Chief of Station de Silva, were "to bring danger and death to Viet Cong functionaries." Corn, D. (1994). Blond Ghost: Ted Shackley and the CIA's Crusades, p. 175
Vietnam, 1966-71. Phoenix operation designed to help U.S. military reach crossover point, where dead and wounded exceeded Viet Cong's ability to field replacements. In April 1967, President Johnson announced formation of Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) for pacification. Robert Komer as deputy commander of MACV-CORDS. CORDS budget about $4 billion from 1968-71. CORDS the management structure for pacification programs. Personnel both military and civilian. By 1971, 3000 servicemen, advisers to ARVN, placed under CORDS. 1200 civilians by 1971. U.S. AID responsible for material aid. State and USIA also provided personnel. But CIA played the crucial role. CORDS reinstated civic action teams under name Revolutionary Development cadre. RD program formed teams of 59 South Vietnamese, divided into 3 11-man security squads and 25 civic action cadres. Teams to spend 6 months in a village to fulfill "Eleven criteria and 98 works for pacification." 1. Annihilation of ...cadre; 2. Annihilation of wicked village dignitaries; etc. System placed 40,000 two-way radios in villages. Land reform failed. (Photos of Phoenix propaganda material). Teams helped create Regional and Popular Forces (RF/PFs). Ruff-puffs, suffered high casualties. They represented half of South Vietnamese government forces, they had 55-66% of casualties. They inflicted 30% of Communist casualties. Underground paramilitary effort called Phoenix, which included a "census grievance," stay-behind. He actually a spy. All information fed into intelligence coordination and exploitation program. Vietnamese at Komer's request set up staff that, with CIA, was responsible for coordinating intelligence reports on Viet Cong Infrastructure. Information from census grievance, military, police reports. paramilitary units, including CIA's Provincial Reconnaissance Units and ruff-puffs. Arrestees — those not killed when captured — taken to Provincial Interrogation Centers (PIC). Also regional prisons and a national center. All financed by CIA. Problems of coordination and jealousy. Numerical quotas created saying how many VCI to be eliminated each month. Torture used in questioning. Manning, R., (ed), (1988). War in the Shadows: the Vietnam Experience, pp. 55-65
Vietnam, 1966. In 1966 recycled counter terrorists called Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRU) and managed by CIA officer in CORDS RDC/O Office. Valentine, D. (1990). The Phoenix Program, p. 117
Vietnam, 1968. CIA issued two handbooks in June 1968. One "the Viet Cong Key Organization From Central Level Down to Village and Hamlet Levels." Second a manual of procedures from Saigon to DIOCCs. One report said "as DIOCCs and PIOCCs have refined data bases, gained experience, and mounted more operations against targeted individuals, the neutralization rate... over 1000 per month for last 4 months." Gia Dinh "has more than quadrupled monthly rate of killed, captured and rallied." Valentine, D. (1990). The Phoenix Program, p. 190
Vietnam, 1971. William E. Colby on July 19, 1971, before Senate Subcommittee testified that CIA's Operation Phoenix had killed 21,587 Vietnamese citizens between January 1968 and May 1971. Counterspy, December 1978, p. 6